# Workplace Flexibility Policies and Wage Growth: Do Organizational Characteristics Matter?

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**ABSTRACT**

This paper explores the wage trajectories of workers using flexible work practices to see how employers evaluate such workers under a variety of organizational settings. Using data from the 1989-2002 panels of the National Longitudinal Study of Youth and fixed-effects regression techniques, we assess the comparative impact of having a flexible schedule, working from home, and working reduced hours on the wage growth of mothers, fathers, and non-parents. We further explore differences in the size of wage penalties based on occupational sector, firm size, and occupational characteristics such as customer or client contact and supervisory authority. Results show that mothers suffer from flexible work practices more than fathers and non-parents, although women without children sometimes show negative effects of policy use on wage growth as well. With respect to organizational characteristics, the negative effects of flexible work practices on mothers' wage growth are accentuated in small firms, lower level occupations, female-dominated occupations, non-union jobs, public-sector work, and jobs with low personnel/client contact.

## INTRODUCTION

Academics and policy makers alike recognize the desirability of more flexible workplaces for American workers who are increasingly squeezed for time to attend to family and personal needs (Gornick and Meyers, 2004; Heymann, 2000). Surveys of employers show an increase in the number of flexible workplaces in the United States (Beers 2000). To understand the full impact of this transformation on wage inequality, information on the wage consequences of flexible work practices is needed. Many scholars fear that employees using flexible work arrangements will pay a steep price in foregone earnings and promotions as employers differentiate between traditional workers and those using flexible work options (Epstein et al., 1999; Williams, 2000). This research addresses whether such penalties exist, explores theoretical reasons why they exist, and whether they differ depending on characteristics of the worker (gender, parental status) and the characteristics of the job (occupational sector, firm size, etc.).

The business press and academic literature are full of qualitative accounts of workers who are afraid to use available flexibility policies because they believe their work careers would suffer as a result (Crittenden, 2001; Hochschild, 1997; Williams, 2000). Unfortunately, this mostly anecdotal literature has not been the subject of rigorous empirical inquiry. Prior work targeting mothers' experiences with workplace flexibility (as the group with the strongest interest in flexibility and greater utilization of policies where present) showed large negative effects of reduced work hours and telecommuting on managerial and professional mothers' wage growth over time (Glass, 2004). But focusing on mothers alone leaves several important questions unanswered about the *processes* leading to wage stagnation among workers using flexible work arrangements.

Theoretically and empirically, it is important to disentangle the motivation for using workplace flexibility policies from the actual use of such policies. In particular, the stigma often placed on workers who openly display their family care responsibilities (by being pregnant in the workplace, bringing a child to a meeting, or leaving early for a school event, as examples) may create depressed wage growth

that appears to be the result of using flexibility policies. Perhaps mothers who used flexibility policies were making their caregiving obligations visible and salient relative to mothers who did not use such policies and thus more carefully hid their domestic responsibilities from employers and coworkers. If, however, childfree workers' use of flexibility policies also creates negative effects on their subsequent wage growth, scholars can be assured that it is the workplace practice rather than family status of the worker that is producing the compensation penalty.

Secondly, it is important to disentangle the organizational contexts in which flexible work practices are penalized or ignored in judging worker productivity. Not all jobs are equally difficult to modify to accommodate worker preferences for flexibility. While research shows that flexible work options are most available to managerial and professional workers, for example, these workers are also likely to be more heavily penalized if they use flexible options because constant availability and schemas of work devotion predominate (Jacobs and Gerson, 2004; Williams 2000). Theory suggests that the penalties for flexible work should be stronger in larger and more bureaucratically controlled work environments, in jobs where workers are asked to synchronize their work with others, where work is organized around customer or client availability, and where workers are responsible for supervising others. For example, law firms frequently sideline part-time workers for partnership or pay increases because they are felt to be unable to meet the demands of large clients or complicated cases (Epstein et al. 1999).

## BACKGROUND

### Potential links between policy use and wages/wage growth

Many human resource professionals believe that flexible work practices are good for workplace productivity because they resolve those workplace issues that prevent workers from positive performance evaluations (workplace stress, excessive absenteeism, tardiness, fatigue, interference from caregiving obligations, etc.). Scholars such as Johnson and Provan (1995) and Weeden (2005) point out that workplaces with flexible work practices enable workers, especially those with caregiving responsibilities,

to perform at their peak capacity rather than forcing them to conform to work structures that hobble their efforts to succeed. If true, the productivity of workers in the aggregate should rise with the use of flexible work practices and should be associated with enhanced wage growth over time. This productivity enhancing effect should particularly lead to higher wage growth among those most impeded by rigid work schedules and long hours of work, namely mothers of dependent children. Anderson, Binder, and Krause (2003), for example, argue that the jobs most likely to produce a motherhood wage penalty are those that require relatively long fixed work hours on an inflexible schedule. In this scenario, flexible work practices are positive enhancements of productivity, which then get translated into higher wages over time for the workers who use them relative to what they could have expected without them.

Several theories about the processes that might lead to lower wage growth among workers using flexibility policies also exist, however. Economists have frequently modeled family care as a competing interest for workers that absorbs time and energy that could be spent on workplace production (Budig and England, 2001). Flexible work practices may allow, or even encourage, workers to expend more effort in family care than they otherwise would attempt. To the extent that workers use flexibility policies to free up time and energy for family care, then, their productivity should be lower than similar workers unimpeded by care work.

While flexibility in time and place do not necessarily result in lowered work effort or productivity, flexibility in volume might. Whether reductions in work hours lower productivity per hour is a highly contested issue. Some scholars emphasize the opposite - low marginal productivity gains of longer work hours above a threshold of about 30-40 hours per week due to fatigue and "slacking" (Crittenden, 2001; Williams, 2000). In this same vein, empirical evidence shows years of part-time and full-time employment experience have substantively similar effects on women's subsequent wages (Waldfogel, 1997), though scholars disagree about the extent to which part-time work experience enhances subsequent wages[1]. In neoclassical economics, prorating annual wage increases by weekly

[1] See Blank (1990), Corcoran, Duncan, and Ponza (1983), Glass (2004), and Russo and Hassink (2005).

work hours would make conceptual sense only if productivity improvements (through experience) were linearly related to hours worked per week. Given the absence of strong empirical evidence that this is true, this analysis combines all workers working at least 20 hours per week, avoiding only workers whose time at work may be insufficient to obtain maximum productivity growth from experience.

Empirical research has documented both the existence of a wage penalty for having children among employed mothers (Anderson, Binder, and Krause, 2003; Budig and England, 2001; Waldfogel, 1997) and a housework/child care penalty for workers regardless of gender (Noonan, 2001; Stratton, 2001). The wage penalty for motherhood (which does not extend to fathers) cannot be unequivocally attributed to lower workplace productivity rather than employer discrimination, however. In these studies, the obvious sources of worker productivity such as education, job tenure, general work experience, etc. are controlled. While the empirical evidence demonstrating a housework/child care penalty seems more consistent with economist's predictions, and some research has indeed shown a link between the use of flexibility policies and greater housework/child care among employed mothers (Noonan, Estes, and Glass, 2007), none of the wage impact of flexibility was due to greater housework and child care time among users (Glass, 2003). Meanwhile, Silver and Goldscheider (1994), using earlier panels of the National Longitudinal Surveys, found that neither flexibility benefits nor hours worked at home increased housework time at all among women workers. Thus, it does not seem that the wage costs of workplace flexibility are due to users spurning work to increase their involvement in family care.

However, given a constant housework and child care burden per worker (that for structural and cultural reasons is higher on average for mothers than other workers), mothers who need employer flexibility may find themselves restricted in their job search to those employers willing to provide such flexibility. This may result in sub-optimal matching processes on wages for mothers compared to other workers, leading to lower starting wages and slower wage growth than such workers could achieve without any limitations on their employment. Flexible work options thus become compensating wage differentials for mothers who more aggressively seek them out and use them than other workers. Fathers

and non-parents may find they have access to flexible work options serendipitously, and their use of such policies would therefore not affect their wage growth.

While economists have theorized *real* productivity deficits among those workers who provide care for family members, social psychologists have emphasized that even the *expectation* of lower productivity can create bias in supervisors' performance evaluations and pay decisions (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004). If parenthood becomes a salient feature of a workers' identity, as it might if they work part-time or a flexible schedule, supervisors and co-workers might activate stereotypes of involved parents in their appraisal of that colleague's contribution to the work unit. In qualitative interviews, workers frequently report that they avoid using flexibility policies even when desired because use might draw attention to them as committed family care providers rather than "ideal workers" (Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997; Williams, 2000). Far fewer workers felt that they would actually *become* less productive workers if they used flexibility policies; in fact, many said they would be more productive and committed to their employer. A plethora of studies attest to the greater productivity of workers in family friendly workplaces (see Baltes, Briggs, Huff, Wright, and Neuman, 1999; Shephard, Clifton, and Kruse, 1996).

Ongoing experimental work on cognitive bias reveals the extent to which parenthood, and motherhood in particular, are status characteristics that invoke negative stereotypes about competency, productivity, and commitment in the workplace. Correll, Benard, and Paik (2007) undertook controlled laboratory studies showing how motherhood but not fatherhood operated as a source of unconscious bias in the evaluation of worker resumes. If this bias extends to actual work settings, then anything that makes a workers' status as a family caregiver visible could contribute to slower wage growth both directly through evaluation bias and indirectly through assignment to less demanding and important work tasks.

Status characteristics theory suggests that the operation of cognitive bias based on caregiving status should be gender neutral, affecting both women and men who are known to their employers as caregivers of their children. In reality, employers rarely have perfect information on their employees'

caregiving status, often not knowing who has children and who cares for those children. Unlike race or gender, which are obvious physical characteristics, caregiving status must be cued through employee behavior. Recent experimental work (Cuddy, Fidske, and Glick, 2004) suggests that the mere fact of motherhood invokes ability and competency biases against employed women, while fatherhood among employed men generally does not. Motherhood is almost synonymous with family care in American culture, while fatherhood is a much more ambiguous status that may even be perceived as evidence of enhanced commitment to work. Since mothers often ask their employers for flexible work arrangements to accommodate parenthood, their use of flexibility policies makes their caregiving status particularly noticeable, and may help explain the wage penalties they experience. According to qualitative accounts, fathers are much less likely than mothers to admit that their need for workplace flexibility is family related (Gerson, 1995; Powell, 1997), which better masks their family status and results in diminished effects of workplace flexibility on their wages. That is, being female may be the precondition for parenthood to invoke negative stereotypes about work commitment and productivity. Fatherhood and direct caregiving are so loosely linked that flexible work may not signal caregiving status among men.

While theories of cognitive bias suggest that the wage penalties for flexibility should be greater for women than men (and for mothers than fathers), an alternative argument based on gender deviance and conformity suggests that men might be even more penalized than women for nonstandard work practices. The logic underlying this prediction is that deviance from norms for constant time availability in the workplace produce negative sanctions against the offender whether male or female (Epstein et al., 1999). However, men who use flexible work arrangements to provide family care engage in a kind of double deviance -- against both conventional work patterns and conventional masculine gender expectations. Women who use flexible work arrangements engage in workplace deviance but conform to gender expectations about family care. In this sense, women's use of flexible work arrangements is both anticipated and predictable, making it less threatening to supervisor and employer control of the workplace. The "double deviance" argument suggest both that fathers' wage growth should suffer more

than mothers' from the caregiving signals elicited by flexible employment, and that childfree men should experience less stigma from flexible employment than fathers.

The double deviance argument has been used to explain why men are less likely to request flexible employment practices than women (Fried, 1998; Hochschild, 1997), less likely to use them when offered for family care (Fried, 1998; Negrey, 1993), and less likely to admit that they are using them for family care when they are (Blair-Loy, 2003). However, the fact that norms of gender conformity encourage men to deceive employers about their need for and use of flexible work arrangements also suggests that employers will have greater difficulty connecting the use of flexible work arrangements with family care among men. The signaling function of flexible work practices is not as strong for men, and thus cannot invoke the stronger sanctions predicted by the double deviance hypothesis. For this reason, we expect male gender to weaken the connection between flexible work practices and wage growth, while female gender enhances it, both among parents and among childfree workers[2].

**Past literature on policy use and wages/wage growth**

A small group of studies has explored the empirical relationship between workplace flexibility policy use and wages. Two cross-sectional studies find that the relationship between policy use and wages is positive (Gariety and Shaffer, 2001; McCrate, 2002). Gariety and Shafer (2001) use Current Population Survey data from 1989 and 1997 to explore whether use of flextime is associated with hourly wage, and, if so, whether the relationship differs based on the reason for using flextime. Even after controlling for work experience, education, occupation, industry, union membership, and other demographic characteristics, they find that flextime is positively associated with wages, specifically for women who use it for "transportation" reasons and for men who use it for "personal reasons." In another cross-sectional study, McCrate (2002) uses data from the 1991 Comparative Project in Class Analysis to explore the relationship between flexible work and hourly wage. Controlling for sex, marital status, industry, occupation, and authority and autonomy at one's job, McCrate finds that hourly wages are

[2] While this prediction logically follows for parents, the expectation of a similar gender difference among non-

significantly higher when workers have flexible schedules. For instance, workers who can decide arrival and departure times on their own earn wages that are 8.3% higher and workers who can decide on their own to take the day off earn 7.7% more in hourly wages.

Since none of these studies looked at the impact of policy use on wages *over time*, we can not make definitive conclusions concerning the causal impact of work-family policy use on wages, because the association may simply be spurious. These reported associations may be the result of unobserved heterogeneity between policy users and non-policy users; for example, policy users may simply be more work-committed than non-policy users, or employers offering flexible work may simply be more wage competitive and selective of productive workers than other employers. Based on these cross-sectional results we cannot conclude that using work-family policies *makes* workers more productive. Using longitudinal data allows researchers to control for any fixed sources of unobserved heterogeneity among workers and thus produces less biased estimates of the relationship between policy use and wages.

To date, two studies have explored the relationship between work-family policy use and wage growth using longitudinal data. Glass (2004) targets Midwestern mothers' experiences with workplace flexibility and wage growth over a seven-year period. Results show large negative effects of reduced work hours and telecommuting on managerial and professional mothers' wage growth over time. Use of schedule flexibility and childcare assistance had mostly mild negative effects or no significant effects on wage growth. Because Glass focuses only on Midwestern mothers in her study, we are unable to conclude whether the relationship between policy use and wage growth also holds for fathers and non-parents.

Using a broader sample of workers, Weeden (2005) looks at the wage effects of workplace flexibility (e.g., schedule flexibility, telecommuting) on wage growth over a one-year period. She uses the 2000 May Current Population Survey supplement and its 2001 follow-up of the same workers, and finds a significant wage premium for schedule flexibility, but no effect for telecommuting. Controlling

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parents assumes that even childfree women are viewed by employers as *potential* caregivers of future children, elderly parents, or spouses.

for previous year's hourly wage and a host of other demographic and human capital variables, men and women who work flexible schedules earn between 9.4 and 9.9 percent more in hourly wages compared to their fixed-schedule counterparts. She found neither gender nor parental status differences in the effects of schedule flexibility. Weeden (2005) also explored whether wage consequences of flexible work differs across occupation (professional, managerial, technical, sales, service, craft, and labor) for men and women, and found that the wage premiums are somewhat higher in nonmanual occupations. Weeden (2005) also found that wage premiums to flexible work are lower in bureaucratized systems (i.e., union jobs and public sector jobs). Because Weeden (2005) only examined one year's wage growth and had only weak controls for differential selection (e.g., the tendency for more productive employers and/or workers to use flexible work practices) however, her results are suggestive at best.

**Does organizational context matter?**

It seems likely that the effects of workplace flexibility policies on wage growth would differ based on job and organizational variables. Work environments are highly diverse in their need for constant face-to-face communication, their organizational culture regarding hierarchy, bureaucracy, and social conformity, and their accountability to external actors, all factors that might influence how workplace flexibility is perceived by decision-makers within the organization. Organizations can have features that alter either the actual productivity or perceived productivity of flexible workers.

In some environments, flexible work practices are more likely to interfere with actual worker productivity than in others. Where work needs to be centrally coordinated in time and space, where strong bureaucratic norms and procedures are followed, and where a high value is placed on workers continuous availability to customers or superiors, flexible work practices may interfere with the coordination of work and harm users performance evaluation. Fried (1998) and Blair-Loy (2003) both note that managers often claim that they cannot use flexible work practices because their presence is constantly needed to coordinate work and maintain contact with customers or clients. Nurses, retail sales workers, and receptionists face similar obstacles to flexible work practices. Osterman (1995) notes that

highly bureaucratized workplaces are less likely to implement work-family programs than decentralized high performance workplaces, citing the difficulty of supervising workers on flexible schedules and organizational reluctance to treat some workers differently from others.

As Ridgeway and Correll (2004) argue, positions of authority are also more likely to invoke negative stereotypes about the competence of family caregivers. Such positions are believed to require near continuous work availability and responsibility for the supervision of others' work, requirements that interfere with the continuous availability to family members demanded of caregivers. To the extent that flexible work signals family commitment, flexible work will be more heavily penalized in positions of authority (such as managerial and professional employment).

Particular organizational features are more likely to elicit cognitive biases against workers on flexible schedules as well. For example, predominantly male occupations are more likely to elicit negative stereotypes about the competency of caregivers than predominantly female occupations. As empirical work has shown (Kilbourne, England, Farkas, Beron, and Weir, 1994), predominantly female jobs are more likely to require nurturance towards others, a job characteristic consistent with the skills needed for family caregiving. The extent to which a job requires nurturance should thus determine the extent to which negative competency biases are aroused towards workers providing family care. Negative competency biases should strengthen as male domination of an occupation increases and nurturing content decreases.

Another group of workplace factors influences the ability of supervisors to act on either diminished productivity or perceptions of productivity among flexible workers by withholding pay. Private sector firms and nonunionized employers are generally acknowledged to have greater leeway in setting wages than public sector firms or government employers. Thus we would expect flexible workers in private, nonunion jobs to experience slower wage growth compared to flexible workers in unionized jobs.

These three categories of work variables can be used to help adjudicate the debate over the

processes leading to flexible work penalties where they exist. Actual productivity reducers include the importance of the provision of a client or customer service. Perceived productivity reducers include occupational status and occupational gender composition. Barriers to enacting penalties for flexible work include public versus private sector employment and union presence. The strength of the relationships between each of these sets of work variables and flexible work penalties can explicate the processes leading to penalties in compensation - actual reductions in productivity, perceptual distortions in productivity assessment, and work structures that permit or block discretion in pay setting by productivity.

Given the complexity of work organizations and labor processes, it is possible that the mechanisms driving flexibility penalties in the workplace differ for different groups of workers. In other words, interactions between work characteristics and worker characteristics may exist. In particular, the workplace characteristics that encourage cognitive biases against family caregivers may more strongly affect women workers. Cognitive biases elicited by flexible work practices are likely much stronger for women, who can be easily imagined as family caregivers. When female gender is combined with a male dominated professional or managerial work environment, the conditions may be especially ripe for flexibility penalties imposed on women that are not extended to men. By contrast, actual productivity reducers in the organization of work and organizational obstacles to pay penalties elicited by flexible work practices should be gender neutral in their impact.

## DATA and MEASURES

### Data

In this analysis we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (hereafter NLSY) begun in 1979 among a representative sample of 12,686 youth then aged 14-21. The NLSY is a national probability sample of young women and men living in the United States and born between 1957 and 1964. The sample was interviewed annually from 1979-1994 and biennially thereafter through 2002. By the 2002 survey wave, the total sample size was 7,724 with a retention rate across all years of

approximately 77.5%. The data contain an over-sampling of Hispanic, African-American, and economically disadvantaged youth, so sample weights to adjust the analyses to a representative sample are used here. The NLSY is a good data set for this research because it contains data on flexible work practices and contains substantial variation in marital and parental status, ethnicity, educational level, and occupational status, enabling tests of any flexibility-wage effect by worker characteristics and organizational characteristics. The only shortcoming of this data set is that the question on schedule flexibility refers to the availability of such a policy, not the workers' actual use of the policy.

Beginning in the 1989 wave of the NLSY, data are available on respondents' hours worked at home per week, usual number of hours worked per week, and whether a flexible work schedule was available. Since these questions on flexible work practices are our key independent variables, our analytic sample is restricted to survey years 1989-2002. This time period covers the years when respondents were in their thirties and early forties, which tends to be peak earnings growth years for those continuously in the labor force.

To these records, we appended occupational characteristics for each respondent's three-digit Census occupation code for their main job in each survey year. These occupational characteristics came from the O*NET or occupational network classification system used by the federal government, which replaced the old Dictionary of Occupational Titles in 2004[3]. From the O*NET data base, we use information for each job on the importance of customer or client contact, the degree of supervisory responsibility, and the importance of coordinating job tasks with others. We also append data from the 1990 U.S. Census Bureau on the percent of women and men in each detailed occupation category.

**Sample**

Our analytical sample includes respondents working for pay 20 hours per week or more during at least two survey years[4]. In addition, self-employed workers were excluded from the sample, since they presumably control both their work practices and pay. Full-time students and respondents in the military

[3] For more details on the procedure used to append these data see Glass and Porter (2006).

were also dropped from the analytic sample. Finally, we excluded respondents missing data on our key variables. See Appendix 1 for details on sample selection. Our final sample size is 46,909 person-years; 8,119 respondents (3,862 women and 4,257 men) contribute an average of 5.5 person-years of data (min = 2 and max = 10).

**Measures**

The primary dependent variable is the log of hourly wage in the respondent's primary job. This variable is constructed by NLSY staff using direct questions for respondents paid by the hour and approximated for those not paid by the hour, using information on monthly/annual pay, hours and weeks worked per month/year, and the presence of overtime pay or bonuses in compensation. Wages were converted to 2000 dollars for every year using the Consumer Price Index[5]. Hourly wages were then logged to adjust for the right skew in the distribution of wages. The independent variables are divided into three groups: flexible work practices, worker characteristics, and organizational characteristics.

**Flexible work practices.** To measure flexible work practices, we focus on three dimensions of flexibility - time, place, and volume. Flexibility in time exists when workers have control over their work schedules and can vary the hours they work to meet personal needs. *Flexible scheduling* is measured by responses to the question: "Does your employer make flexible hours or work schedule available to you?" Note that positive responses to this item indicate the *availability* of flexible hours but not necessarily the *use* of a flexible schedule on a regular basis[6]. Flexibility in place is indicated by the hours a respondent works from home or another off-site location. *Flexplace* is measured by the item: "How many hours per week do you usually work at this job at home?" Responses were recoded so that overtime hours of work at home are excluded, but hours at home before 40 hours per week are reached are included. We then

[4] We require at least two observations on each individual because the estimation technique used here entails wage differencing to control for unobserved, individual-specific fixed effects.
[5] We excluded a small number of respondents (less than 1 percent) who had hourly wages less than $2/hour or hourly wages greater than $150/hour.
[6] We attempted to measure the worker's actual use of a flexible schedule rather than mere availability. However, the NLSY survey does not provide the necessary survey questions to allow the creation of a flexible-use measure.

created a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent worked at least 5 hours per week at home.[7] Flexibility in volume occurs when workers lower their work hours below a full-time threshold (typically set at 30-35 hours per week). *Reduced work hours* are measured with this item from the NLSY: "How many hours per week do you usually work at this job?" Responses were recoded into a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent worked fewer than 30 hours per week.

Three variables are constructed for each respondent to indicate the *total months of availability/use of each flexible work practice at the current job* at each survey year. We only measure the use of flexibility policies at the current job because new employers may know nothing about past policy use, making the signaling function of past policy use especially weak in setting wages. This variable is constructed in two steps. First, we sum the number of weeks worked in the previous year at the respondent's main job for those respondents that indicated a given flexible policy was used/available at that job at the time of the survey. Since we do not know the exact date that the policy became available/was first used, this measure may be an overestimate of policy use/availability. This variable is assigned a value of "0" for respondents who indicated that the given policy was not used/available at the survey time. We only count months worked at the respondent's *main job* in order to be consistent with the flexible work policy and wage data, both of which refer to the respondent's main job. Second, we link the respondents' employers across contiguous survey years. If the job in a given year was the same job as the one held in the previous year, we add the months of policy use from the previous year to the current year to arrive at a cumulative measure of months of policy use at current job. If the job in a given year was a new job, previous policy months were not added to current policy months.
At the first survey (1989), the policy month variables will range between 0 and 12 (1 year*12 months). At the last survey (2002), these variables will range between 0 and 168 (14 years * 12 months).

**Worker characteristics.** Gender and race are demographic indicators available in the data. *Race* is not explicitly included in the models since it is a fixed characteristic and does not vary over time;

[7] We also created a continuous measure of *flexplace* by multiplying the "average hours worked from home in a given

it is implicitly controlled for in the fixed-effects modeling techniques. *Female* is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is female, and equal to 0 if the respondent is male. Gender is not explicitly included in the regression models, but we use it in order to run our models separately for women and men. *Parental status* is measured as a dummy variable indicating the presence of dependent children under 18 in the respondent's residence. *Marital status* is measured as a set of three dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is never married, married, or divorced/widowed. *Educational attainment* is measured as a set of four dummy variables indicating whether the respondent has less than a high school diploma, a high school diploma, some college, or a college degree or more. *Years of full-time work experience* since leaving school, *years of full-time tenure* (years at current job), and *number of jobs ever held* are also included in the models. *Usual hours worked per week* is also included in the model as a continuous variable and whether the respondent works a *fixed work schedule* is included as a dummy variable. Finally, dummy variables indicating whether the respondent *lives in the south* and whether the respondent *lives in an urban setting* are included.

**Organizational characteristics.** In our models, we include a set of five dummy variables indicating the respondent's current *occupation*: upper white-collar, lower white-collar, upper blue-collar, lower blue-collar, and farm/army.[8] Other job characteristics that are included in the models are whether the respondent is employed in the *private sector* and whether the respondent belongs to a *union*.

Three additional organizational variables are not explicitly included in the regression models, but we use them in order to run our models separately by the given characteristic. The first in a measure of *personnel/client intensity*. This is a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent works in an occupation with above-median scores on the following five dimensions: the importance of customer and

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month" with "total months worked from home." The results using this alternative measure are substantively similar to those presented here and are available upon request.

[8] More specifically, the occupations were defined as follows: upper white-collar includes professional, technical, managers, officials, and proprietors; lower white-collar includes sales workers and clerical; upper blue-collar includes craftsman and foreman; lower blue-collar includes laborers, service workers, private household workers, and operatives; and farm/army includes farmers, farm managers, farm workers, and armed forces.

personal service[9], importance of instructing[10], importance of management of personnel resources[11], importance of negotiation[12], and importance of personnel and human resources[13]. The second measure is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent works in a *male-dominated occupation.* We define male-dominated occupations as those with more than 75% male workers. The final measure is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent works in a *large firm*. We define large firms as those with an above-median number of employees (in our sample, the median firm size is 60).

**METHODS**

As a first step, descriptive statistics on the percentage of respondents who used each of the three flexible work arrangements are shown by demographic group (men and women, mothers and fathers, childfree men and women). We present these statistics in two ways. First, we classify each respondent according to whether he/she has *ever-used* each of the policies and/or *ever-been* a parent over the entire observation period. Second, we classify each person-year observation according to current parental status and current policy use. In the second case, a respondent may contribute some observations to the childless group and some observations to the parent group if he/she became a parent over the observation period. T-tests were used to determine whether there were significant (1) sex differences in policy use within each "parental status" group (all, parents and nonparents) and (2) parental status differences in policy use within each sex.

Next, we estimated fixed-effect models predicting individual change over time in wages as a function of variation in individual use of flextime, flexplace, and reduced hours of work. The

[9] Knowledge of principles and processes for providing customer and personal services. This includes customer needs assessment, meeting quality standards for services, and evaluation of customer satisfaction. Examples of occupations with low scores: electrical technician, construction laborer; examples of occupations with high scores: preschool teachers, bank teller, nurse.
[10] Teaching others how to do something. Examples of occupations with low scores: janitor, data entry; examples of occupations with high scores: elementary school teachers, coaches.
[11] Motivating, developing, and directing people as they work, identifying the best people for the job. Examples of occupations with low scores: laborers, truck drivers; examples of occupations with high scores: managers of firefighters, general managers.
[12] Bringing others together and trying to reconcile differences. Examples of occupations with low scores: telecommunication installer; examples of occupations with high scores: real estate agent, sales agent.
[13] Knowledge of principles and procedures for personnel recruitment, selection, training, compensation and benefits,

multivariate analysis assessed how use of each of the three types of flexible work practices affect wage increases over time for groups differing on gender, parental status, and occupational characteristics. Relevant demographic and personal characteristics are included as controls in all of our models. Fixed characteristics (i.e. race, ethnicity) are not included in the models as main effects because this modeling technique implicitly controls for any individual-level variables that do not change over time. The fixed-effects model took the form:

$$LnY_{it} = B_x X_{it} + B_z Z_{it} + u_i + e_{it},$$

where *i* indexes individuals, *t* indexes time (survey year), $Y$ represents hourly wage, $X$ represents the three measures of flexible work, $Z$ represents a vector of occupational, personal and family controls, $u$ is a person-specific fixed-effect, and $e$ is a random error term. Since our dependent variable is log wage, coefficients multiplied by 100 are interpreted as the percent change in hourly wage that would result from a unit increase in the independent variable. The model is estimated on the full sample, and then disaggregated into subsamples of mothers and fathers, childfree women and childfree men. We then compare across models to see whether the policy-use wage effect differs depending on gender and parental status. Finally, in order to determine if the policy-use wage effect differs depending on organizational characteristics, we estimate the main model six additional times based on whether or not the respondent works in (1) a union job, (2) a private sector job, (3) an upper-white collar occupation, (4) a large firm, (5) a job with a high level of personnel/client interaction, or (6) a male-dominated occupation.

**RESULTS**

**Descriptive Statistics**

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on policy use by gender and parental status. Panel A shows the percentage of respondents who have ever-used each of the three policies over the observation period[14].

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labor relations and negotiation, and personnel information systems. Examples of occupations with low scores: postal clerk, dishwasher; example of occupation with high score: human resources manager.

[14] In analyses not shown here, we identified occupations which were significantly positively correlated with ever-

We present this information by gender and parental status. Two main findings emerge from these results. Women are significantly more likely than men to have used each of the three policies, and schedule flexibility is much more prevalent than working from home or part-time work.

**[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]**

Among women, mothers are significantly more likely than childless women to work part-time. Mothers and non-mothers are equally likely to have ever had access to a flexible work schedule or to have worked at least 5 hours from home over the observation period. Among men, non-fathers are significantly more likely than fathers to have ever worked part-time. Fathers and non-fathers are equally likely to have ever had access to a flexible work schedule or to have worked at least 5 hours from home over the observation period.

Panel B of Table 1 shows the percentage of respondents who state that they use a given policy at any given survey year by gender and parental status. In Panel B, we see that women are still more likely than men to be using any of the three policies at any point in time, but the gender differences are not as large as in Panel A. Again, mothers are more likely to be working part-time compared to childless women, and they are also slightly more likely to be working from home. Compared to childless women, mothers have accrued more months of flexible work practices at their current jobs.

Compared to childless men, fathers are somewhat less likely to have access to a flexible schedule at any point in time, but they have accumulated more months of flexible schedule availability at their current job. Fathers are also less likely to be working part-time at any point in time, and they have slightly fewer months of part-time work experience compared to childless men. Fathers and non-fathers are similar with respect to work-from-home experience.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the other variables that are used in our regression

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using a flexible policy over the observation period. Examples of occupations correlated with the availability of a flexible schedule include: general managers; child, family, and school social workers; and mangers of retail sales workers. Examples of occupations correlated with "working from home" include: real estate agents; computer programmers; loan counselors; educational counselors; post-secondary teachers; editors; child care workers; and sales representatives. Examples of occupations correlated with a part-time schedule include: lawyers; teacher assistants; nursing aides; waitresses; cashiers; and truck drivers.

models. The average age of respondents in our sample is 33, and parents are approximately two years older than non-parents (statistics not shown). Women earn less on an hourly basis than do men ($14/hr versus $17/hr). Also, mothers earn less than childless women ($13/hr versus $15/hr), and fathers earn more than childless men ($19/hr versus $15/hr).

**[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]**

Most of the other control variables differ by gender within parental status group (values in bold), and by parental status within gender (values underlined). Women in our sample are more likely to be parents than men. Almost all the fathers in our sample are married (91 percent), whereas only two-thirds of mothers are married. For both sexes, parents are more likely to be married compared to nonparents. Educational differences by sex are pretty minor, but fathers have slightly more education than mothers, and childless women have slightly more education than childless men.

Compared to women, men have more full-time work experience and tenure, they have had held slightly more jobs, they work more hours per week, and they are somewhat less likely to work a fixed schedule. Non-mothers are more attached to the labor force than mothers; fathers are more attached to the labor force than non-father.

With respect to organizational characteristics, men are more likely to be in blue-collar occupations and women are more likely to be in white-collar occupations. Men are also more likely than women to work in a private sector, union-covered, male-dominated job. Women are slightly more likely to work in a large firm. Women and men are equally represented in jobs with a high level of personnel and client contact.

**Regression Results**

In Table 3a, we present the fixed-effects regression results. Irrespective of gender or parental status, an additional month of flexible schedule availability increases wage growth by between 0.1 and 0.2 percent (see row 1 of Table 3a). This positive relationship is likely due to the fact that we are measure availability, not use, of flexible scheduling; jobs that offer flexible scheduling may also have steeper wage

profiles than jobs that do not make flexible scheduling available to employees. Working from home has a positive effect on wage growth for all workers, except mothers. For mothers, every additional month of work-from-home depresses wage growth by 0.6 percent. For men and childless women, an additional month of work-from-home enhances wage growth between 1.0 and 2.4 percent (see row 2 of Table 2a). Finally, part-time work does not have a statistically significant impact on wage growth for men but does depress women's wage growth. Mothers' wage growth is reduced by 0.3 percent for every additional month of part-time work and childless women's wage growth is depressed by 1.8 percent for every additional month of part-time work.

**[TABLE 3a ABOUT HERE]**

In Table 3b, we present the estimates from our main model, by organizational context. In this table, we present only results for the women, since men showed no negative impacts of workplace flexibility on wage growth. Panel A shows results for mothers and Panel B shows results for non-mothers. We indicate significant relationships between policy months and wage growth with a "+" or "–" symbol, depending on the direction of the estimated coefficients, and we indicate non-significant relationships with a "NS." To begin, we find no really consistent pattern for the impact of flexible schedule availability on wage growth, although both mothers and non-mothers who work in union jobs, in large firms, or in upper white-collar occupations experience a boost to their wage growth as months of flexible schedule availability increases.

**[TABLE 3b ABOUT HERE]**

A more distinct pattern of results emerges for the two other flexible work arrangements. Mothers who work in a non-union or private firm are penalized if they work from home or work parttime, whereas mothers who work in a union or government firm are not financially impacted by using either of these policies. These results support our expectations that supervisor discretion in assigning pay rates will be greater in private and non-unionized firms. Findings are similar for non-mothers, except their work at home *enhances* wage growth (if they work in a non-union or private firm).

Results for the other occupational contexts are opposite of what we expected. We find that work-from-home and parttime work slows mothers wage growth but only for mothers who work in small firms, female-dominated occupations, non-professional jobs, or jobs that do not require a high level of personnel or customer interaction. Work-from-home and parttime work have no impact on wage growth for mothers in large firms, male-dominated occupations, professional jobs, or jobs with a high level of personnel/customer involvement.

**DISCUSSION**

The results reported here demonstrate (1) the disproportionately negative impact of workplace flexibility on mothers' wage growth, (2) the more benign impact of workplace flexibility on wage growth among women without children, and (3) the relative immunity of men from any negative impacts of workplace flexibility irrespective of their parental status. In theoretical terms, these results most closely support the "motherhood as status characteristic" perspective, in which women with children are disproportionately affected by any alterations from a standard work schedule. Mothers suffered significant negative wage consequences for working from home or part-time, the only group to exhibit both penalties.

The overarching failure of flexible work options to penalize men, whether with children or without, suggests that flexible work options themselves do not reduce productivity, or influence perceptions of worker productivity across the board. The occasional positive effect of telecommuting or reduced work hours on subsequent wages among men suggests that theories of enhanced performance from decreased stress and increased commitment may have some validity. Of course, it is also possible that such positive effects are the results of unspecified selection – that is, high productivity workers being rewarded for their performance by granting them permission to reduce their time at work or work from home. Yet the used of fixed effects modeling should minimize such tendencies, and maximize the probability that the results are due to increases in actual productivity.

The only policy that seemed to benefit all groups was the availability of schedule flexibility. This

finding complements the work of others who have shown flexibility increases with job status (Glass and Fujimoto, 1995). However, the actual *use* of schedule flexibility on a regular basis might display more negative results, especially for mothers.

In order to translate our results into concrete numbers, we simulated wage growth for a hypothetical women using the estimated coefficients from Table 3a. To begin, assume that we have a mother with the following (typical) characteristics: she is married, with a high school diploma, works in a lower white-collar job, in an urban area in the north. She works 40 hours per week with a fixed schedule, has 9 years of work experience, and has been working at her current job 5 years. She has not used any of the flexible policies at her current job. Her predicted wage is $10.39. If she continues working full-time, her predicted wage the following year will be $10.66; this 2.6 percent boost is due to an additional year of full-time work experience and tenure. Now assume this same woman chooses, instead, to start working part-time, 25 hours per week; if so, her hourly wage the following year will be $10.40 (essentially no wage growth). This woman has missed out on the boost that additional full-time work experience gives, and she has also been penalized for working part-time (0.3 percent for every month of part-time work). Finally, if the woman decided to continue working full-time, but works at least 5 hours per week at home, her hourly wage will be $9.92, a 4.5 percent drop from the previous year.

Turning now to the influence of organizational context on the wage penalties for flexibility, our results suggest that women, but not men, can be negatively influenced by organizational context. As was the case for flexible work policies overall, results are stronger for mothers than women without children. However, they do not always correspond to our theoretical expectations. While we expected that managing personnel or providing services to clients would make it difficult to work flexibly without losing productivity, it was actually in jobs scoring low on this dimension that penalties for flexibility were strongest for mothers. While we expected that high occupational status and predominantly male occupations would make mothers' deviance from traditional work patterns more noticeable, it was actually in lower status jobs and predominantly female work that mothers received the strongest penalties

for flexible work.

We did, however, find that certain organizational features proved to be barriers to enacting penalties for flexible work, as expected. Working in the public versus private sector or in a unionized job did eliminate the penalty for telecommuting or part-time hours among mothers, suggesting that work structures that block supervisory discretion in pay setting are effective in preventing wage penalties for flexible work among mothers.

While the pattern of results among the organizational variables does not eliminate the possibility that mothers experienced wage penalties for flexibility because of diminished actual or perceived productivity, they did challenge the common perception that flexibility will be riskier in lucrative, high status jobs involving the coordination of efforts among people. These are the type of jobs where reductions in productivity (actual or perceived) could be readily imagined. Instead, the results suggest that workers in lower status predominantly female jobs in small firms are the most vulnerable to wage penalties for work flexibility. It may be the case that these are the jobs where negative cognitive biases about mothers' job performance are strongest, or it may be the case that this pattern reflects the restricted job search options for mothers with limited education who seek flexibility in their employment. Prior research has demonstrated that these organizational characteristics (small firm size, lower occupational status, female domination) are associated with fewer, rather than more, flexible work options, suggesting that flexible work practices are less well institutionalized in these settings. Perhaps that low level of institutionalization means that mothers with lower levels of human capital seeking flexibility face a much more limited range of job options, which in turn lowers their achieved wage.

Future work would benefit by closer attention to job search processes, by better measurement of the availability as well as use of flexible work options, and stronger data on actual work productivity. Such data are, of course, exceedingly difficult to collect. Differentiating between actual productivity gains (or losses) and perceptions of productivity gains or losses by supervisors and managers remains the research conundrum of those seeking to understand the motherhood wage gap.

**Appendix 1. Sample Selection Details**

| Criteria | N | Percent Remaining |
|---|---|---|
| **Total Sample** | 12,686 | |
| Total person-records (each respondent has 10 records 89-94 96 98 '00 '02) | 126,860 | |
| **Sample restriction** | | |
| Exclude person-years when not-interviewed | 89,769 | 0.71 |
| Exclude person-years when not working | 65,547 | 0.52 |
| Exclude self-employed workers | 60,404 | 0.48 |
| Exclude military | 59,940 | 0.47 |
| Exclude students (currently enrolled in high-school or college) | 57,080 | 0.45 |
| Exclude person-years when not working at least 20 hours per week | 54,799 | 0.43 |
| **Missing data** | | |
| Exclude person-years with missing data on work policies | 52,223 | 0.95 |
| Exclude person-years with missing data on wages | 50,983 | 0.93 |
| Exclude person-years with missing data/outliers on controls | 48,962 | 0.89 |
| Exclude person-years with missing O*Net data | 46,909 | 0.86 |
| Exclude respondents with only 1 person-year of info | 46,909 | 0.86 |
| **Final sample size** | **46,909** | |
| Number of respondents | 8,119 | |
| Average number of observations per respondent (2-10) | 5.5 | |
| Number of male respondents | 4,257 | |
| Number of female respondents | 3,862 | |

**Table 1. Descriptive statistics on use/availability of flexible work practices, NLSY '89-'02**

| | All | | Parents | | Nonparents | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Women** | **Men** | **Women** | **Men** | **Women** | **Men** |
| **Panel A. Persons** | | | | | | |
| **Percent ever used policy over observation period** | | | | | | |
| Flexible work schedule available | **91%** | **88%** | **91%** | **87%** | 89% | 89% |
| Work from home (at least 5 hours/wk) | **19%** | **12%** | **20%** | **11%** | **18%** | **13%** |
| Work parttime (30 hours/week or less) | **50%** | **21%** | **54%** | **18%** | 33% | 29% |
| N (persons)[a] | 3,862 | 4,257 | 3,114 | 3,008 | 748 | 1,249 |
| **Panel B. Person-Years** | | | | | | |
| **Percent using policy at given point in time** | | | | | | |
| Flexible work schedule available | **57%** | **49%** | **58%** | **48%** | 57% | 51% |
| Work from home (at least 5 hours/wk) | **2%** | **1%** | **3%** | **1%** | 2% | 1% |
| Work parttime (30 hours/week or less) | **9%** | **1%** | **12%** | **1%** | **4%** | **2%** |
| **Average policy months at current job** | | | | | | |
| Flexible work schedule available | **7.33** | **6.65** | 7.76 | 7.66 | **6.60** | **5.54** |
| Work from home (at least 5 hours/wk) | **0.27** | **0.13** | **0.33** | **0.13** | **0.18** | **0.12** |
| Work parttime (30 hours/week or less) | **1.01** | **0.14** | **1.36** | **0.11** | **0.40** | **0.17** |
| N (person-years) | 21,165 | 25,744 | 14,154 | 13,370 | 7,011 | 12,374 |

Notes: These data are weighted. Values in bold represent significant differences by sex within parental status group ($p<0.05$). Values that are underlined represent significant differences by parental status group within sex ($p<0.05$).

[a]Split groups based on ever being a mother/father over observation period.

**Table 2. Descriptive statistics on wage, worker characteristics, and organizational characteristics, NLSY '89-'02**

| | All | | Parents | | Nonparents | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Variable** | **Women** | **Men** | **Women** | **Men** | **Women** | **Men** |
| **Wage** | | | | | | |
| Ln Wage | **2.47** | **2.69** | **2.41** | **2.78** | **2.57** | **2.60** |
| Wage (in 2000 dollars) | **13.69** | **17.21** | **12.89** | **18.70** | **15.07** | **15.59** |
| **Worker characteristics** | | | | | | |
| Parent | **0.63** | **0.52** | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Marital Status | | | | | | |
| Never married | **0.21** | **0.25** | **0.08** | **0.04** | **0.43** | **0.49** |
| Married | **0.58** | **0.61** | **0.69** | **0.91** | **0.39** | **0.29** |
| Divorced/widowed | **0.21** | **0.14** | **0.23** | **0.06** | **0.19** | **0.22** |
| Educational attainment | | | | | | |
| Less than high school | **0.06** | **0.10** | **0.07** | **0.11** | **0.03** | **0.10** |
| High school | 0.45 | 0.45 | **0.50** | **0.47** | **0.35** | **0.43** |
| Some college | **0.24** | **0.19** | **0.25** | **0.18** | **0.23** | **0.20** |
| College graduate or more | 0.25 | 0.26 | **0.17** | **0.24** | **0.38** | **0.28** |
| Work history | | | | | | |
| Years of full-time work experience | **9.49** | **11.43** | **9.41** | **12.71** | **9.62** | **10.02** |
| Years of tenure | **4.96** | **5.25** | **5.18** | **6.19** | **4.59** | **4.22** |
| Number of jobs | **8.72** | **9.28** | **8.37** | **8.70** | **9.32** | **9.91** |
| Usual work hours per week | **39.46** | **44.93** | **38.39** | **45.53** | **41.28** | **44.28** |
| Work schedule (1= fixed shift) | **0.89** | **0.87** | **0.90** | **0.88** | **0.89** | **0.86** |
| Region (1=South) | **0.39** | **0.34** | **0.40** | **0.34** | **0.36** | **0.33** |
| Urban | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.72 | 0.71 | 0.81 | 0.81 |
| **Organizational characteristics** | | | | | | |
| Occupation | | | | | | |
| Farm/army | **0.01** | **0.03** | **0.01** | **0.02** | **0.01** | **0.03** |
| Lower blue-collar | **0.09** | **0.23** | **0.10** | **0.24** | **0.07** | **0.22** |
| Upper blue-collar | **0.17** | **0.29** | **0.19** | **0.27** | **0.15** | **0.30** |
| Lower white-collar | **0.38** | **0.15** | **0.39** | **0.14** | **0.36** | **0.17** |
| Upper white-collar | **0.35** | **0.30** | 0.31 | 0.31 | **0.41** | **0.28** |
| Private sector | **0.85** | **0.88** | **0.85** | **0.88** | **0.86** | **0.89** |
| Union | **0.11** | **0.16** | **0.11** | **0.19** | **0.10** | **0.14** |
| Large firm | **0.53** | **0.48** | **0.54** | **0.49** | **0.52** | **0.46** |
| High personnel/client intensity | 0.26 | 0.25 | **0.25** | **0.27** | **0.28** | **0.24** |
| Male-dominated occupation | **0.08** | **0.48** | **0.07** | **0.50** | **0.09** | **0.45** |
| N (person-years) | 21,165 | 25,744 | 14,154 | 13,370 | 7,011 | 12,374 |

Notes: These data are weighted. Values that are in bold represent significant differences by sex within parental status group ($p<0.05$). Values that are underlined represent significant differences by parental status group within sex - differences between moms and non-moms, differences between dads and non-dads.($p<0.05$).

**Table 3a. Fixed Effects Regression Results Predicting Ln Wage, NLSY '89-'02**

| | | All | | Parents | | Nonparents | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Policy months at current job** | **All** | **Women** | **Men** | **Women** | **Men** | **Women** | **Men** |
| Flexible work schedule available | 0.001** | 0.001** | 0.001** | 0.001* | 0.002* | 0.002* | 0.001 |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Work from home | 0.006** | -0.001 | 0.017** | -0.006** | 0.024** | 0.010** | 0.017** |
| | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.002) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) |
| Work parttime | -0.002* | -0.004* | 0.003 | -0.003* | 0.001 | -0.018** | 0.002 |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.004) |
| N | 46,909 | 21,165 | 25,744 | 14,154 | 13,370 | 7,011 | 12,374 |

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. These models control for the following variables: parental status, marital status, educational attainment, years of full-time work experience, tenure, number of jobs, work schedule, hours worked/week, occupation, region of residence, urban residence, private sector, union, and year/period. Coefficients multiplied by 100 are interpreted as the percent change in hourly wage that would result from a unit increase in the independent variable.

**Table 3b. Fixed Effects Regression Results Predicting Ln Wage for Women, NLSY '89-'02**

**Panel A. Mothers, n=14,154**

| | Union[a] | | Private[b] | | UWC[c] | | Firm Size[d] | | Personnel/Client Intensity[e] | | Male-Dominated Occupation[f] | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Policy months at current job** | **No** | **Yes** | **No** | **Yes** | **No** | **Yes** | **Small** | **Large** | **Low** | **High** | **No** | **Yes** |
| Flexible work schedule available | NS | + | NS | NS | NS | + | NS | + | NS | NS | + | NS |
| Work from home | - | NS | NS | - | - | NS | - | NS | - | NS | - | NS |
| Work parttime | - | NS | NS | - | - | NS | - | NS | NS | NS | - | NS |
| N | 12,358 | 1,796 | 2,497 | 11,657 | 10,169 | 3,985 | 6,287 | 7,867 | 10,813 | 3,341 | 13,137 | 1,017 |

**Panel B. Non-Mothers, n= 7,011**

| | Union | | Private[b] | | UWC | | Firm Size | | Personnel/Client Intensity | | Male-Dominated Occupation | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Policy months at current job** | **No** | **Yes** | **No** | **Yes** | **No** | **Yes** | **Small** | **Large** | **Low** | **High** | **No** | **Yes** |
| Flexible work schedule available | NS | + | + | NS | NS | + | NS | + | + | NS | NS | + |
| Work from home | + | NS | NS | + | NS | NS | NS | + | NS | NS | + | NS |
| Work parttime | - | NS | NS | - | - | - | NS | - | - | - | - | NS |
| N | 6,232 | 779 | 1,197 | 5,814 | 4,337 | 2,674 | 3,211 | 3,800 | 5,114 | 1,897 | 6,395 | 616 |

Notes: "+" and "-" indicate significant relationship at 5%; NS = not significant at 5%. These models control for the following variables: parental status, marital status, educational attainment, years of full-time work experience, tenure, number of jobs, work schedule, hours worked/week, occupation, region of residence, urban residence, private sector, union, and year/period. Coefficients multiplied by 100 are interpreted as the percent change in hourly wage that would result from a unit increase in the independent variable.

[a] Indicates whether respondent is member of a union or is covered by a union contract.

[b] Indicates whether respondent works at a private company (versus a government job). Self-employed individuals are excluded from the analysis.

[c] Indicates whether respondent works in an upper-white-collar occupation, defined as: professional, technical, kindred, managers, officials, or proprietors.

[d] Indicates whether respondent works in a large firm, defined as those with more than the median number of employees (60).

[e] Indicates whether respondent works in an occupation with above-median scores on the following five dimensions: importance of customer and personal service, importance of instruction, importance of management of personnel resources, importance of negotiation, and importance of personnel and human resources.

[e] Indicates whether respondent works in an male-dominated occupation, defined as those comprised of more than 75% men.

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