How to Intervene in Civil Wars:

Strategic Interests, Humanitarianism, and Third-Party Intervention

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Abstract
This paper examines how major powers intervene in civil wars in other countries. Major powers can intervene through the UN or unilaterally. They can intervene with or without the use of force and in a neutral or a biased manner. I develop the theory that major powers' two contrasting incentives, strategic interests and humanitarianism, influence their intervention strategies. When strategic interests are at stake, major powers are more likely to consider the expected benefits and costs of intervention than the norms of intervention, such as multilateralism and neutrality. If major powers respond to humanitarian disasters, they are more likely to care about the norms of intervention than when they seek strategic interests. I empirically test how the motives of intervention affect the types of intervention, using competing risks models, based on a civil war dataset from 1944 to 1999. The findings show that exclusive strategic interests among major powers, such as ideology and former colonial history, are likely to result in unilateral and biased intervention, while common interests, such as oil, are likely to produce multilateral and neutral intervention. Contiguity is likely to be a strong factor resulting in the use of force. The findings also show that humanitarianism can be the significant motive that leads to multilateral intervention without the use of force, and neutrality may not be a consistent norm of humanitarian intervention.

Introduction

Facing civil wars in other countries, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Perm-5) must decide whether or not they intervene in civil wars, and whether to intervene through the United Nations (UN) or without help or authorization from the UN. Also, they must decide on the manner of intervention, whether to use force and whether to be neutral or biased in an intervention. In the Rwandan Civil war in 1993, the Security Council members decided to deploy UN peacekeepers with a neutral observer mission. However, in the Bangladesh civil war in 1972, neither the UN nor any major power intervened in the civil war. The Soviet Union intervened in the Afghanistan civil war in the late 1970s, with the use of force, unilaterally without authorization from UN. The US unilaterally intervened in Nicaraguan civil war in 1980s using military force and supporting only one side.

Major powers' options on intervention raise the following question: what factor determines the types of intervention? While a number of research projects have examined why states intervene in civil wars in other countries (Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Finnemore 2003; Western 2002), relatively few studies have investigated the types of intervention, whether unilateral or multilateral, biased or neutral between the sides in the civil war, and with or without use of force. The factors that determine the types of intervention are not well known. Whether intervention can positively contribute to peace in civil war states may depend on the types of intervention (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002; Fortna 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Therefore, if one identifies the factors influencing the types of intervention, one may be able to make an important contribution to an understanding of third-party intervention in civil wars.

I argue that major powers' two contrasting incentives, strategic interests and humanitarianism, influence how they intervene in civil wars. When major powers respond to strategic interests, the results will be unilateral intervention, biased intervention, and use of force. Conflicting strategic interests among the Perm-5 make it difficult for them to reach a consensus for multilateral intervention in the UN Security Council. Thus, major powers are likely to undertake unilateral intervention in civil wars where strategic interests are at stake, as long as they do not share each others' interests. Considering their own interests, major powers will support the side which is likely to protect or increase their interests, which means biased intervention. The expectation of achieving strategic goals can offset the costs of use of force and thus it can encourage major powers to use military force. However, if there are common strategic interests among major powers, they are more likely to engage in multilateral intervention than unilateral intervention.

On the other hand, if major powers respond to a humanitarian disaster rather than strategic interests, they are more likely to engage in multilateral intervention, neutral intervention, and intervention without the use of force. Multilateral intervention can help legitimize claims of the humanitarian cause for intervention. With humanitarian concern, major powers can relatively easily agree on multilateral intervention. When interveners have humanitarian motives, they are less likely to care about which party will contribute to their strategic objective, and thus they are less likely to have a biased position. The use of force which may increase the human costs including civilian casualties, will defeat the humanitarian purpose, and thus when major powers focus on humanitarian motives, they are less likely to use military force.

To define third-party intervention, I follow Regan (2000, 9-10). Regan's definition has two criteria: convention breaking and authority targeted. Convention breaking distinguishes

third-party intervention from the normal international influence. Authority targeted means that "the goals of intervener are directed at changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target society (Regan 2000, 9)."[1] The definition includes military intervention such as deployment of troops or equipment, sanctions, and the use of force indicated by military clashes, as well as economic intervention such as grants, loans, and sanction.

By major powers, I mean the five permanent members of the Security Council, United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and the United States (Perm-5). The Security Council has the authority to decide on UN intervention in civil wars, and only the 5 major powers have veto power over intervention. Thus, they have a decisive power to undertake UN intervention. By unilateral intervention, I mean intervention without help or authorization from UN. If a major power is involved in a civil war within UN, it is defined as a multilateral intervention. Biased intervention means when a major power intervenes in a civil war supporting only one side, either the government or the opposition. If a major power uses armed force resulting in military clashes, this is defined as the use of force.

Literature Review

Previous studies of third-party intervention in civil wars have mainly answered the following two questions: why do states intervene in civil wars in other countries and how does third-party intervention influence the settlement of civil conflict? For the first question, scholars found that intervention decision results from potential interveners' incentives. On the one hand, some scholars emphasize promotion of peace or humanitarian purposes (Zartman 1989; Finnemore 2003; Western 2002; Regan 2000). They argue that third-party intervention is an important tool to alleviate or prevent humanitarian disaster. Factors, such as the number of refugees in a civil

[1] The two criteria for third-party intervention used by Regan (2000) are from Rosenau (1968, 167).

war, can be important incentives which can encourage states to intervene in civil war. On the other hand, other scholars argue that third-party intervention is likely to be related to interveners' strategic interests (Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007). They contend that potential interveners consider the conditions of countries in civil conflict, such as their alliances, geographical location, colonial history, natural resources, and ideology. In addition, strategic interaction among potential interveners may influence their intervention decisions.

Previous studies have found that the types of intervention can significantly influence the duration of civil war and the likelihood of peace after civil war. Regan (2002) finds that biased intervention is more likely than neutral intervention to be associated with a shorter civil war. Regan (2002) also shows that multilateral intervention has no significant impact on the duration of civil war. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) found that balanced intervention which means equitable support for both sides in a conflict, is likely to result in a longer civil war. Focusing on the effects of intervention on peace after civil war, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Fortna (2004) found that multilateral intervention through UN can be a successful peacebuilding strategy likely to contribute to the end of the violence. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) contend that when the UN conducts an enforcement peacekeeping mission which does not require host government consent and may include the use of force, it can be more successful than a traditional peacekeeping operation.

Showing the causes and consequences of intervention, past research has made important contributions to the intervention literature. However, previous research leaves an important gap. Even though a number of studies have examined the determinants of intervention, it is not clear what factors determine the types of intervention. The consequences of intervention may vary with the types of intervention, but we do not know much about the determinants of intervention

types. Despite this gap, previous research on the incentives for intervention provides clues to what is missing, and shows how strategic interests and humanitarian norms influence intervention decisions.

Strategic interests

Scholars have investigated the strategic interests which encourage states to intervene in civil wars and how those interests affect the states' intervention decisions. The international influence model explains that the goal of intervention is the expansion of influence, and the decision on intervention depends on specific conditions of a country in civil conflict (Lemke and Regan 2004). Using Singer's internation influence model (1963) about when and how states will attempt to manipulate other states' behavior, Lemke and Regan (2004, 148) argue that "civil conflicts are situations in which many states may have powerful incentives to try to influence the outcome." Thus, Lemke and Regan (2004) view civil conflicts as intervention opportunities enabling states to expand their influence on civil war states. This model considers potential interveners as rational actors who evaluate the likely costs and benefits of intervention and decide whether and how to intervene, considering the anticipated costs and benefits of intervention (Lemke and Regan 2004, 149). Anticipated benefits are the effects of the future behavior of the state in which intervention has occurred on the intervening state (Lemke and Regan 2004, 153). In the pursuit of international influence on a civil war state, major powers may have expansionist or geopolitical ambitions and seek the consolidation of their hegemony (Stavenhagen 1996, 216).

Findley and Teo (2006), and Gent (2007) focus on strategic interactions among potential interveners as well as the relationships between potential interveners and the conditions of civil war states. States may intervene in civil war to protect the common interests of allies or to

counter the opposing interests of rival states, and thus "interrelated interventions are reflections of the interaction between a potential intervener's interests and the interests of other states" (Findley and Teo 2006). Gent (2007) argues that when there are common concerns such as concern for a humanitarian disaster in a civil conflict, states face a free rider problem, and thus they hesitate to intervene in such civil wars. Rather, for Gent (2007), a state is more likely to intervene in a civil war when its preferences diverge from an initial intervener's preference. Therefore, for Findley and Teo (2006) and Gent (2007), civil war intervention may be a result of strategic competition between potential interveners.

These previous studies argue that strategic rather than benevolent objectives influence major powers' decisions on intervention. They suggest that alliances, contiguity, former colony status, and ideological conflict are key elements of the strategic interests that cause civil war intervention. Lemke and Regan (2004, 153) show that neighbors, allies, and former colonial powers of a civil war state are likely to interact frequently with the civil war state, and will continue to do so in the future. Therefore, they are more likely to intervene. Findley and Teo (2006) also show that states contiguous to the same region as a civil war country are more probable interveners, and these states may resort to intervention as preemption against the danger of conflict spillover (Findley and Teo 2006). Many civil wars occur in former colonies, and warring factions often have strong ties to their former colonizers (Findley and Teo 2006). The former colonial powers want to maintain interests in their former colonies, thereby increasing the probability they will return to aid their favored groups (Findley and Teo 2006; Lemke and Regan 2004). Gent (2007) also shows that geographical contiguity and former colony history of civil war states can be important elements of strategic interests which encourage major powers to intervene in the states.

Civil wars fought over factional ideological differences provide an attractive target for intervention, as evident from the superpower interventions into the ideological conflicts in Nicaragua and Angola during the cold war (Findley and Teo 2006; Regan 2000). Scott (1996) asserts that the US interventions during the Reagan administration were undertaken to combat the communist threat. Yoon (1997) finds that, while economic interests such as trade and foreign investment were unlikely to be related to the US intervention decisions in Third World internal wars between 1945 and 1989, strategic interests like the communist presence and intervention by a Soviet ally were likely to lead to the US intervention in these wars.

Natural resources, such as oil, provide another strategic interest accounting for civil war intervention (Humphreys 2005). Ross (2004) found that natural resources tend to encourage outside actors to intervene in civil war. To gain access to oil after the end of a civil war, major powers may undertake a military or economic intervention. Civil war in the state exporting oil can threaten the oil supply to other countries, and make the global oil market unstable. Thus, major powers are likely to intervene in the civil war with the intention of rapid termination of the conflict.

These prior studies show that strategic interests can be important incentives for civil war intervention. They suggest the factors - alliances, contiguity, former colony status, ideological conflict, and access to natural resources - which influence intervention decisions. States intervene in civil war in other countries in order to preserve or expand their own international influence or access to natural resources. However, other scholars have showed that strategic interests alone cannot explain intervention in civil wars. Humanitarian concerns can be another important incentive for intervention decision.

Humanitarianism

In 1992, the US intervened militarily in the Somalia civil war with the UN where there were few strategic interests. Prior to the November in 1992 intervention, the Bush administration had objected to the US military intervention in the Somalia civil war because the conflict was not relevant to US vital interests (Western 2002). The important factor that changed the position of the administration was that 300,000 Somalis were killed by the summer of 1992 (Western 2002). In other words, humanitarian purpose was an important incentive for the US intervention in Somalia (Finnemore 2003).

The perception of humanitarian norms has changed historically and has been diffused throughout the international community. According to Finnemore (2003), a normative change has made the protection of humanitarian values important to the international community. Until the early twentieth century, there were no widely perceived norms with regard to human rights (Finnemore 2003). By the mid-twentieth century, normative concern for the protection of human rights had become widespread (Finnemore 2003). International organizations have reflected these normative changes, and have contributed to the spread of existing norms and the creation of new norms (Finnemore 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 1999). The UN Charter has provided the normative framework related to human rights and established the Genocide Convention in 1948 (Finnemore 2003). The US Congress established the Foreign Assistance Act for the protection of human rights in 1974, and the Carter administration emphasized human rights as the main theme of foreign policy (Huntington 1991, 91-92). Since the end of the Cold War, the UN and humanitarian organizations have increasingly emphasized that the international community and all states have the obligation to protect people threatened by civil conflict (Barnett and Weiss 2008). The evolution of humanitarian norms among states and the rise of the UN as a diffuser of norms can explain that states can have common humanitarian concerns in relation to civil wars in

other countries, and such humanitarianism may be an important incentive for civil war intervention.

However, there have been limitations on humanitarian intervention. The UN Charter enshrines two conflicting principles (Finnemore 2003). Article 2 preserves states' sovereign rights as the organizing principle of the international system, which means a rule of non-intervention, but Article 1 of the Charter emphasizes human rights and justice as a fundamental mission of the UN (Finnemore 2003). This contradiction in the Charter has often led the international community to hesitate to intervene in humanitarian crises. Therefore, the humanitarian concern of states or of the international community does not necessarily lead to humanitarian intervention by the UN. Only the Security Council can decide to intervene in a country, and thus whether the Perm-5, which have a veto, perceive a civil war as a humanitarian disaster can be an important factor in UN humanitarian intervention.

Scholars have examined when and how humanitarian concern leads a state to intervene in a civil war. They have used the example of US intervention in the Somalia civil war in 1992. First, media can influence states' intervention in civil war, the so called, a "CNN effect". Roberts (1993) argues that the US intervention in Somalia in 1992 was a response to the pressure of media. The images of starving people in Somalia, broadcast by television, led to the public's moral outrage, and affected the US decision on intervention. Jakobsen (1996) shows that humanitarian interventions are driven by a combination of the CNN effect and good chances of success, as governments are reluctant to take casualties when national interests are not involved. Second, Hirsch and Oakley (1995) contend that political leaders and key staffs' own moral outrage over the humanitarian disaster in Somalia led to the decision that the US should intervene in order to terminate or alleviate the disaster. Third, Western (2002) shows that the US

intervention in Somalia may have been related to pressure from liberal humanitarians belonging to NGOs.

These studies show that media can generate states' humanitarian incentives, and that political leaders' moral outrage or liberal humanitarian NGOs' pressure can influence governments' decisions on intervention. That is, the public's or government's perception of humanitarian disaster can increase the possibility of states' civil war intervention. Therefore, it can be said that besides strategic interests, humanitarian incentive can importantly affect intervention decision.

Past research on strategic interests and humanitarianism as causes of intervention shows that these two contrasting incentives can be explained by a rational choice and a normative theory, respectively. The studies show that when strategic interests are at stake, civil wars can be opportunities for the major powers to expand international influence or gain access to natural resources, and intervention decision will depend on the expected benefits and costs and strategic competition among potential interveners. If major powers have humanitarian motives, they are less likely to care about their own interests, and normative criteria can affect intervention decisions. The theories and findings of previous studies may imply that strategic interests and humanitarianism can affect how to intervene as well as whether to intervene. Both rational choice and normative theory which focuses on strategic interests and humanitarianism respectively can explain the relationships between interveners' incentives and the types of intervention, such as multilateral or unilateral intervention, neutral or biased intervention, and use of force or intervention without use of force.

Theory and Hypotheses

I argue that strategic interests and humanitarian incentives will influence the types of intervention. When strategic interests are at stake, major powers will primarily take into account the expected benefits and costs of intervention and other major powers' actions rather than norms of intervention and they will choose types of intervention which can maximize the expected benefits and minimize the costs. On the other hand, when major powers respond to a humanitarian disaster rather than strategic interests, they are more likely to take into account the norms of intervention which international communities have emphasized, such as multilateralism and neutrality, than when they pay attention to strategic interests.

< Figure 1. about here >

The Relationship Between Strategic Interests and the Types of Intervention

When a civil war involves major powers' strategic interests, they are more likely to rely on unilateral intervention without authorization from the UN in order to achieve their own strategic interest. Unlike humanitarian purpose which may be a common concern among major powers, when major powers pursue the expansion of international influence or try to deter competitors, it is difficult for them to get consent from the UN Security Council whose members are other major powers. When the strategic interests of the major powers differ, there are limits to Security Council involvement in civil wars (Cousens 2004, 113-114).

Fortna (2008) found that the UN peacekeepers are less likely to go into civil war states which are former colonies of the Perm-5 or contiguous to them because these conditions may be closely related to the Perm-5' strategic interests. One interpretation of this finding is that UN peacekeepers are less likely to go to civil wars related to major powers' strategic interests and are more likely to be motivated by humanitarianism. Another interpretation is that when their interests are at stake, major powers are likely to engage in a unilateral intervention without the auspices of the UN. Therefore, I argue that when there are conflicting strategic interests among

major powers, they are more likely to undertake unilateral intervention rather than multilateral intervention. Even though multilateral intervention may reduce the costs of intervention, conflicting strategic interests among major powers will not allow for multilateral intervention. Also, the expectation of serving their own strategic interests justifies the cost of unilateral intervention.

When there are strategic interests in a civil conflict, major powers as rational actors calculating costs and benefits of intervention will take into account which group in a civil war state is likely to serve their strategic interests. They will support the side, government or the opposition, which will serve their interest. Therefore, the strategic interests among major powers lead them to engage in a biased intervention rather than a neutral one. However, if there is no strategic interest, major powers are less likely to care about which side is likely to contribute to their own interests, and thus they are less likely to engage in a biased intervention.

Major powers must decide whether to use military force when they intervene in a civil war. If strategic interests are at stake, they are more likely to use military force. While the use of force may increase the costs of intervention and exacerbate a humanitarian crisis, it can bring a decisive victory for the side that the interveners support. When a group supported by an intervener wins a victory, the intervener can expand its influence on a targeted country. Scholars show that in order to maintain or expand influence on a state or a region, major powers can run the risks of the use of force in civil wars in other countries (Guelke 1974; Weisburd 1997). Therefore, interveners may believe that the expected benefits of the use of force may offset the costs. When a civil war is not associated with major powers' strategic interests, they are less likely to bear the costs of the use of force.

< Table 1. about here >

If a major power has a close military or economic tie to a civil war state through an alliance or former colony history, it may have an incentive to support their favored party using military force so that it can maintain its influence or increase the future interest in the civil war state. However, other major powers in the Security Council are unlikely to agree with such an intervention because they may perceive that the security of the civil war state serves the strategic interest of only one major power. Many cases show such patterns of intervention. For example, the US unilaterally intervened in civil wars in Latin American states such as Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, which are allied with the US, and supported the government side with the use of force. Major powers regarded the civil war in Sierra Leone in the 1990s as the United Kingdom's and Western Africans' problem and hesitated to engage in a military intervention, although they eventually deployed UN peacekeepers against the rebels after the international community raised attention to the humanitarian toll that the civil war was taking (Fortna 2008, 66-70).

Civil war in the state contiguous to a major power may give rise to a spillover effect which can expand conflict into the territory of the major power or the sphere of influence of the major power, and thus threaten the security of the major power or diminish the influence of the power in the region. Responding to such a critical strategic interest, major powers are less likely to seek the authorization for intervention from the Security Council. The major power intervenes to stop a civil war from threatening its security as quickly as possible or to help its protégé. In such a case it will undertake a biased intervention affecting the balance of power between the warring factions. The major power is likely to use military force not only because geographical contiguity causes the spillover effect but also because it can reduce the costs of deployment of military troops and equipment. For example, even though Russia has repeatedly intervened in the Georgian civil war using military force since 1992 by supporting the opposition, South Ossetia,

which favors Russia, the UN has not involved itself because only Russia's strategic interest is at stake.

If a civil war is associated with an ideological conflict, a major power is likely to support the side which is consistent with or is likely to accept its ideology. The Cold War era can be characterized by ideological competition between two super powers. During and after the Cold War, the grand strategy of the US has emphasized the diffusion of democracy, free trade, and open markets. Ideology can define a state's policy and political and economic systems. Therefore, facing ideological conflict, major powers may have motives to expand their own ideology or deter other major powers' ideology, and their future interests may depend on which party will win a civil war. With such a critical strategic interest, major powers are likely to undertake a biased intervention and may bear the costs of the use of force.

In sum, when a civil conflict involves exclusive strategic interests among major powers resulting from alliances, contiguity, former colony status, and ideology, they are more likely to intervene in civil wars unilaterally rather than multilaterally through UN. When they have exclusive strategic interests, they are more likely to engage in a biased intervention assisting the party which is favorable to them rather than engaging in neutral intervention. In addition, they may run the risks of using military force in order to achieve their own strategic interests.

However, all strategic interests are not necessarily conflicting among major powers. That is, major powers may have common strategic interests with which they can reach a consensus to intervene in a civil war multilaterally. Therefore, even multilateral intervention through the UN may reflect major powers' strategic interests. While Fortna (2008) contends that UN peacekeeping is not driven by major powers' greed, Gibbs (1997) argues that it is doubtful that policy makers in the major powers disregard economic and strategic interests when they decide

on UN intervention. When the strategic interests at stake in a civil war consist of abundant natural resources, particularly oil, intervention is likely to be multilateral since access to oil and a stable supply in the global oil market can be a common interest among major powers. However, the decision to undertake a biased intervention with the use of force is likely to be the same when common strategic interests like oil are at stake as when the interests at stake are exclusive to one major power. The interveners may want to break the balance of power between warring factions to terminate the conflict at an early stage and to stabilize oil supply into global market as quickly as possible. The major powers' interest in maintaining a stable oil supply justifies them to use force. As a result, I will test the following hypotheses about the effects of exclusive and common interests on intervention in civil wars by the major powers:

H_1: *If a civil war is related to major powers' strategic interests, the likelihood of major powers' biased intervention will increase.*

H_2: *If a civil war is related to major powers' strategic interests, the likelihood of major powers' use of force will increase.*

H_3: *If a civil war is related to major powers' exclusive strategic interests, the likelihood of major powers' unilateral intervention will increase.*

H_4: *If a civil war is related to major powers' common strategic interests, the likelihood of major powers' multilateral intervention will increase.*

< Table 2. about here >

The Relationship Between Humanitarianism and the Types of Intervention

If major powers respond to a humanitarian disaster caused by a civil war, they are likely to take into account the goal of humanitarianism, the provision of relief to victims, and the norms of intervention, such as multilateralism and neutrality, which the international community has emphasized. Such goals and norms can produce different types of intervention from those that result from strategic interests. Finnemore (2003, 73) argues that "humanitarian intervention must be multilateral to be legitimate; without multilateralism, claims of humanitarian motivation and justification are suspect." Legitimacy criteria for intervention derive from the shared principles, articulated most often through the UN, about consultation and coordination with other states before acting and the need for multilateral intervention (Finnemore 2003, 81). Multilateral norms create political benefits for conformity and impose costs for nonconforming action (Finnemore 2003, 81-82). The benefits and costs flow not from the material features of the intervention but from shared norms (Finnemore 2003, 81-82). Therefore, when major powers respond to a humanitarian disaster, they are likely to choose multilateral intervention through UN rather than unilateral intervention.

Multilateral intervention can be a useful strategy even in terms of the self interest of the interveners. It encourages sharing of costs for which the fixed burden-sharing mechanism of UN peacekeeping operations provides an institutional solution that reduces the risks of bargaining failures, lessens transaction costs, and alleviates the problem of free rider (Voeten 2005). When they have no strategic interest in a civil war, through multilateral intervention major powers can try to divide or even to avoid responsibility for a humanitarian disaster. For example, in the Rwandan civil war in 1993, the major powers decided to intervene through the UN with a neutral mission, which resulted in very limited operations.

When responding to a humanitarian disaster, major powers are likely to be indifferent between the sides in the civil war. One of the classical principles of humanitarianism is neutrality which means that "humanitarian organizations refrain from taking part in hostilities or from any action that either benefits or disadvantages the parties to the conflict (Barnett and Weiss 2008, 3)." These principles emphasize that "the essence of humanitarian action is to save lives at risk," and it should be "apolitical" (Barnett and Weiss 2008, 11). Therefore, if humanitarian intervention follows these principles, it should be neutral intervention. Also, interveners will refrain from using military force to avoid further death and destruction.

However, some scholars, practitioners, and humanitarian agencies argue that it is neither possible nor desirable to separate humanitarianism and politics and that humanitarianism cannot be apolitical (Barnett and Weiss 2008, 4). They argue that humanitarian interveners should distinguish perpetrators from victims and try to rebuild economy and promote democracy to remove causes of conflict. Such ambitious humanitarianism may result in biased intervention and the use of military force, in order to punish perpetrators and build a state fitting interveners' objectives. Assuming that humanitarian intervention is more likely to follow classic principles rather than ambitious goals, I argue that humanitarianism is likely to produce neutral intervention and avoid the use of force. I will test the following hypotheses about humanitarian intervention in civil wars by the major powers:

H_5: *When major powers repond to a humanitarian disaster caused by a civil war, the likelihood of multilateral intervention will increase.*

H_6: *When major powers respond to a humanitarian disaster caused by a civil war, the likelihood of neutral intervention will increase.*

H_7: *When major powers respond to a humanitarian disaster caused by a civil war, the likelihood of intervention without use of force will increase.*

Alternative Explanations for the Types of Intervention

There may be alternative factors which influence the types of intervention. First, the structural change of the international system can affect the types of intervention. Regan (2000) argues that while unilateral interventions dominated the international landscape throughout the cold war, multilateral interventions have become more salient after the cold war. The UN has been much more involved in civil wars since the end of the Cold War (Fortna 2004). Thus, the end of the Cold War may have affected major powers' decisions on the types of intervention. Second, the capability gap between a potential intervener and a civil war state can influence the types of intervention. This reflects the realists' conventional argument which focuses on the impact of power distribution on states' behavior. Third, the level of democracy of a civil war state can affect intervention decisions in that maintenance or change of the regime of a state may be a goal of major powers' intervention. Ikenberry (2000) argues that democratic promotion has been one of the US key foreign policies since World War II. Civil war may be a chance for regime change. Fourth, the level of institutionalization of regional international organizations can influence major powers' intervention decision. Previous studies find that highly institutionalized regional IOs can play a significant role in conflict resolution (Boehmer et al 2004; Hansen et al. 2008). Thus, if major powers consider the roles of regional IOs as conflict managers, the level of their institutionalization can affect major powers' decisions on intervention.

Research Design

For my empirical analysis, I use Regan's data (2002). The dataset include 150 civil wars from 1944 to 1999. In the dataset, civil war refers to organized combat between groups, where at least 200 fatalities were reported (Regan 2002). The data provide information about interveners and the types of intervention. Therefore, the dataset can provide an opportunity to estimate the effects of each independent variable on the types of intervention.

In order to test the hypotheses, I employ a duration model, the competing risks Cox model with time varying covariates. The model is effective for the purpose of this study in that inferences can be made regarding the influence of independent variables on the length of time from the start of a civil war to the occurrence of intervention as well as the occurrence or nonoccurrence of intervention (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Employing the Cox model, one can estimate how fast major powers respond to strategic interests or a humanitarian disaster with particular types of intervention as well as whether particular types of intervention occur.

The unit of analysis is a major power's decision on a civil war in a particular year. The 5 major powers that are potential interveners are matched with each conflict for each year during civil war.[2] Using this unit of analysis, I analyze the response of each major power to the particular conditions of civil war states or the characteristics of civil wars and estimate the effects of independent variables on the types of intervention. The use of time varying covariates can produce dependence among observations over time, and thus I use the robust estimator proposed by Lin and Wei (1989) to address the problem of temporal dependence. I assume that major powers' decisions on intervention types are made simultaneously, not sequentially, and thus there would not be selection problems. I analyze three models separately, comparing

[2] China is not regarded as a major power until 1971 because it was not a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

unilateral and multilateral intervention, biased and neutral intervention, and intervention with and without the use of force.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the duration from the start of civil war to the occurrence of the first intervention by a major power. I measure duration as the number of months. Although there may be multiple interventions by a major power in a civil war, there are few cases where the type of the second or third intervention is different from the type of the first intervention.[3] Therefore, the dependent variable measures the duration to the first intervention by each major power.

In the dataset, if intervention occurs in a given year, the observation is reported as "failure." If a civil war does not result in intervention, it is assumed to be under risk of failure until the civil war end or until it is right-censored by December 1999 (Aydin 2010). These observations contribute information to the risk set but contribute no information about duration to intervention (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The failure indicator is coded on a three-point scale according to the types of failure, that is, the types of intervention, in each model. For example, for the failure indicator of multilateral / unilateral intervention, non-intervention is coded 0, multilateral intervention is coded 1, and unilateral intervention is coded 2.

Independent Variables

The presence of strategic interests is measured by alliances, contiguity, former colony status, ideology conflict, and oil output. These variables are conventional proxies for strategic interests, which many scholars have used (Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Fortna 2008, etc.). Alliance is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether a civil war state is allied with a

[3] One might raise the problem that the use of force may follow the first intervention without use of force, and thus they are not competing outcome. However, in this paper, the use of force is defined as intervention resulting in military clashes. If a military clash between interveners and warring factions occurs after the first intervention, the intervention is coded as the use of force, otherwise coded as intervention without use of force. In this way, I operationalize the use of force and intervention without use of force as a competing outcome.

major power in a given year. The data for alliances is based on the Correlates of War (COW) dataset. Former colony status is also a dummy variable, denoting whether a civil war state was a former colony of a major power. I regard members of the former Soviet Union as its former colonies. For example, Georgia is coded as a former colony of Russia. To confirm former colonies of major powers, I use the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Colonial History dataset. The data on contiguity are obtained from the COW dataset. If a major power has geographic contiguity with a civil war state by land or up to 150 miles of water, it is coded 1, otherwise 0. Data on ideological conflict are based on Regan's dataset (2002). If a civil war was an ideological conflict, it is coded 1, otherwise 0. These four variables, alliance, former colony status, contiguity, and ideological conflict, are regarded as proxies for exclusive strategic interests in that they may only be associated with the self-interest of a particular major power.

As a proxy for common strategic interests, I use the oil output of a civil war state. The oil output means a civil war state's output of crude petroleum in thousand metric tons in a given year. The natural logarithm of the output is taken as the variable. Previous studies, examining the effect of oil as a strategic interest, have mainly measured whether or not a state is an oil exporter (e.g., Fortna 2008). Although it may be an effective measure, it misses information about the amount of oil produced by a state. Major powers are more likely to pay attention to how much oil a state produces than whether it is an oil exporter. There may be large differences in the amount of oil output among oil exporters. Therefore, the amount of oil output of a state may be a more effective measure than whether a state is an oil exporter. The data for the amount of oil output are based on Mitchell (2007).

My theory is that major powers can respond to a humanitarian crisis as well as strategic interests. The more serious the humanitarian crisis, the more likely major powers are to respond

to it. The level of a humanitarian disaster is measured by the number of refugees in a given year. One might argue that the number of civilian deaths in a civil war can be a proxy for a humanitarian disaster. However, it is difficult to distinguish the number of civilian casualties from the number of battle deaths. In addition, unfortunately Regan (2002)'s civil war dataset do not provide information about annual number of deaths. Therefore, I employ the number of refugees to measure a humanitarian disaster, which is based on Moore and Shellman's dataset (2004) for forced migration. The variable is the natural logarithm of the number of refugees fleeing from a civil war state.

Control Variables

Testing theory and hypotheses requires one to incorporate alternative factors into the models. First, to control for the structural change of the international system, I use a dichotomous variable, the cold war, which denotes whether a civil war took place after 1989. One can argue that the cold war variable might be identical to another variable, ideological conflict. However, even after the end of the Cold War, there have been many cases of ideological conflict. Correlation between the cold war and ideological conflict is 0.2, which shows that these variables are not identical. Second, the capability gap measures the ratio of a potential intervener's capability score to a civil war states' score. Data on the capabilities of states are obtained from the CINC score from the COW dataset. Third, the models control for the level of democracy of a civil war state in a given year. The data on the level of democracy are based on democracy scores from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). Fourth, I control for the effects of institutionalized regional IOs. There are a great number of regional IOs, but all regional IOs are not likely to have significant influence on major powers' intervention decision. Pevehouse (2005) suggests a set of 55 regional IOs which are likely to influence states in terms

of politics and economy. Out of the 55 IOs, I measure the level of institutionalization of IOs of which a civil war state is a member at a start year of civil war. To identify a civil war state's IO memberships in a given year, I use the COW Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) dataset. The scores of institutionalization are coded on a three-point scale, according to Boehmer et al. (2004)'s criteria for classification of IOs' institutionalization. Out of the multiple IOs in which a civil war state is a member, I take the score of the most highly institutionalized IO as a value of the variable. Finally, I control for country fixed effects because unobserved characteristics of major powers can affect intervention decisions. To do so, I use dummy variables for major powers, the US, United Kingdom, France, and Russia. A reference major power is China.

Empirical Analysis and Discussion

Tables 2-4 show the results of the competing risks Cox models of the types of major powers' intervention in civil wars. In using the Cox models it is necessary to check whether the models violate the proportional hazards assumption (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Diagnostic tests show that the assumptions are violated in the models for biased intervention and intervention with use of force. Therefore, for each model violating the assumption, I add an interaction term between an offending covariate and a duration variable (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

The Cox models report estimated coefficients and hazard ratios with regard to the effects of each independent variable. If the hazard ratio is significantly larger than 1, this implies that the hazard is increasing with changes in the independent variable. If it is significantly smaller than 1, it means the hazard is decreasing with changes in the independent variable (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The increasing rates of hazard imply shorter times for major powers to respond

to strategic interests or humanitarian disasters and mean the increase in risk of intervention. The decreasing rates of hazard imply longer response times and the decrease in risk of intervention. Therefore, the test results including hazard ratios show substantive effects of independent variables as well as their statistical significance.

< Table 2. about here >

The results from Table 2 generally support the hypotheses 3, 4, and 5: exclusive strategic interests will increase the likelihood of unilateral intervention; common strategic interests will increase the likelihood of multilateral intervention; humanitarian incentives will increase the likelihood of multilateral intervention. Former colony status has a significant and positive impact on the hazard of unilateral intervention. The hazard ratio shows that if a civil war state was a former colony of a major power, the risk of unilateral intervention by the major power is likely to increase by more than 400%, in comparison with when a civil war state was not a former colony of any major power. If a conflict is an ideological conflict, the risk of unilateral intervention by major powers is likely to increase by 81.7%, compared with when it is not an ideological conflict. While contiguity has a negative effect on multilateral intervention, it does not have a statistically significant impact on unilateral intervention. Alliances with major powers are likely to increase the risks of both multilateral and unilateral intervention.

Oil output as a common strategic interest has a significant and positive impact on the hazard of multilateral intervention, while it has no significant impact on unilateral intervention. The more oil a civil war state produces, the more likely major powers are to engage in multilateral intervention. The number of refugees, as a proxy of a humanitarian disaster, has a significant and positive effect on the hazard of multilateral intervention, but it has no significant impact on unilateral intervention. Therefore, it can be said that when major powers respond to a humanitarian disaster, they are more likely to undertake a multilateral intervention rather than

unilateral intervention. The estimated hazard functions for unilateral / multilateral intervention clearly show that interveners' motives are likely to produce differences in their intervention policy, in particular in the early period of war, although the effects are likely to decrease or disappear over time (Figure 2).

< Figure 2. about here >

These findings show that when exclusive strategic interests are at stake, major powers are more likely to engage in unilateral intervention rather than multilateral intervention, in order to maintain or expand their influence on a civil war state. Also, they are likely to do so because conflicting interests among major powers make it difficult for Perm-5 in the Security Council to agree on multilateral intervention. Common strategic interests, such as oil output, are more likely to be associated with multilateral intervention rather than with unilateral intervention. Multilateral intervention can be a tool which reduces the costs of intervention of major powers seeking natural resources abroad. Therefore, even multilateral intervention through the UN may not be free from major powers' strategic interests. If major powers respond to humanitarian disasters, they are more likely to undertake a multilateral intervention than unilateral intervention. This means that multilateralism as a norm of intervention can affect major powers' intervention decision, and when they perceive that a civil war is a humanitarian disaster, they can relatively easily reach a consensus for multilateral intervention.

< Table 3. about here >

Table 3 shows how strategic interests and humanitarianism influence major powers' decisions on neutral / biased intervention. The test results partly support the hypotheses 1 and 6: strategic interests, exclusive or common interests, will increase the hazard of biased intervention; humanitarianism will increase the hazard of neutral intervention. While exclusive strategic interests, such as former colony status and ideological conflict, are likely to increase the risk of

biased intervention, common strategic interests measured by oil output are likely to increase the risk of neutral intervention. Figure 3 shows the substantive impacts of those variables, which change over time. Alliances have significant and positive impacts on both neutral and biased intervention. Contiguity with a major power has a negative impact on neutral intervention, while it has no significant impact on biased intervention. The findings show that former colony status and ideology can be strong incentives for biased intervention. Major powers are likely to engage in a biased intervention to support the group which has been closely connected to them through former colonial history, or is likely to accept their ideology. In doing so, they can expect that their future interests will increase. One possible reason why oil output is likely to increase the hazard of neutral intervention is because major powers may believe that both government and rebel group may provide them with opportunities to gain access to oil, and thus biased intervention may not be beneficial to their future interest.

< Figure 3. about here >

The number of refugees has significant and positive impacts on both neutral and biased intervention. These findings show that when major powers respond to humanitarian disasters, they may have more ambitious goals as well as classic goals based on the principle of neutrality. In other words, humanitarian interveners may assert that they need to distinguish perpetrators from victims, and punish the perpetrators and thus be biased in an intervention in a civil war. Also, they might argue that in order to promote a democratic institution and reconstruct the economy, they need to support a group which is likely to accept their policy. For these reasons, humanitarianism may increase the risk of biased intervention as well as neutral intervention. This finding implies that there may not be a consistent norm in the international community in relation to neutral or biased intervention.

< Table 4. about here >

Table 4 reports the effects of strategic interests and humanitarianism on major powers' use of military force. The findings support the humanitarianism hypothesis. They show that a humanitarian disaster caused by a civil war is likely to produce major powers' intervention without use of force rather than use of force. The Figure 4 shows that the number of refugees can be an important predictor of intervention without use of force. This means that if they have humanitarian incentives, the major powers are likely to avoid using military force because that may increase the number of victims. However, the findings do not support the strategic interest hypothesis. Contiguity is likely to increase the likelihood of use of force. In particular, in the early period of civil war, contiguity has a strong effect on the use of force (Figure 4). However, former colony status is likely to be associated with intervention without use of force. Alliances have significant and positive impacts on both use of force and intervention without use of force. Ideological conflict has no statistically significant impact on both use of force and intervention without use of force at 0.05 level. Oil output is also unlikely to affect major powers' decision on use of force.

One can speculate on the reasons for the unexpected results. First, civil war states allied with major powers or former colonies of major powers may have historic or cultural connections with the major powers. Such connections may enable major powers to consider the use of force more carefully. In other words, historically shared culture and interactions may shape a norm of non-violence between the major powers and the civil war states. Second, when major powers use military force in a civil war, it may be harmful to interveners' future interests because the use of force can increase the intensity of conflict and thus amplify the uncertainty of the oil supply into global market, although the use of force may have an advantage in rapid termination of a conflict.

The test results show that besides strategic interests and humanitarian incentives, other factors can affect major powers' decisions on the types of intervention. The capability ratio of a major power to a civil war state will increase the hazards of all the types of intervention, except for the use of force. The level of institutionalization of regional IOs is likely to decrease the risk of multilateral intervention. Thus, if a civil war state is a member of a highly institutionalized regional IO, multilateral intervention through the UN is less likely to occur. This finding implies that highly institutionalized regional IOs may substitute for the UN, functioning as a conflict manager. Highly institutionalized regional IOs will decrease the risk of biased intervention, and will reduce the risk of intervention without use of force. The Cold War is more likely to be associated with unilateral intervention than with multilateral intervention. This is consistent with the finding from previous research (Regan 2000). Also, major powers are less likely to undertake neutral intervention in the Cold War period. As to country fixed effects, the US and Russia are more likely than China to undertake unilateral intervention. France is more likely than China to engage in neutral intervention. The US is more likely than China to use military force.

Conclusion

This study has examined the factors that influence major powers' decisions on the types of intervention they employ in civil wars. The findings show that major powers' two contrasting incentives, strategic interests and humanitarianism, can significantly affect the types of intervention. When major powers respond to strategic interests, they are more likely to take into account the expected benefits and costs of intervention than the international norms governing intervention and such a rational choice will dominate decisions on the types of intervention. Exclusive strategic interests tend to produce unilateral and biased intervention. Common

strategic interests, such as oil, are likely to be associated with multilateral and neutral intervention which can reduce the costs of intervention and might increase opportunities to gain access to oil.

On the other hand, if major powers respond to humanitarian disasters, they are more likely to pay attention to the international norms of intervention than when they focus on strategic interests. Multilateralism can affect major powers' decisions on intervention in civil wars. A classic goal of humanitarianism, relief to victims, may cause major powers to avoid the use of military force which can increase the number of victims. However, the findings show that there is not a well-defined norm of intervention that would be whether to undertake a neutral or a biased intervention.

Even though a great number of studies have examined the determinants of third-party intervention, relatively few studies have examined the factors that influence the types of intervention. The effects of third-party intervention may vary with the types of intervention. Therefore, the findings of this study can make a meaningful contribution to the literature on third-party intervention. In addition, the test results of this study include some unexpected findings, particularly on the relationship between strategic interests and the use of force. Future research needs to examine the causal relationships between strategic interests and the use of force both theoretically and empirically.

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Figure 1. Interveners' Incentives and the Types of Intervention



Figure 2. Hazard Functions for Unilateral / Multilateral Intervention



Figure 3. Hazard Functions for Biased / Neutral Intervention



Figure 4. Hazard Functions for the Use of Force / Intervention without Use of Force



Table 1. Perm-5's decision making on intervention types in civil wars, 1944-1999

Types of Intervention			Number of Civil Wars
Multilateral vs.	China	Multilateral	13
		Unilateral	4
Unilateral	France	Multilateral	15
		Unilateral	14
	Russia	Multilateral	15
		Unilateral	19
	United Kingdom	Multilateral	15
		Unilateral	10
	United States	Multilateral	16
		Unilateral	31
Neutral vs.	China	Neutral	5
		Biased	12
Biased	France	Neutral	7
		Biased	22
	Russia	Neutral	7
		Biased	27
	United Kingdom	Neutral	7
		Biased	18
	United States	Neutral	7
		Biased	40
Int. without Use of Force vs.	China	Int. without Use of Force	16
		Use of Force	1
Use of Force	France	Int. without Use of Force	25
		Use of Force	4
	Russia	Int. without Use of Force	27
		Use of Force	7
	United Kingdom	Int. without Use of Force	18
		Use of Force	7
	United States	Int. without Use of Force	36
		Use of Force	11
Non-Intervention (or Only Regional IOs and/or Minor States' Intervention)			76
Total Number of Civil Wars (Conflicts in Perm-5 are not included.)			146

Data: Regan 2002.

Table 2. Competing Risks Cox Model of Major Powers' Intervention: Multilateral vs. Unilateral

	Multilateral Intervention		Unilateral Intervention	
Variables	Coefficients	Hazard Ratios	Coefficients	Hazard Ratios
Exclusive Strategic Interest				
Alliance	**1.015 (0.459)***	**2.759**	**0.786 (0.314)***	**2.195**
Contiguity	**-40.379 (0.397)****	**2.91e-18**	0.509 (0.663)	1.664
Former Colony	0.281 (0.412)	1.324	**1.634 (0.366)****	**5.122**
Ideological Conflict	-0.218 (0.298)	0.804	**0.597 (0.225)****	**1.817**
Common Strategic Interest				
Oil Output	**0.090 (0.032)****	**1.094**	0.005 (0.036)	1.005
Humanitarianism				
The Number of Refugees	**0.103 (0.020)****	**1.108**	0.034 (0.025)	1.035
Control Variables				
Democracy	-0.020 (0.022)	0.980	-0.015 (0.020)	0.985
Capability Ratio	**0.255 (0.118)***	**1.290**	**0.366 (0.100)****	**1.442**
Regional IO	**-0.902 (0.197)****	**0.406**	-0.102 (0.237)	0.903
Cold War	**-1.588 (0.316)****	**0.204**	**0.959 (0.363)****	**2.609**
The United States	-0.016 (0.366)	0.984	**1.482 (0.552)****	**4.400**
United Kingdom	0.209 (0.409)	1.232	0.455 (0.693)	1.577
France	0.358 (0.425)	1.430	1.084 (0.611)	2.955
Russia	0.042 (0.367)	1.043	**1.183 (0.544)***	**3.263**
Observations	4533		4533	
Log pseudo likelihood	-385.809		-410.771	

Note: ** $p \leq 0.01$, * $p \leq 0.05$. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 3. Competing Risks Cox Model of Major Powers' Intervention: Neutral vs. Biased

	Neutral Intervention		Biased Intervention	
Variables	Coefficients	Hazard	Coefficients	Hazard Ratios
Exclusive Strategic Interest				
Alliance	**1.629 (0.737)***	**5.098**	**1.115 (0.273)****	**3.049**
Contiguity	**-42.106 (0.523)****	**5.17e-19**	-0.031 (0.505)	0.969
Former Colony	0.730 (0.586)	2.075	**1.168 (0.281)****	**3.216**
Ideological Conflict	**-0.888 (0.376)***	**0.412**	**0.433 (0.198)***	**1.541**
Common Strategic Interest				
Oil Output	**0.193 (0.056)****	**1.213**	-0.036 (0.035)	0.965
Humanitarianism				
The Number of Refugees	**0.076 (0.029)****	**1.079**	**0.081 (0.018)****	**1.084**
Control Variables				
Democracy	0.047 (0.031)	1.048	-0.025 (0.016)	0.976
Capability Ratio	**0.666 (0.162)****	**1.947**	**0.238 (0.092)****	**1.269**
Regional IO	-0.123 (0.286)	0.884	**-0.686 (0.186)****	**0.504**
Cold War	**-1.985 (0.442)****	**0.137**	-0.076 (0.237)	0.927
The United States	-0.008 (0.555)	0.992	**0.861 (0.341)***	**2.366**
United Kingdom	0.995 (0.613)	2.704	0.035 (0.439)	1.036
France	**1.316 (0.649)***	**3.730**	0.487 (0.405)	1.627
Russia	0.322 (0.590)	1.380	0.542 (0.341)	1.719
Oil Output * Time			**0.001 (0.0003)****	**1.001**
Observations	4533		4533	
Log pseudo likelihood	-176.882		-642.337	

Note: ** $p \leq 0.01$, * $p \leq 0.05$. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 4. Competing Risks Cox Model of Major Powers' Intervention:

Intervention without Use of Force vs. Use of Force

	Intervention without Use of Force		Use of Force	
Variables	Coefficients	Hazard Ratios	Coefficients	Hazard Ratios
Exclusive Strategic Interest				
Alliance	**1.276 (0.272)****	**3.582**	**1.071 (0.497)***	**2.919**
Contiguity	-1.514 (0.799)	0.220	**1.791 (0.590)****	**5.996**
Former Colony	**1.290 (0.279)****	**3.631**	0.270 (0.550)	1.310
Ideological Conflict	0.326 (0.192)	1.385	-0.127 (0.375)	0.880
Common Strategic Interest				
Oil Output	**0.070 (0.024)****	**1.073**	-0.090 (0.081)	0.914
Humanitarianism				
The Number of Refugees	**0.085 (0.017)****	**1.088**	0.041 (0.033)	1.042
Control Variables				
Democracy	-0.003 (0.015)	0.997	-0.058 (0.042)	0.944
Capability Ratio	**0.349 (0.079)****	**1.417**	0.175 (0.205)	1.191
Regional IO	**-0.639 (0.156)****	**0.528**	-0.580 (0.420)	0.560
Cold War	**-0.606 (0.227)****	**0.546**	-0.359 (0.408)	0.698
The United States	0.349 (0.301)	1.418	**2.508 (1.145)***	**12.275**
United Kingdom	-0.243 (0.391)	0.784	2.381 (1.249)	10.820
France	0.431 (0.359)	1.539	1.848 (1.231)	6.346
Russia	0.234 (0.304)	1.263	1.928 (1.102)	6.877
Oil Output * Time			**0.003 (0.001)***	**1.003**
Observations	4533		4533	
Log pseudo likelihood	-668.386		-169.404	

Note: ** $p \leq 0.01$, * $p \leq 0.05$. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.