Why do some wars resume after their successful settlement? After two parties have come together and worked out a ceasefire to their conflict, there is still a chance that the same war can resume as a result of changing conditions. Building on literature into the durability of peace and leadership changes, this paper puts forward a theory based on the bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995) to explain how domestic leadership turnover can affect the durability of peace following ceasefire agreements. Using data on ceasefire agreements and their institutional strength (Fortna 2004), it is found that leadership turnovers that occur following weakly structured agreements will experience shorter spells of peace, while those that follow strong agreements see no such return to a state of war. This leads to the conclusion that in order to maintain the peace, agreements with commitment enhancing mechanisms should be put in place, which will help alleviate the inherent issues that arise from leader turnovers.
Why do some wars resume after their settlement? In the broader study of conflict, it seems a lot of focus is given to the idea that wars occur for certain reasons. One popular vein of research entails that war is part of the bargaining process between states (Fearon 1995). When states are uncertain of the capabilities or resolve of the other state, war is a very real possibility in order to mitigate the uncertainties between the states. As war continues, informational questions and misperceptions are answered, and eventually wars end. This rationalist approach to the study of war, as a source of information, would seem to say though that once a war ends, both sides should have sufficient information to know who would win in subsequent fighting, and therefore the recurrence of war should be unlikely. War is no longer an efficient solution to a problem if one side knows it is going to lose. Peaceful settlements should come out of this, and in light of the new information that war has provided, this peace should exist as long as there is not some sort of shock to the system. Not only do negotiated settlements occur, but in some cases they are powerfully structured and offer formal, structural mechanisms that prevent future commitment problems from causing the war to recur.

The puzzle that exists, though, is that conflicts do reoccur even after their peaceful settlement, and cease-fire agreements do not always hold. While the terms and conditions of the settlement themselves can extend the peace, this alone does not account for what occurs within the states to make the peace fleeting or sturdy. What domestic factors then change how durable the peace is? Do changes in domestic leadership cause changes in the length of time that peace prevails? If a new leader comes to power, will they still have the same information and commitment to peace as their predecessor? My paper will attempt to answer the question: how do changes in leadership affect the durability of peace following a cease-fire agreement? Why is it that some conflicts, like the Second Kashmir War fail to maintain a peaceful settlement, but others
like the Football War remain peaceful after years of inactivity? Does the difference between a strongly and weakly structured agreements influence this relationship?

The paper proceeds as follows: First, I will review some of the important literature on the nature of leadership changes and the durability of peace. Next, I will develop a theory based on the bargaining model to show how potential commitment issues from the change of leaderships can affect the durability of peace following ceasefire agreements, accounting for strength of the agreements. This model will be used to develop testable hypotheses. Following this, I will test the implications of the theory using duration analysis, accounting for if and when a ceasefire agreement fails. I find that leadership turnover does have an effect following different types of agreements. Specifically, weak ceasefires will fail sooner in the face of leadership turnovers, while leadership turnover following strong agreements does not decrease the durability of peace. These results are important because they show that changes in domestic political conditions should be considered when working out post-conflict agreements.

**Literature Review**

According to Fearon (1995), there are three rationalist explanations for why states can go to war. Incomplete information, commitment issues, and issue indivisibilities make it so that even rational state actors who know war is inefficient will chose war to bargaining for a mutually beneficial agreement. While not the only explanation for why wars occur, the framework allows the following theories to develop out of the bargaining model of war. Other prominent research has revealed such causes of war as expected utility of fighting\(^1\), territoriality and contiguity\(^2\), balance of power and power transition\(^3\), alliances\(^4\), democratic peace\(^4\) and many others.

\(^1\) See Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992
\(^2\) See Diehl and Goertz 1988; Vasquez 1995, 1996; Senese and Vasquez 2003; Carter 2010
\(^3\) See Morgenthau 1956; Waltz 1979; Organski 1958; Organski and Kugler 1980; Lemke 2002
\(^4\) See Morrow 1991, 1993; Leeds 2003
Under the rational choice explanation, incomplete information is mitigated by the process of fighting and war can itself be a further dimension of the bargaining process (Fearon 1995; Reed et al. 2000; Powell 2006; Filson and Werner 2002). When war reveals information and both sides are aware of where they stand in relation to their opponent, the commitment issues could still be a detriment to peaceful resolution and prevent each side from negotiating or settling on what the revealed information dictates as the optimal outcome. When states are able to put aside their commitment issues and account for informational disparities, some form of cooperation is possible even in the anarchical state of the international system (Fortna 2004; Axelrod 1984; Grieco 1988; Keohane 1984; Oye 1986; Waltz 1979). The question remains though on how durable the peace that is created by this cooperation, in the form of ceasefire agreements, is? Do agreements overcome potential commitment issues resulting from leader turnover?

Along these lines, Fortna (2004) examines the durability of peace following cease-fire agreements. Her investigation first establishes a baseline probability of peace to remove any selection effects that might arise from who signs what kind of cease-fires, and if they are only being used for “easy” or “hard” cases. Once this has been established, she finds that the strength of the agreement, and the presence of commitment enhancing mechanisms, such as third party guarantees, return to the ex-ante status quo, peacekeepers, demilitarized zones, joint commissions among the belligerent forces, and explicitly maintained cease-fire terms, all improve the length of the peace (Fortna 2004, 210). In addition, Werner and Yeun (2005), find that settlements that are achieved and reflect the realities of the information revealed on the battlefield by the combatant parties (not imposed by a third party) are the most likely to stay at peace because they reduce any informational differences. Despite this, they find that

5 See Rummel 1985; Maoz and Russett 1993; Mitchell 2002
commitment issues are still a serious detriment to peace and there is always the possibility of resumption of hostilities (Werner and Yeun 2005). Democracy factors in as well, as the least democratic the combatants, the more likely the sides are to attempt this sort of negotiated settlement (Dixon and Senese 2002).

Werner (1999) addresses similar issues, but finds that the most common detriment to peace is belief on one side that there is an incentive to renegotiate the settlement; they are unable to commit to past agreements due to internal changes. If the belligerents believe that they can gain something better than they received in the outcome of the previous settlement, they will resume the conflict to do so (Blainey 1988; Wagner 1993; Werner 1999). Specifically, institutional changes in one state make it more likely that it will become the target of its former adversary (Werner 1999, 929). This is consistent with the findings of Filson and Werner (2002) who show that negotiations occur throughout the war as a concurrent process with the fighting, and that changes in the privately held information of one side can cause hostilities to emerge. Leeds (2003) finds similar results when looking at changes in internal characteristics on alliance commitments. Changes in internal capabilities have the effect of making a state more likely to be targeted, as external challengers no longer believe in the commitments of alliances to protect a state (Leeds 2003). The change in structural elements further compounds commitment issues that follow leadership changes.

Knowing how states act as a stationary unit, though, is not the most informative ways of explaining the decisions and incentives to go back to war following a cease-fire agreement. In order to investigate this decision, one must look inside the black box of the state, as characteristics within the state affect their decision making (Putnam 1988). Following a war, different regime types are likely to see leader turnovers at differing rates; it is at the leader level
that information about the durability of peace should be investigated. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995; Also Bueno de Meqsuita et al. 2003; Bennett and Stam 2004; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999), the structure of the state affects the turnover of the specific leader. Depending on the electoral or elite conditions within the state, states may see turnover as a factor of either normal, constitutional change, or as a result of extra-governmental problems. Focusing on leaders is also important, because war can be an inefficient outcome to the specific leader (Chioza and Goemans 2004). This finding is consistent with others who have shown a relationship between the end of war and both regular and irregular transfers of power (Goemans 2000a, 2000b; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1993). Overall, democracies are no more likely to face a turnover for losing a war, but large losses lead to leaders being replaced (Colaresi 2004). In fact, democracies are less likely to suffer detrimental effects on the durability of ceasefire agreements from a leadership change than authoritarian states, due to the frequency of turnover (Lipson 2003). Leaders may be deselected from power for even being perceived to lose a war against a rival (Diehl and Geortz 2000; Rasler and Thompson 2000; Colaresi 2004).

Knowing that leaders can turnover following a war, the next logical step is to examine how leadership turnovers affect the likelihood of war reemergence. Anytime a state experiences a leader turnover, new information is introduced. New leaders bring with them new sets of private information about their reputation and competence, creating a situation where war is more likely to follow, either started by the new leader or an outside actor wishing to test their resolve (Wolford 2007). Changing leaders after a dispute would then change the level of information known between two conflicting states, and should increase the likelihood of settlement failure. High turnover has been found to increase the probability of a state being

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6 Again in this draft, the relationship between leadership change and war’s end is not being re-examined. This is one of the next steps I will take in the continued draft. This is something I’m still working on including in the next draft.
attacked by another state (Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Grieco 2001; Rousseau et al. 1996). In other cases, war can be started by new leaders in any type of state as a means of signaling their resolve and competence to outside viewers (Smith 1998). This coincides with the arguments of Mansfield and Snyder (2002), who show that transitioning regimes are more conflict prone. These results lead one to wonder then how new leaders would affect the tenuous situation that exists following a cease-fire agreement. Specifically, how should these new leadership affect the durability of the peace?

**Theory**

If war can be thought of as a costly bargaining strategy between two states, then the war should end when there was enough information revealed by fighting that both sides can make a rational decision about the expected outcome and reach an agreed upon settlement (Fearon 1995). This space exists in the region of overlap between what is an acceptable amount of the issue to State A and State B. These expectations are revealed through fighting and stay consistent as long as factors within the state remain constant. Depending on the structure of this bargaining space and the baseline probability of coming to an agreement*, certain ceasefire agreements can have commitment enhancing mechanisms which bind the state, despite the potential for future changes (Fortna 2004, 151-159). The proposed explanation that follows varies from other bargaining models in that it allows for a fixed commitment position as defined by the nature of the cease-fire agreement. Strong cease-fire agreements install mechanisms to ensure the future compliance of both sides and fix a location that both sides must abide by. Weak agreements lacking these commitment enhancing mechanisms have no such inherent changes in the basic bargaining models given. These differences can be seen in the way in which some ceasefires
install mechanisms or have peacekeepers in place to monitor past beligerants.* Figure 1 depicts a potential bargaining space at the end of a war.

As can be seen, there is a clearly delineated area where both sides can reach an agreement having been revealed through war. In this area, the sides are sufficiently close to their own ideal point, but would accept terms to end fighting close enough to their opposition’s ideal point to create some room for compromise. Within this space, the sides are able to make agreements of various types, from weak agreements designed to quickly end the fighting to strong agreements with guarantees and mechanisms to ensure future commitment. Potential mechanisms delineated in the above figure show the minimum values that states must meet within strong agreements.

Regardless of the reasons why states select to create weak or strong agreements, the signing of any agreement is a signal to the domestic selectorate of the leader’s competence.\(^8\) The selectorate theory put simply entails that a fixed number of people that is a subset of the population selects the leader with the incentive that they gain either public or private goods from their selection. Seeing the end of the war and the allotment of goods that it brings in, the selectorate can either chose to get rid of the leader immediately (though legitimate or illegitimate means) or retain the leader and depose him at all subsequent time, \(t+n\), where \(n\) represents a number of finite time intervals until the leader is selected out of office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Regardless of when or how this transition in leadership occurs, the new leader in power has the ability to reassess decisions made by the previous leadership. If a leadership transition occurs following the successful settlement of a peace agreement, the new leader could see this as a clear signal that the selectorate is not happy with the post war allotment of goods. Knowing

\(^7\)Bargaining model developed from Fearon 1995; Thyne 2006.

\(^8\)See Fortna 2004 for discussion of types of agreements, mechanisms, and their ability to ensure the durability of peace. See also McGillivary and Smith 2004 for discussion on leadership competence.
this, the new leader could return to a costly state of war in order to display both competence and compliance with the populous’ wishes.

Regardless of the agreement strength, a new leader has incentive to renegotiate the cease-fire agreement, and if no better settlement can be reached, to return to a state of war if necessary (Werner 1999). New information, experiences, and a signal from the selectorate give the leader incentive to renege on the agreement and return to war for a better bargaining position. Where there is no way to ensure the commitments in place, both sides are likely to see commitment to the agreement as fractious. Either side can think that the other will renege on the agreement with a structural change as a result of the change and seek a better outcome than the status quo. Figures 2 and 3 show two potential bargaining spaces available to a leader as she seeks to renegotiate with side B.

[ Insert Figure 2 About here]

In the presence of a weak agreement that lacks commitment building mechanisms, the new acceptable bargaining space could appear as it does in Figure 2. In this case, without some firm means to prevent State A from reneging on the past agreement, the leader is better able to press for a position closer to her state’s ideal point. This creates a divergent area in which there is not just the possibility, but also the likelihood of war recurring. Weak agreements lacking in the ability to enforce or prevent the state from reneging should make for a very fragile peace when there is a change in head of state. While it seems likely that only side A will initiate with the other side, the presence of a new leader might also spark side B to target side A. The initiator of the new war should not matter. When side A experiences a leadership change, they could see the incentive to attack, unsure if side B will see the change as a sign of weakness. Side B at the same time might have incentive to attack, as they will not be sure of the type of the new leader in
state A (hawk/dove) and therefore cannot be certain that the new leader will commit to her country’s previous agreements. Side B might also see an internal change as a signal that state A will not have the support of previously established alliances and attack to gain a better position than was possible when alliances were thought to be credible (Leeds 2003).

An example of this type of turnover can be seen in the end of the Second Kashmir War between Pakistan and India. Following external pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan initiated a ceasefire agreement and signed the Tashkent accords on 23 September 1965. The day after the accords were signed, Prime Minister Shastri of India suffered a heart attack, and was subsequently replaced. The weakly structured agreement, that only returned the states to a pre-war status quo condition without any commitment enhancing mechanisms, soon deteriorated, and the Third Kashmir War broke out after sporadic fighting in 1971 (Fortna 2004, 63-64).*

\[ H1: \] Leadership transitions following a ceasefire agreement between states will decrease the duration of peace.

\[ H2: \] Leadership transitions following a ceasefire agreement between states that have a weak agreement will decrease the duration of peace.

Because of the incentive to renegotiate in general, it is therefore believed that at all times following a leadership transition, the peace will be less likely to last. This is especially true in areas where there are no mechanisms in place to ensure future commitment and that peace lasts. Commitment mechanisms can include but are not limited to instillation of a de-militarized zone, international peacekeepers, requirements to remove troops from a certain location, or a third party overseeing the agreement (Fortna 2004). As commitment problems are one of the ways in which wars come about, it seems to follow that when there is not some way to alleviate fears, war becomes more likely (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006). Figure 3 shows a case in which there is a
leadership transition, but mechanisms have been put in place by the specific ceasefire agreement to keep the peace between the two sides.

[Insert Figure 3 About here]

Commitment to the agreement is thus being ensured by some mechanism or outside power willing to ensure the peace. While the leader is able to renegotiate to a certain point, past commitments by previous leaders prevent her from fully reneging, and therefore, a space exists where the existing bargain is still acceptable to going to war. War becomes less likely, and unless a leader can remove the mechanisms, they will not fight. Removing the mechanisms and constraints will take time, and therefore strong agreements should maintain the peace. While it is possible at some later time that the leader could break the agreement, she will be able to do so only after a considerable amount of time have passed, with the potential for lasting peace or subsequent leadership turnover by the time she is able to renegotiate.

**H3:** Leadership transitions following a ceasefire between states that have a strong agreement see less chance of peace failure than those in weak agreements.

An example of how strong agreements being resilient to changes in leadership can be seen in the Football Wars between El Salvador and Honduras. The conflict ended in July of 1969 with the signing of an agreement with outside guarantees to keep the peace. One of the only examples of an agreement with this type of commitment enhancing mechanisms, it is a prime example of a strong agreement. Despite numerous leadership changes, to include national elections in Honduras in 1971 as well military coup d’états in both states*, and public outcry against the agreement, war never re-emerged between the two sides. The two sides did subsequently renegotiate the agreement in August 1976 and October 1980. Leadership changes lead to further negotiating and slight changes to the agreement, but because of the strength of the
agreement and the commitment enhancing mechanisms in place, the sides avoided the resumption of hostilities.

**Research Design**

In order to test the relationship between leadership change and length of post cease-fire peace, a duration model will be used consistent with the research designs of Fortna (2004) and Werner and Yeun (2005). The dependent variable that I am interested in explaining is the durability of post settlement peace, or how long the peace lasted following a ceasefire agreement. Recurrences of war might happen at a short time period, after many months or years, or the peace might hold until the present. For this reason I employ a duration model which will estimate the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable over time. Consistent with Fortna (2004), I use the Weibull distribution model:

…because it requires no a priori assumption about whether peace is more or less likely to last given that it has lasted up to some point. I can therefore test the duration dependence of peace: does peace become more stable over time, or is the hazard rate flat, with war equally likely to resume in every period, or does the probability of war actually increase as peace survives longer. (44)

As with other investigations into this type of relationship and the problems that might exist with its assumption, I investigate this as well using the Cox model; but from these other investigations, it is believed that the Weibull will result in the best possible outcome (Fortna 2004; Werner and Yeun 2005).9

The dependent variable in this case is the duration of time between the cease-fire at the end of a war and the resumption (or censored end) of a subsequent war. War as it is defined, is a situation where the battle deaths within a single year in armed conflict between two states exceed one thousand battle deaths (Singer and Small 1994). While this is a high threshold for the

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9 Assumptions about the non-proportional hazards were investigated using a Cox-Snell residual plot, and I find that there are problems with the previous assumption. In order to account for this, key variables were interacted with time in the models.
resumption of hostilities, it provides a harder test for the above theory. This data is drawn from the Cease-Fires Data Set (time varying) provided by Fortna (2004). Additional data were generated using the EUGene software package (Bennett and Stam 2000). These sources of data have been widely used and published, but require that a few additional variables be added in from other sources. These data cover 48 cases of war ended by a ceasefire between 1946 and 1994 (Singer and Small 1994). In the time varying dataset being used, each of the 48 cases has multiple observations over time, creating a total observation level at 870 peace years following ceasefires. While this leaves a situation where the cases without peace failure are right censored, the bias created should not be problematic to the overall analysis. Peace that continues after 1998 is considered right censored. In all 29 of the 48 ceasefire agreements are right censored. This is accounted for in the model and therefore the fact that these conflicts have not seen resumption of hostility does not affect the estimates found below.

In order to test the main hypothesis on the effects of leader turnover and the length of peace, measures will be adapted from the ARCHIGOS dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), which includes information useful for determining when a leadership turnover happened, and how this then affected the prospects for peace. These data give specific dates of leadership turnovers, and therefore are ideal for creating the variable to measure leadership transitions.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable for this analysis is taken from Fortna (2004), and codes the failure of a cease-fire agreement as the time since the agreement. This means that at the given time period for values coded “1” that a new war has broken out between two parties to a cease-
fire agreement the war is considered active again. As it is coded by time spells, this variable allows to measures the duration of peace from the date of the signing of the peace treaty until any failure. One potential problem with this measure is that it only accounts for the high threshold wars. While lower levels of conflict happen more often, the phenomena of interest in this case is the return to a state of war between two states. While investigating a return to any type of hostility between the states would give greater variation, this variable allows for a harder test of the theory. If war is indeed a complicated and costly bargaining technique, then leaders are going to have more incentive to work out their problems before coming to this. If we see war recurring, then we know that other peaceful settlement methods have failed.***

*Independent Variable*

As the primary variable of interest in leadership *turnover*, a dichotomous variable has been coded to capture this. Using the ARCHIGOS dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009), I identified cases of leadership turnover in the time spells for the time varying covariates. If a leadership transition occurred in the temporal period, values of the variable were coded as a “1”. If there was no turnover in that time period, the value was coded as “0”. One possible problem with this measure is that it does not take into account the manner in which a leader came to power.**** Because it is believed that a transition of any kind matters and is a signal of the selectorate’s overall happiness, I have decided to not disaggregate between leaders who were replaced by legal means and those who were replaced by illegal means; in this examination, both are important. This difference has been shown to have an effect (Werner 1999), but it is my assessment that the selectorate’s decision to replace a leader also plays a role, and therefore the two should not be treated any differently.****
The second main independent variable of interest is the strength of the agreement. This is a subjective measure developed by Fortna (2004, 49-52) coded on an ordinal scale from 0-4. A score of “0” means that there are no mechanisms present in the agreement, while a “4” means that there is a strong, formal agreement with many controls and checks on both sides’ power and ability to reignite the war. For the sake of the preliminary investigation, this measure will be used in its current form. In order to test \textit{H2} and \textit{H3}, this variable is turned into a series of dichotomous variables. Values of 0-2 (None, very weak, and weak) are coded one in the variable \textit{weak} as a “1” and “0” otherwise. Values of 4 (strong) are coded into a dichotomous variable \textit{strong} as “1” and “0” otherwise. This allows me to interact the variables \textit{turnover} and \textit{weak} to test \textit{H2}, and \textit{turnover} and \textit{strong} to test \textit{H3}. Values of 3 (moderate) are left out of the coding structure for the dichotomous variables. These values have some commitment enhancing mechanisms, but they are not by any means strong. At the same time, they are not weak and easily violated. As such, they are left out of the analysis of the dichotomous variables.\textsuperscript{10} These interactions are the primary variables that I will be interested in. A summary of the expected results of these interactions are given in Table 1.

[Insert Table 1 About here]

\textit{Controls}

Control variables for this investigation are drawn from the same data set as the dependent variable and are consistent with those used by Fortna (2004) in her investigation. A brief description of each is given with a simple justification for its inclusion below.

The first control to be included is whether the previous war ended in a \textit{tie}. This is a dichotomous variable coded “1” for wars that ended in a non-decisive victory for Side A or Side B (Stam 1996). Decisive victories have been seen to increase the durability of peace (Senese and

\textsuperscript{10} Inclusion of the left out value to either side does not substantively change the results of the models.
Quackenbush 2003), so it should hold that a war that ended in a tie should see a higher risk of peace failure. I would expect a significant relationship for this variable with a hazard rate greater than 1. The next variable to be included is the Cost of the war, measured as a natural log of the deaths of side A plus the deaths of side B. As conflict gets costlier, the people lose support for the fighting, and therefore increases in this should increase the duration of peace as the selectorate of the leaders loses support for the war (Mueller 1971).

*History of past conflict* is the next variable to be controlled for. This variable is drawn using EUGene as a number of Militarized Disputes the two sides engaged in prior to the war’s initial outbreak (Bennett and Stam 2000). As is present in much of the literature on serial disputes, states are more likely to engage in further hostilities the more history of conflict that they have (Klein et al. 2006; Leng 1983; Colaresi and Thompson 2002). I would expect this variable to decrease the duration of peace as this evidence suggests.

*Existence at stake* is being controlled for because states are more likely to continue fighting or be more willing to fight as a result of conflicts where their very survival is at stake. It is coded “1” when the highest level of threat is the very existence of the state, and “0” otherwise. At the heart of this argument is that if the existence of the state is at stake, the issue being fought over is indivisible, one of the three explanations for war (Fearon 1995). This is at the heart of most realist theories, that the survival of the state is the state’s first (and in some cases) only priority (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). This variable is coded from the International Crisis behavior data (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1992) gravity of value threatened variable. As thought of in realist literature, states should be more willing to go back to war if their survival is at stake, and therefore we should see shorter durations of peace as a result.
Contiguous states are consistently found to be the most conflict prone.\textsuperscript{11} This variable is coded “1” if the dyad is contiguous by land or separated by no less than 150 miles of water and “0” otherwise (Bennett and Stam 2000; Fortna 2004). Contiguous states are expected to have a higher likelihood of returning to war, and therefore states that are contiguous should have less durable peace. The final variable being controlled for is change in relative capabilities between the belligerents. This variable is coded as:

\[
\text{Change in relative capabilities} = \left| \frac{\text{Cap}_t - \text{Cap}_{t-1}}{\text{Cap}_{t-1}} - \frac{\text{Cap}_t - \text{Cap}_{t-1}}{\text{Cap}_{t-1}} \right|
\]

(Werner 1999, 923). It is expected that the change in relative capabilities should be associated with a higher probability of conflict onset. It is expected that this variable will be associated with lower duration of peace as there is an incentive to renegotiate agreements when there is a larger change in the relative capabilities between the two sides (Werner 1999).

**Results****

**Conclusion******

\textsuperscript{11} This result holds for nearly all dyadic conflicts under nearly all conditions. For reference, see Bennett and Stam 2004.
Works Cited


**Figure 1.** Bargaining Space at time of Cease-Fire Agreement

**Figure 2.** Potential Shift in Bargaining Space as a result of Leader Turnover with a weak agreement
Figure 3. Potential Shift in Bargaining Space as a result of Leader Turnover with a strong agreement

Figure 4: Weak Agreements and Turnover on Peace Failure

Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval
Figure 5: Strong Agreements and Turnover on Peace Failure

Table 1. Predicted Outcomes

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<th>Strong Agreement</th>
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<td>Peace Semi-Durable</td>
<td>Peace Durable</td>
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<td>Leader Turnover</td>
<td>Peace Failure</td>
<td>Peace Semi-Durable</td>
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Table 2: Leadership Turnover and Peace Durability

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<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard Ratio</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Tie</td>
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<td>0.00**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of Conflict</td>
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<td>0.00**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Note: Results clustered by conflict. Estimations conducted in STATA12. Values of the reported Hazard Ratio that are less than zero indicate areas where peace is more durable.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05
Table 3: Weak Agreements, Leadership Turnover and Peace Durability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hazard Ratio</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard Ratio</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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Note: Results clustered by conflict. Estimations conducted in STATA12. Values of the reported Hazard Ratio that are less than zero indicate areas where peace is more durable.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05
Table 4: Strong Agreements, Leadership Turnover and Peace Durability

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<th>Hazard Ratio</th>
<th>P-value</th>
<th>Hazard Ratio</th>
<th>P-value</th>
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<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
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Note: Results clustered by conflict. Estimations conducted in STATA12. Values of the reported Hazard Ratio that are less than zero indicate areas where peace is more durable.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05