PRACTICING DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY NORMS: 
Third Party Conflict Management and Successful Settlements*

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Abstract

In this paper we investigate the methods by which aggregate democratic forces influence dyadic-level interactions. We examine the causal linkage between a global democratic community and the involvement of third parties in attempts to settle dyadic claims that may otherwise lead to violence. We hypothesize that a strong democratic community and its institutions make third party settlement attempts more frequent and successful, and that these third party mediators are likely to be democracies or international institutions. Using data from the ICOW project as well as from Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon (2003), we test these hypotheses and find broad but not universal support for the notion that when the democratic community has the ability to influence international politics, it does so through the propagation of democratic societal norms of dispute resolution.

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Since the classic Liberals proposed republican governance of states as a foundation for a “perpetual peace,” a plethora of empirically minded scholars have investigated this claim. Almost without exception, they have found little support at the monadic level of analysis and strong support at the dyadic level: although democracies are just as likely as non-democracies to participate in conflicts,\(^1\) they do not fight each other (e.g., Chan 1984, Maoz and Russett 1993, Morgan and Schwebach 1992, Russett and Oneal 2001). Kant ([1784] 1991, [1795] 1991, and [1797] 1991) exemplifies the original vision of the democratic peace as a systemic phenomenon, a tranquility produced by a developed international society of republican (representative) governments (Harrison, 2002; Huntley, 1996). Yet, rigorous systemic democratic peace analyses have only recently been conducted. These recent investigations indicate that augmenting global democracy ultimately has a pacifying effect, though there is some debate about whether the path to peace involves a monotonic lessening of conflict or initial increases in warfare up to some critical value after which war levels subside (cf. Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003; Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999). Nonetheless, much is left to learn. We do not yet know much about the mechanisms by which systemic peace is achieved. This paper seeks to investigate the processes by which aggregate democratic forces produce pacific benefits.

We theorize that a “strong democratic community” (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003) nurtures the expansion of democratic norms in international society. While there are multiple ways to practice democratic norms, we focus this paper on conflict alleviation strategies. In particular, we ask how does the strength of the democratic community affect the willingness of states to allow third party involvement in the resolution of contentious issues?
Additionally, how does the strength of the democratic community influence the likelihood of success of third party conflict management efforts?

The paper begins by laying out a basic conflict resolution process, drawing on the democratic peace literature to understand how a strong democratic community influences that process. From there, we formulate hypotheses concerning the relationship between the strength of the democratic community and the incidence and success of third party settlements. We reason that as the strength of the democratic community increases, the likelihood of third party conflict management increases. We also anticipate that democratic states and international institutions will be more active conflict managers, and that conflict management efforts will be more likely to succeed. Our test cases, provided by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project, include territorial, river, and maritime claims in the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East between 1816 and 2001. Analysis of these issue claims suggests a strong democratic community significantly increases the likelihood of third party conflict management, especially by democratic states or international organizations (IOs), and enhances the chances that disputants will comply with agreements reached. International organizations also enhance the prospects for peaceful settlement by offering their services as third party mediators and by guaranteeing compliance with agreements that are struck.

**Theorizing a Baseline Conflict Resolution Process**

What kind of advice would an omniscient give to an aggrieved state? Most likely, counsel akin to this:

If another state is aggressive toward you, try to settle the problem dyadically. If the bilateral attempt succeeds, you have gained stronger ties. But if this fails, use a third party as a guarantor, that “by the mouth of two or three witnesses every
word may be established.” And if this fails, bring the dispute to an IO. But if the aggressor still refuses to settle the dispute, the IO should shun and sanction the aggressor. (Adapted from Matthew 18:15-17)

Along these lines, we assume that, ceteris paribus, all states prefer peaceful resolution to conflictual resolution because they would rather avoid the costs of armed violence and reap the benefits of peace (Fearon 1995). Every state also prefers bilateral settlement to third party mediation because it wants to control negotiation outcomes as much as possible (Hensel 2001).

Despite some universal state preferences, one particular type of dyad, namely one comprised of two democracies, has the best success rate when it comes to bilateral negotiations. Several non-competing explanations come to mind: because democracies share norms regarding pacific conflict resolution, they more easily achieve this outcome (Dixon 1994); democracies enjoy mutual trust based on the transparency and reliability of their institutions, making it easier for them to strike durable and credible agreements with one another (Lipson 2003); democracies must sell their bargains to their tough audiences, but once a bargain is approved, it is likely to last (Leeds 1999, Putnam 1988); electoral accountability to their publics make democracies’ agreements more dependable (Gaubatz 1996, Leeds 1999); and the recognition that both democracies view third party mediation with legitimacy (Mitchell 2002) makes them more likely to succeed in the bilateral stages of a disagreement, much like two individuals’ willingness to use a judicial body for settling their problems enjoins them to settle out of court. The theme across these explanations indicates that on the one hand, democracies are exceptionally willing to engage in bilateral negotiations; but on the other hand, their domestic institutions also make it harder to reach agreement. Consistent with this theme, empirical evidence demonstrates that while two democracies are not more likely than other pairs of states are to reach bilateral
agreements, the bilateral agreements they do reach are much more successful. Among states reaching bilateral agreements, jointly democratic dyads are by far the most likely to comply with the agreement (83.7% compared to 70.2% for mixed dyads and 60.85% for jointly autocratic dyads). An agreement between two democracies is also notably more likely to resolve the issue at stake (56.3% compared to 39.2% for mixed dyads and 37.5% for jointly autocratic dyads).³

Although mixed and jointly autocratic dyads are just as able to reach bilateral agreements, these agreements are less likely to resolve the underlying issues and the parties are less likely to comply with them. This is because autocrats enjoy more flexibility and are thus more willing to strike “agreements with some risk of abrogation” (Leeds 1999:980). Leeds argues that when states have a hard time forming credible commitments, they can turn to guarantors in order to realize successful, lasting agreements (2000). Third party states or IOs are just such guarantors. Dyads with at least one autocratic state are more apt to rely on these outside guarantors or enforcement aides. What influences the availability of other states or IOs that are willing to serve as third parties? When do disputants see third parties as a legitimate mechanism for the pacific resolution of issues? Under what conditions are these third party efforts most likely to bear fruit? The answer to all these questions lies in the strength of the democratic community, a systemic concept that we lay out in the following section.

**THEORIZING ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY**

In this section, we conceptualize a democratic international community and its norms, reason about how such a system becomes more influential, and discuss the use of third party conflict management as one particular resolution method used more frequently and more successfully when the democratic community is potent.
What is an International Democratic Community?

Just as individuals comprise local communities, nation-states comprise a global community. 

Hedley Bull provides a foundational look at the closely related notion of an international society, in which states share “common interests and common values” and feel obligated to adhere to a “common set of rules and institutions” (1995:40). The particular interests, values, rules, and institutions seem less important than their universality. An international community can be based on norms such as “might makes right” and *rebus sic stantibus* just as it may be based on norms such as human rights and egalitarianism. Furthermore, just as individuals might disagree about which norms should govern a local community (e.g., group security vs. individual privacy, personal choice vs. limited externalities), members of the international system have struggled over a variety of norms: dominance of church and primacy of princes in Richelieu’s days, capitalism and socialism during the Cold War, human rights and state sovereignty, non-aggression and punishment of aggressors, and the like.⁴

One dominant characterization of the international norms struggle focuses on the competition between autocratic and democratic forms of governance. American presidential rhetoric, for example, contrasts democratic norms of freedom and peace with autocratic norms of lawlessness and violence (Bush 2002, Clinton 2000). Scholars, too, have treated the autocratic versus democratic rift as a defining feature of the international system. For instance, Thucydides detailed the conflicting norms of democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta as the two vied for dominance of Greek city-states. In addition, Maoz and Russett (1993:637) compare an international system in which most states are autocratic with one in which there is a “critical mass of democratic states.” In the former, all states must “play by the rules of autocracy” in order to survive in a Hobbesian world; whereas in the latter, the norms and rules are
reconstructed to emphasize the peaceful resolution of political conflicts. More recently, Mitchell draws on Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) framework to trace the process of democratic norm emergence and establishment as a viable alternative to autocratic norms (2002:750-3).

What distinguishes democratic norms and institutions from autocratic ones? The answer begins with domestic politics. Whereas authoritarian governments are ruled by methods such as coercion, repression, religious edict, and despotism, democracies are ruled by consent of the governed. Leaders are elected and controversies are settled with a system of bargaining, negotiation, and jurisprudence. Consider, for example, how these liberal processes and institutions operated after the Québécois narrowly lost their secessionist effort in 1995. Concerned by the close referendum result, the federal government asked the Supreme Court of Canada to assess whether or not Quebec had the constitutional right to secede. The court artfully provided an answer designed to smooth current and potential tensions. Drawing on principles such as democracy, rule of law, and respect for minorities, the decision stated that Quebec did not possess the right to unilateral secession but also emphasized that if a future referendum were successful, the federal government would have a “constitutional duty to negotiate” (Toope 1999:521). Impartial third parties, such as arbiters and courts, are important democratic resources for maintaining harmony when bilateral efforts break down.

States tend to externalize the norms governing their domestic politics. Democracies, therefore, are more likely to resolve disputes with one another peacefully, whereas autocracies are more willing to employ violence to achieve their foreign policy goals (see also Dixon 1994; Maoz and Russett 1993:625; Simmons 1999:211).

Many extrapolate from the dyadic democratic peace finding to predict a systemic democratic peace. In a sense, the system “can be socially constructed from the bottom up; that
is, norms and rules of behavior internationally become extensions of the norms and rules of domestic political behavior” (Maoz and Russett 1993:637). If pacific norms prevent democracies from going to war with each other, then a predominantly democratic system should also be governed by these norms and hence exhibit less violence (Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999; Starr 1992). A belief in the tranquil gains from a “global community of democracies” (Talbott 1997) forms the cornerstone of U.S. policymakers’ efforts to export democracy (Albright 1997; Bush 2002; Clinton 2000). Moreover, analytic investigations demonstrate impressive evidence of lessened hostilities as a result of a more democratic global community:

- In the post WW II era, the proportion of democracies in the system decreases the proportion of states participating in war (Crescenzi and Enterline 1999).
- Up to some critical value, increasing the proportion of democracies in the system increases the frequency of new conflicts. Afterward, increases in the proportion diminish the onset of conflicts. (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997)
- As the number of democracies in the system increases, democracies are less likely to be targets of military intervention (Hermann and Kegley 1996:454).
- Global levels of democratization are inversely related to the proportion of states at war, and this effect becomes more pronounced over time (Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999).
- Even though high aggregate levels of war are dangerous for the survival of democracies, a strong democratic community can immunize democracies against this threat (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003).

Given these pacific benefits, it is important to lay out the paths by which high levels of democratic community are attained.

**Strengthening the Democratic Community**

When the democratic community is strong, its norms dominate the international system. Bull posits that order in any society is maintained “not merely by a sense of common interests in creating order or avoiding disorder, but by rules which spell out the kind of behaviour that is
orderly” (1977:54). States have incentives to legitimize these rules (or norms) by convincing others to accept them, and IOs play an important role in this process (Bull 1977:72). Even though Bull initially argued for a “pluralist” conceptualization of international society in which states had diverse interests and agreed on only rudimentary principles such as sovereignty and non-intervention, he ultimately argued that order would only arise from a “solidarist” system in which states universally agree on a broader set of norms and are willing to enforce rules against “states which violate the cardinal rules and norms of the society” (Wheeler and Dunne 1996:95).

To assess the universality of democratic norms and the community’s ability to enforce them, we draw on Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon’s (2003) model of systemic democracy, which emphasizes three features to represent the aggregate community: proportion, influence, and intensity. The first is the common and straightforward comparison of the number of democracies and the number of autocracies, typically reported as the proportion of democratic states (Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999; Mitchell 2002). Democracies represent an “Axelrod-like core of cooperators,” whose behavioral norms are more likely to be adopted by other states as their numbers increase (Starr and Lindborg 2003, quoting Axelrod 1984).

The second feature modifies this basic scorecard approach by considering the degree of influence held by autocratic versus democratic states. Democracies can help each other more when their group’s material strength outweighs that of nondemocracies. Similarly, Modestski and Perry reason that “demonstration effects” of powerful democracies further systemic democracy (1991). According to reasoning that parallels Bull’s (1977:72) characterization of the process by which norms take hold, peaceful conflict resolution becomes an established norm when strong democracies are able to show its desirability, set up institutions that encourage its adoption, and
enforce its outcomes. It is not enough for democracies to outnumber autocracies; they must also possess sufficient resources to effect the democratic community’s preferences. While this strength might come from a democratic hegemon, results can also be realized when many democracies share their power advantage more equally among themselves.

Third, we evaluate how intensely committed the competing states are to their respective community’s norms. For example, regimes that exhibit only primitive features of liberalism contribute very little to the strength of the democratic community. Mature democracies, on the other hand, can lead the way as “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Mitchell 2002). Intensely democratic states such as Great Britain and the United States pioneered the use of peaceful methods of conflict resolution such as arbitration and mediation (Mitchell 2002:751). Pragmatically speaking, highly democratic states are more motivated to practice and propagate norms such as the rule of law and conflict management than are weakly democratic states. The most intense regimes, almost by definition, are most committed to a particular norm structure (be it democratic or autocratic). As such, they stand to lose the most if those norms are overridden by the principles of less egalitarian (or less centralized) states. Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) argue, for example, that American and British hegemonic power was an insufficient tool for establishing a liberal world order. The “material incentives” these hegemons could threaten or offer were only successful when coupled with active socialization such as Roosevelt’s effort to persuade Europe to abandon colonialism and economic nationalism in favor of a multilateral liberalism following WWII (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990).

The model thus relies on the number, material strength, and ideological intensity of democracies in comparison to the same qualities for autocracies, and it is particularly focused on the interaction of these three components for the production of community strength. Material
capabilities such as economic and military strength facilitate democracies’ promotion of their ideas, or norms. Furthermore, states’ understanding of which norms are dominant and legitimate in the international system depends on the frequency, intensity, and strength of different regime types in the world. Thus the characteristics of any international community reflect the domestic regime characteristics of its members. Like Wendt (1999), we believe that the structures of human association are influenced by shared ideas, but we also believe that material forces help determine which community’s ideas prevail.7

Activities of the Democratic Community: Third Party Dispute Management

Different preferences lie at the heart of politics. States disagree about the division of land, fishing rights, rules governing trade, and so on. Contentious issues can be resolved in a variety of ways such as bargaining and negotiation, adherence to preexisting treaties and agreements, threats, and overt military conflict. In a global arena dominated by numerous, strong, and intensely democratic states, we expect that less violent and more community-based methods of resolution will prevail. In this paper, we focus on one particular instantiation of these methods, namely third party conflict management. While direct bilateral negotiation is the most frequent method employed for the peaceful settlement of disputes (Levi 1991), states often involve third parties when they are unable to reach a bilateral settlement. A strong democratic community ensures that when states need third parties, there is a ready supply of them, they are reliable and trustworthy, and their use is seen as legitimate.

Democracies themselves may not need to frequently tap into third party resources for conflict resolution. We have already highlighted the experience democracies have with non-violent conflict resolution technologies and the transparency of their commitments as factors that contribute to the successful and efficient navigation of democratic dyads towards pacific,
bilateral conflict resolution (see also Dixon, 1998:117). An “out of court settlement” effect may also be at work: Because democracies can credibly signal a willingness to use third parties should bilateral talks fail, jointly democratic dyads are more likely than others to successfully end a disagreement without third party assistance.⁸

If democracies do not necessarily use third parties when dealing with each other, is third party management really a democratic norm that can form the basis of an international democratic community? Yes. Democracies effectively demonstrate and propagate third party management because they adopt community-based forms of non-violent conflict resolution at home, are willing to use third parties if bilateral talks fail on the international scene, and convince others that third parties are legitimate and trustworthy arbiters of international disagreements. As legalists point out, democracies are more apt to respect domestic judicial processes and limited government, and are therefore more likely to extend the rule of law to their international relations (Simmons 1999:211; Slaughter 1995). As the democratic community’s strength is enhanced, this rule of law should cover a larger portion of the global political sphere. Just as citizens in democracies can comfortably ask courts to resolve their disagreements, states in a system dominated by democratic norms would be at ease asking third parties to step in.

In part, this comfort stems from a sense of trust in conflict management processes that is established by norms of bounded competition that are prevalent in democratic systems (Dixon 1993, 1994). Community-based procedures for resolving disputes carry over into international affairs to the extent that democratic states are more willing to accept binding forms of third party conflict management (Powell and Mitchell 2005, Raymond 1994). Prominent democracies serve as norm entrepreneurs when they are able to relate third party management success stories, such as the U.S. and Britain’s establishment of an international court of arbitration to handle the
Alabama claims (Mitchell 2002). As the democratic community increases its membership, net strength, and the members’ commitment to liberal ideas, we should see the acceptability of third party conflict management “cascading” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) to nondemocracies. Not only does a strong democratic community power this cascade by encouraging the use of neutral third parties to settle intractable disagreements (Dixon 1993, 1994, 1996; Raymond 1994) and legitimating third party efforts, it does so by increasing the availability of high quality mediators. An environment characterized by a strong democratic community nurtures a population of democracies (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003) and international organizations (Risse-Kappen, 1995; Shannon 2005), potential mediators that are more likely to exhibit reliability and transparency (Lipson 2003, Grigorescu 2003) and therefore gain disputants’ trust. Through democracies’ wide-reaching free presses (Sullivan and Gartner, Forthcoming) and IOs’ information-gathering and dissemination functions (Grigorescu 2003), a strong democratic community can also promote the reliability and transparency of third parties. In short, as the democratic community takes hold, the domestic institutional features that allow for compromise and non-violent conflict resolution in democratic societies allow for similar types of peaceful conflict resolution in international affairs.

Widespread faith in third party mediation is also based on a strong democratic community’s system of property rights and its establishment of the sanctity of contracts. States involved in disagreements with democracies may find the involvement of third party managers attractive because democracies tend to comply with agreements they sign (Gaubatz 1996; Leeds 1999; McGillivray and Smith 2000; Lipson 2003). In addition, lessons from the transaction costs literature in economics (e.g., Williamson 1996) suggest that as the democratic community gets stronger, its system of property rights and legal infrastructure propagates, so even those outside
the system are more willing to accept a peaceful, brokered settlement. Advanced contracting skills lead to more efficient non-violent outcomes, and this technology is exported to non-democratic states through the democratic community. This explanation is supported by Bull’s (1977) contention that the sanctity of contracts and stability of property rights (as well as freedom from violence) are essential for maintaining order in international society. An important component of allowing oneself to be vulnerable to third party mechanisms is a confidence that the resulting agreement provides the expectation of a better alternative than non-cooperation. As the democratic community strengthens, it becomes more capable of fostering this confidence by providing more reliable, transparent third party guarantors. Formal enforcement mechanisms may not be necessary to achieve this confidence. A stalwart democratic community encourages adoption of non-violent resolution technologies and uses its strength to stand behind its norms. In a world of anarchy, norms and institutions are aided by strength, and the adoption of these norms and the use of institutions becomes more likely when they are supported by strength.

Because a strong democratic community promotes the legitimacy and trustworthiness of third parties by producing a system characterized by bounded competition, reduced contractual uncertainty, and improved expectations about the sanctity of contracts, we propose:

_Hypothesis 1 – Third Party Management: As the strength of the democratic community increases, the likelihood of third party conflict management increases._

We also believe that the democratic community’s institutions play an essential role in the promotion of third party conflict management. While entrepreneurs may have played a prominent role in establishing a norm for third party conflict management, institutions help facilitate the spread of democratic norms through a process of socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Mitchell 2002). States join IOs to gain a variety of benefits such as economic development, security enhancement, and gaining a voice in global affairs. Because states want
to maintain these diverse benefits, they have incentives to adhere to the general principles and norms promoted by the organizations. In this sense, IOs serve as agents of collective legitimization and conformity (Claude 1966; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).

Two principles commonly advocated in the charters of prominent IOs are the promotion of democracy and peaceful conflict resolution. For example, numerous institutions (e.g., the Organization of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe, the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU)) call for the use of good offices, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and so forth. Because institutional enforcement and benefits extend to even non-democratic members, such states are socialized to adopt democratic conflict management practices. In this way, institutions serve as the “third leg” of a Kantian peace (Russett and Oneal 2001). Therefore, we expect that when contending states jointly belong to organizations promoting peaceful conflict resolution methods, they are more amenable to third party mediation efforts, regardless of their own regime type.

_Hypothesis 2 – Institutional Socialization: As two disputing states increase the number of shared memberships in peace-promoting institutions, their odds for third party settlement are enhanced._

Not only do we expect a vital democratic community and its institutions to yield more frequent third party settlements, we also anticipate that certain _types_ of actors will be more common as third parties. Because democracies externalize their norms of resolving disagreements through bargaining and negotiation, they are more likely to offer mediation, good offices, and the like to disputing states. States at odds with one another are also more likely to accept interventions by democracies. Given that they emphasize the rule of law in their external affairs and are more transparent, liberal states should be viewed as more legitimate and
trustworthy third parties. When considering the universe of third party management cases, we postulate:

Hypothesis 3 – Democratic Management: As the strength of the democratic community increases, democratic states are more likely to become involved as conflict managers.

International organizations are also more likely to act as third parties as the democratic community takes hold. Beyond providing a nurturing environment for third party management, institutions also directly act as third party managers. For instance, the Arab League’s charter specifically calls for its own involvement in disputes that could escalate to war between members (Article 5). Consistent with its charter, the Arab League mediated 21 times from 1950-1990 (Berkovitch and Schneider, 2000:159). The frequency of Arab League mediation efforts ranks lower than only those of the United Nations (158 mediations), the U.S. (84), the OAU (38), Syria (31), and the OAS (26). Beyond the call for peaceful conflict management in many IO charters, institutional conflict management also occurs frequently because IOs provide neutral forums for bargaining, decrease uncertainty by providing information to disputing parties, raise the reputation costs for reneging on agreements, and provide credible guarantees for carrying out agreements reached (Keohane, 1984; Mitchell and Hensel, 2005). Because democracies are more committed to forming and sustaining IOs (Russett and Oneal, 2001), our expectation is that a strong democratic community will foster the conflict management efforts of institutions, which we present as the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4 – Institutional Management: As the strength of the democratic community increases, international institutions are more likely to become involved as conflict managers.

Broadly speaking, a Kantian culture improves the chances for third party involvement by states and international institutions alike. Wendt (1999: 305) argues that when Kantian values
become deeply internalized, “states identify with each other, seeing each other’s security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own.” Thus conflicts take on more importance as actors come to view security threats to one member of their community as threatening to all. This parallels a citizen’s attitude toward crime in her neighborhood. Even if her home is not vandalized, she may be concerned because she views it as a threat to her community’s security. In this regard, the stronger the democratic community, the more proactive states and institutions will be in controlling conflict escalation around the globe.

**Results from a Democratic Community: Conflict Management Success**

Once a third party comes to the aid of claimants, there is no guarantee that this mechanism will be successful. For example, only 57% of third party conflict management efforts in the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, and the Middle East have produced agreements between the disputants. Potent and reliable, the resources and commitments of a strong democratic community should bolster third parties’ chances for success. Regardless of the third party’s type (free or not, state or IO), the democratic community supports conflict managers’ work by providing templates for institutional frameworks designed to prevent future hostilities, recommending reconciliation tactics, dispatching peace keeping forces, offering neutral meeting grounds, making side payments to buy off disputants’ claims, and coercing provocative claimants into conciliation.

A good example of the role the democratic community plays in promoting third party managers’ chances for success can be seen in the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) ongoing efforts to settle the controversy between Honduras and Nicaragua over delimitation in the Caribbean Sea. In 2000 and 2001, the ICJ’s work was bolstered by the OAS, which helped broker a series of agreements in which both claimants agreed to separate their ground forces,
create a demilitarized zone in the Caribbean, mark their border in the Gulf of Fonseca, and create a verification mission to ensure compliance. This series of confidence-building measures should increase the likelihood that adjudication of the claim will resolve the conflict. As a bulwark of the liberal society, the OAS also provided community-wide support for the 1971 recommendation of a three-state mediation committee (Argentina, Mexico, and Guatemala) in the fishing rights disagreement between Ecuador and the U.S. Upon recommendation by the mediation committee, the OAS adopted a resolution calling for the disputants and mediators to resume talks to resolve the quarrel. Faced with widespread pressure to do so, Ecuador and the United States compliantly continued their discussions.

In short, a strong democratic community should not only increase the frequency of third party management, it should also improve the success of these efforts. Because success is a broad concept, we consider three specific indicators of success, which we stipulate in working hypotheses below: 1) whether a given attempt to settle a contentious issue produces an agreement, 2) whether an agreement reached ends a contentious issue claim, and 3) whether claimants comply with agreements reached. These specific measures of success are similar to those found in other empirical analyses of conflict management (e.g. Dixon 1996; Goertz and Regan 1997). Therefore we posit a general success hypothesis along with its three testable, working hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 5-Success: Third party conflict management efforts are more likely to be successful in resolving a contentious issue claim when the democratic community is strong and when its institutions are influential.*

*Working Hypothesis 5a-Agreements: States are more likely to reach agreements to resolve a contentious issue claim when the democratic community is strong and when its institutions are influential.*
Working Hypothesis 5b-End of claim: Agreements reached are more likely to end contentious issue claims when the democratic community is strong and when its institutions are influential.

Working Hypothesis 5c-Compliance: States are more likely to comply with agreements reached to resolve contentious issue claims when the democratic community is strong and when its institutions are influential.

With these hypotheses in mind, we now turn to the task of testing our arguments.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

To empirically evaluate our hypotheses, we utilize data collected by the ICOW project. Rather than starting with a set of militarized disputes or wars and coding the issue at stake (e.g., Holsti 1991; Mitchell and Prins 1999), the ICOW project collects data based on verbal contention over an explicit issue between two or more states. This allows one to more fully study the process by which conflicts are managed, as some contentious issues are resolved peacefully, while others lead to open hostility.

The ICOW project identifies contentious issue claims based on explicit evidence of contention involving official representatives of two or more nation-states over the issue type in question. For example, the territorial claims dataset is based on evidence that officials from at least one state make explicit statements claiming sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state. The project has collected data on two additional distinct types of contentious issues: maritime claims, which involve explicit contention between two or more states over the ownership, access to or usage of a maritime area; and river claims, which involve explicit contention over the usage of an international river. The spatial-temporal domain of the data used in this paper is the set of all qualifying claims to territory from 1816 to 2001, maritime zones from 1900 to 2001, and cross-border rivers from 1900 to 2001 in the Western Hemisphere (North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean),
Western Europe, and the Middle East. In these regions, the project has identified 191 dyadic territorial claims, 68 dyadic maritime claims, and 82 dyadic river claims.

Two ICOW data formats are relevant for our analyses, the dyad-year claim data and the settlement attempt data. The dyad-year claim data includes a case for each year of every dyadic claim. For example, the Belize territorial claim involves two dyads: Guatemala-United Kingdom (1868 - 1981) and Guatemala-Belize (1981 - present). There are 114 dyad claim years for the Guatemala-UK dyad and 21 dyad claim years for the Guatemala-Belize dyad (through 2001). The settlement attempt data provides information on each peaceful effort to settle a contentious issue claim. This includes, *inter alia*, start and end dates of the attempt, the type of settlement attempt (bilateral negotiations or third party efforts such as good offices, inquiry, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, etc.), the identity of any third party, whether an agreement was reached, and whether the claimants complied with resulting agreements. For the Belize claim, ICOW codes 16 settlement attempts between Guatemala and Great Britain and 12 attempts between Guatemala and Belize. Each peaceful attempt represents a single case.

**Independent Variables**

The independent variables employed in our analysis are similar across the various models we estimate, so we describe them first. The summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table 1. Our first theoretical variable of interest is the strength of the Democratic Community. We adopt the measure developed by Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon (2003), which multiplies each state’s CINC score (the Correlates of War (COW) project’s measure of industrial, demographic, and military capabilities, first introduced by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey in 1972) by its Polity 4 score (Marshall and Jaggers 2000). The scores are then summed over all states in the international system during each year, creating a systemic measure of the democratic
community’s strength. This composite indicator not only accounts for the number of democracies relative to the number of autocracies in the international system, but also captures the strength of democracies relative to the strength of autocracies and the intensity of liberal democratic regimes relative to autocratic regimes. The measure ranges from –4.998 to 5.604, with the democratic community becoming stronger as the variable’s value increases.

To capture the influence of the democratic community’s institutional framework for pacific dispute settlement, we create a *Joint Institutions* variable. This variable is measured as the count of multilateral treaties and institutions calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes that both claimants have signed and ratified. The greater the number of treaties that both states have accepted, presumably, the greater should be the pressure on them to peacefully settle their disputes and to call on the assistance of third parties (H3). We measure membership in qualifying institutions with the ICOW project’s Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) dataset, which records the signature and ratification of all multilateral treaties and institutions (at either the global or regional level) that explicitly call for the pacific settlement of political disputes among members (Hensel 2001; Mitchell and Hensel 2005). Examples include general references to resolving disputes peacefully (e.g. UN Charter, Article 2), pledges to refrain from the use of force (e.g. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Article 1), and procedures for resolving disputes with third party assistance, including good offices and mediation (e.g. 1907 Hague Treaty, Articles 2-8), arbitration (e.g. 1902 Treaty on Compulsory Arbitration), and adjudication (International Court of Justice, Optional Clause).

*Control Variables*

Because we expect democratic dyads to employ their internal conflict resolution technologies and take advantage of their expectation of compliance with third party mediation,
we create a dyadic regime type variable, Democratic Dyad, utilizing the democracy scores from the Polity 4 data set. If both states score six or higher on the democracy scale, we consider the dyad to be jointly democratic. Although we expect democratic dyads to be more amenable to third party conflict management if bilateral efforts fail, we also recognize that democratic dyads are much more likely to settle their grievances on their own. In analyses of ICOW territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere, Hensel (2001) and Mitchell (2002) demonstrate a greater tendency for democracies to resolve claims with bilateral negotiation (relative to third party settlement). Overall, then, democratic dyads may not be more likely to actually use third party services. However, when they do call on third parties, we expect democratic dyads to be more successful at resolving their claims and complying with resulting agreements (Mitchell and Hensel 2005).

Another relevant variable is the Salience, or importance, of each claim. Conflicts that are highly salient to one or both claimant states are more difficult to resolve and more likely to lead to militarized conflict (Hensel 2001; Hensel, Mitchell, and Sowers 2003). In the territorial, river, and maritime data, salience is measured through a variety of indicators, each addressing an aspect of the claim that should increase its value to one or both sides. We combine six dichotomous indicators of salience for each issue type to create an overall index. Each indicator contributes up to two points to the index, one point per claimant for which the indicator is present, producing a total range from zero to 12.12

Our next control variable addresses the extent of the settlement attempt. The ICOW project codes four specific topics covered by peaceful attempted settlements. Two comprise efforts aimed at general settlement—negotiations meant to settle the entire claim and negotiations over a smaller part of the claim. The other two constitute procedural and functional efforts—
negotiations over procedures for future settlement of the claim\textsuperscript{13} and over the use of the claimed territory, river, or maritime area without attempting to settle the question of ownership\textsuperscript{14}. A dummy variable, \textit{Procedural/Functional SA}, represents whether the settlement attempt was procedural or functional. Such settlements should be less likely to involve third parties because they do not resolve the larger issues at stake and should therefore facilitate agreements.

Our final control variable is \textit{Hostility}, which controls for a dyad’s history of hostile interaction. This variable is included only in the dyad-year analyses to help compensate for temporal dependence. \textit{Hostility} is measured using Crescenzi and Enterline’s (2001) Interstate Interaction Score (Conflict Interaction Level version). The score captures conflictual interaction as a shock to the dyadic relationship, and the impact of these shocks decays over time in the absence of additional activity. The variable ranges from zero (neutrality) to negative one (maximum hostility) and is lagged one year.

**Dependent Variables**

Direct bilateral negotiation is the most frequent method employed for the peaceful settlement of disputes, constituting 70% of all settlement attempts. The remaining 30% involve third parties; 13% of which are binding, and 87% of which are non-binding. Among the 26% of non-binding forms of third party settlement (as a percentage of all settlement attempts), mediation is the most frequent, occurring in 9% of all settlement attempts.

The two dependent variables created to test Hypotheses 1 and 2 capture the involvement of third parties in attempts to settle contentious claims. In the dyad-year format, we code the \textit{Third Party Settlement} variable one if a third party attempt began during a given claim dyad year, and zero otherwise.\textsuperscript{15} Zero thus includes both years where no settlement attempt was initiated and years where bilateral negotiations began. In the settlement attempt data, we code the \textit{Third Party
A third dependent variable is used to test Hypothesis 3, which argues that democratic states should be more active as conflict managers when the democratic community is strong. ICOW codes up to six third party (state and non-state) actors for each peaceful settlement attempt. We considered the third party actor to be democratic if it was a COW system member and scored six or higher on the Polity 4 scale. Any settlement attempt that involved one or more democratic states was coded as a one for this Third Party DemActor variable. Zero represents cases of bilateral settlement or instances where third party actors are non-democratic.

To test Hypothesis 4, we look at the involvement of institutions in the conflict management process, most of which are IOs such as the UN or OAS. Our belief is that IOs playing a conflict management role generally embody democratic values, especially if their charters explicitly call for peaceful conflict management. We create a Third Party IOActor variable that is scored one if one or more institutions are involved in a given settlement attempt, and zero otherwise.

Our final hypotheses—5a, 5b, and 5c—examine the influence of the democratic community’s strength and its institutions on the success of conflict management efforts. We use three dichotomous measures of success: 1) whether an agreement was reached for a given attempt (Agreement Reached), 2) whether the attempt ended the claim (Settlement Ends Claim), and 3) whether the claimants complied with agreements that were reached (Compliance). Compliance is coded as one if both states followed through with the terms of the agreement within five years. As the strength of the democratic community and its institutions increases,
agreements should be easier to reach, claims should be more likely to end if agreements are reached, and claimants should be more likely to comply with the terms of agreements reached.

**EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS**

**Third Party Settlement**

Part I of Table 2 tests the third party management hypothesis (H1) and the institutional socialization hypothesis (H2). Model 1 provides results from the dyad-year analysis. As predicted, third party settlement attempts become more likely as the democratic community gains strength ($p = 0.005$). Democratic dyads themselves are not significantly more likely to embrace third party settlement ($p = 0.376$). A dyad’s total joint membership in peace-promoting institutions is positively correlated with third party settlement attempts ($p = 0.068$). Consistent with our theoretical argument, this finding suggests that the democratic community’s institutional mechanisms successfully promote pacific settlement. Members of these institutions are more open to third party settlement.$^{18}$

Our control variables perform as expected. As the claim becomes more salient, states are more likely to allow third party settlement attempts ($p < 0.001$), suggesting that issue salience triggers more frequent attempts to sort out entrenched claims. Also as expected, previous hostility within the dyad makes third party attempts significantly less likely ($p < 0.001$).

Using cases of attempted settlements, Model 2 assesses support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. It compares how states try to resolve issue claims peacefully, whether through bilateral negotiations (zero) or with third party assistance (one). Again we find support for Hypothesis 1; strengthening the democratic community leads to a higher likelihood of third party involvement ($p = 0.026$) relative to bilateral negotiations. As the democratic community strengthens, it fosters confidence in third party mechanisms. We also find support for Hypothesis 2; the more
overlapping memberships in institutions calling for pacific dispute settlement, the greater a dyad’s chances of involving a third party ($p < 0.001$). Recall that our measure of institutions focuses on organizations with charters that explicitly call for peaceful conflict management. The positive and significant influence of this measure on the likelihood of third party conflict management supports our view that member states adhere to the general principles and norms promoted by these organizations to capture a broad array of institutional benefits. The substantive effects for both key theoretical variables are notable. As we increase the strength of the democratic community from its minimum to its maximum value, while holding all other variables at their mean or mode, the probability of third party settlement increases by 19%. States that share membership in eleven conflict managing institutions are 22% more likely to turn to third parties than are states that share none.

Democratic dyads are more likely to turn to bilateral settlement instead of third parties ($p < 0.001$). As expected, democracies in these dyads can reliably tap into their own liberal norms and institutions, thereby forgoing the need to reach out for help.\textsuperscript{19} The other control variables have the expected signs and statistical significance. High salience makes third party involvement more likely ($p = 0.001$), while procedural and functional settlement attempts make it less likely ($p < 0.001$). Overall, the results from Models 1 and 2 confirm Hypotheses 1 and 2, demonstrating that a strong democratic system and institutional socialization enhance the prospects for pacific, community-based approaches to conflict management.

**Democratic and Institutional Management**

The test results for Hypotheses 3 and 4 are reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 2. Are third parties more likely to be democratic states and international institutions when the democratic community is strong? Yes. Democracies are more likely to get involved as
managers as the democratic community takes hold \((p < 0.001)\). The substantive impact of this variable is the largest in Model 3, increasing the probability of third party settlement by 24\% as we go from the minimum to the maximum level for the strength of the democratic community.

Democracies are less likely to be involved, however, in claims between two other democracies \((p = 0.001)\). Institutions also are more likely to serve as mediators when the democratic community is strong \((p < 0.001)\), but they do so regardless of whether the dyad is democratic or not \((p = 0.604)\). Increasing the strength of the democratic community from its minimum to its maximum value raises the probability of institutional third party settlement by 14\%. Not surprisingly, the variable with the largest impact on institutional third party involvement is the \textit{Joint Institutions} variable \((p < 0.001)\). States with shared membership in 11 institutions calling for peaceful conflict resolution are 35\% more likely to involve institutions as managers than dyads belonging to no such institutions. At the same time, a higher level of joint institutional membership has no bearing on democratic third party involvement \((p = 0.690)\).

Both hypotheses are supported by these results, indicating that systemic democratic community strength translates into democracies’ and institutions’ greater ability and willingness to help resolve contentious claims in the international arena.

More salient issues affect neither institutional involvement \((p = 0.177)\) nor democratic involvement in settlement attempts \((p = 0.715)\). Procedural and functional settlement attempts have no impact on democratic involvement \((p = 0.353)\) and make institutional involvement less likely \((p = 0.002)\).

\textbf{Success}

Finally, the test results for the success hypotheses—5a, 5b, and 5c—are reported in Part II of Table 2. Models 5, 6, and 7 assess the likelihood that a settlement attempt will produce an
agreement, end the claim, and result in compliance by the primary parties if an agreement is reached. Here we find mixed results. A stronger democratic community makes compliance with agreements more likely \((p = 0.064)\), but has no effect on helping claimants reach agreements \((p = 0.328)\) or ending the overall issue claim \((p = 0.387)\). We should note, however, that the effect of the democratic community is significant \((p = 0.04)\) for ending the overall issue claim when estimated in a bivariate model. One explanation for the weak findings on reaching agreements is that as the democratic community gets stronger, it becomes involved with more intractable disputes. Management efforts would presumably be more effective in less contentious claims, leaving the highly salient, and most difficult, claims to resolve. This problem is at least partially accounted for by controlling for issue salience. In addition, robustness checks using selection models prove to be consistent with the analysis in Table 2.

Shared membership in institutions committed to the norm of peaceful conflict resolution promotes the termination of claims \((p = 0.118, p = 0.052\) in bivariate model) and compliance with agreements \((p = 0.005)\), but does not affect whether or not agreements are reached \((p = 0.319)\). A vigorous democratic community coupled with the institutionalization of the community’s pacific norms produces agreements that are more likely to be carried out and to terminate contentious conflicts. This supports our contention that the democratic community and its organizations provide formal mechanisms for enforcement, socialization, and conformity.

Interestingly, democratic dyads are less likely to reach agreements facilitated by third parties \((p = 0.061)\), but any agreements realized are more likely to be complied with \((p = 0.010)\). We expect that this first result is a function of the fact that the rare democratic dyads that require third party assistance have failed to use their internal conflict management technologies successfully, setting the stage for a difficult negotiation using third party help. The compliance
result contradicts Raymond’s (1996) finding that democratic dyads using arbitration are no more likely to succeed than non-democratic dyads. Moreover, our dyadic finding is consistent with Putnam’s (1988) argument that domestic constituencies decrease the range of acceptable bargains for two negotiating democracies, while simultaneously helping ensure that any bargain reached will be ratified and carried out. The remaining controls perform as expected.

Robustness of the Empirical Analyses

We perform a variety of tests to determine if our empirical results are robust. These include clustering standard errors to control for non-independence of observations and thinking carefully about alternative explanations for these results, most notably hegemony. We clustered the standard errors in our logit analyses in two ways: by dyad and by claim. Clustering by dyad captures the interdependence among cases involving the same countries (e.g. all US-Canada claims), while clustering by claim controls for the dependence among settlements (or dyad years) for a particular claim (e.g., the US-Canada Gulf of Maine claim). When clustering the standard errors for all seven models in Table 2, our results are virtually identical. The strength of the democratic community maintains its effect in all models when clustering standard errors except in Model 2, where its coefficient is no longer significant ($p = 0.239$, by dyad; $p = 0.241$, by claim). On the other hand, the results for Democratic Community are the same (positive coefficient, statistically different from zero) in Model 1’s dyad-year analyses when clustering is employed. Likewise, the results for Joint Institutions are robust to clustering. The only model where the influence of institutions becomes insignificant is in Model 1, where the coefficient becomes indistinguishable from zero when clustering standard errors by dyad ($p = 0.145$) and by claim ($p = 0.615$). Clustering by dyad actually strengthens our findings for the influence of Joint Institutions on ending the claim (Model 6), making the coefficient statistically significant.
In short, while a few of our findings are slightly altered when clustering standard errors, we are confident in the summary inferences from our empirical analyses.

As healthy skeptics, we are also compelled to ask if the results found here are due to the realities of hegemonic dominance rather than to the norms of a liberally minded community. Does the U.S. (or did Britain) simply force claimants to use mediators? Empirical investigations do not support this alternative hegemonic explanation (Kadera and Mitchell, Forthcoming). We utilized two measures of hegemony: 1) \(\text{CON}\): a systemic power concentration measure developed by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972), which ranges from zero (perfect balance of power among major powers) to one (complete preponderance by a single state) and 2) \(\text{Hegemon}\): a spliced measure of British (1816-1899) and U.S. (1900-2002) CINC scores, capturing each leading state’s share of total system military, economic, and demographic capabilities (the range is 0.157 to 0.337 for UK and 0.131 to 0.384 for U.S.). Our indicator for \(\text{Democratic Community}\) is clearly capturing something different than hegemony. Not only is hegemonic power inversely related to \(\text{Democratic Community}\), the correlations are modest (-0.40 with \(\text{CON}\), -0.36 with \(\text{Hegemon}\)).

We entered each of these indicators for hegemony (separately) in all seven models presented in Table 2. The \(\text{CON}\) measure fails to reach statistical significance in five of the seven models; higher levels of systemic power concentration (towards preponderance) are more likely to produce third party settlement (Model 2, \(p < 0.01\)) and more likely to end the overall claim (Model 6, \(p < 0.05\)). The other measure of hegemony, the spliced UK-U.S. CINC score, is significant and positive only in Model 2 (\(p < 0.01\)). More importantly, virtually none of our findings for \(\text{Democratic Community}\) or \(\text{Joint Institutions}\) are altered by inclusion of either \(\text{CON}\) or \(\text{Hegemon}\) (\(\text{Joint Institutions}\) becomes insignificant in Model 1, but achieves significance in
Model 6). Hegemonic power alone, then, cannot account for the spread of peaceful democratic practices. Rather, “it is the consensual normative order that binds ruler and ruled and legitimates power” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 289).

**CONCLUSION**

The charge to uncover the causal mechanisms linking democracy and peace is essential. To be sure, a multitude of these causal mechanisms operate at every level of analysis. In this paper we have explored the linkage between global democratic community and dyadic peace. Our argument, that a strong global democratic community and its institutions cultivate norms of pacific dispute resolution, provides a glimpse into a complex web of linkages between influence, norms, and contentious world politics. Democracies and international institutions tap into this global strength to aid settlement attempts, offering democratic techniques to help resolve claims that threaten peace. Third party conflict managers are able to reflect the norms available from the democratic community. Increases in the strength of the community lead to more reliable third party conflict management options. This same strength makes such options more appealing to governments involved in settlement attempts, thereby increasing the willingness to adopt these techniques.

This research suggests a critical interdependence between the capability to exercise power, the ideas that become the product of this influence, and the embodiment of those ideas in formal organizations. Such a conclusion challenges schools of thought that deal with the study of power and ideas independently. The success of the global democratic community does not exclusively rest on a belief in the inherent appeal of liberal ideals, nor on the strength of a democratic hegemon. Rather, democratic beliefs must be broadly demonstrated in the structure of many states’ regimes and aggregate capabilities must chiefly rest in the hands of democracies.
Furthering the degree to which states belong to the democratic community’s institutions can be accomplished by offering states incentives for joining. Although a strong democratic community can use its muscle to encourage autocracies to use third parties, resulting agreements are more likely to be successful when those autocracies have bought into an IO with pacific ideals. World leaders interested in global peace should therefore consider an expansion of the benefits allocated to members of institutions such as the OAS, OAU, and Arab League.

More research is needed, both to uncover the plentitude of causal linkages between democracy and peace and to further our understanding of how norms, capability, and IOs combine to affect political interaction. This initial investigation nonetheless presents an optimistic assessment of the Kantian vision of a global democratic peace: democratic norms and institutions permeate world politics and have a pacific impact on contentious disputes.
### Table 1: Summary Statistics for ICOW Claim Data

#### I. Dyad-year Claim Data (N = 9202)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Settlement</td>
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<td>0.192</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Settlement</td>
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<td>0.291</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Community</td>
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<td>2.241</td>
<td>-4.998</td>
<td>5.604</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Dyad</td>
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<td>Hostility</td>
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</table>

#### II. Peaceful Settlement Attempt (SA) Data (N = 1444)**

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<td>Third Party Inst. Actor</td>
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* Each case represents a (challenger-target) dyad-year for each claim.

** Each case is a peaceful attempt to settle a claim (with variables merged on the year the settlement began).
Table 2: Third Party Settlement Attempts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I. Probability of Settlement Attempt</th>
<th>II. Success of Settlement Attempts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1: Third Party Settlement</td>
<td>Model 2: Third Party SA</td>
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<td>(SA data)</td>
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<td>Key Variables</td>
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<td>Model 4: Third Party IOActor</td>
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* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01, All tests are one-tailed, with robust standard errors.
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ENDNOTES

1 There is some debate about the monadic claim. Benoit (1996), Leeds and Davis (1999), and Rummel (1995) find evidence that democracies are less likely to be involved in conflicts.

2 Paul R. Hensel and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell direct the ICOW project. We employ Version 1.0 of the dataset, which is available at http://www.icow.org.

3 The data that produced these statistics are described in the Research Design section of this paper.

4 For Bull, security against violence, observance of agreements, and property rights stability (1977:5) are necessary for any society. While this is consistent with our conception of a democratic society, we argue that alternative norms can constitute different types of societies.

5 Rather than seeing a democratic or autocratic society, Bull (1977) and Wendt (1999) identify Hobbesian, Grotian (or Lockean), and Kantian types of international societies or cultures of anarchy. Bull (1977:41) perceives that “the modern international system in fact reflects on all three of the elements singled out…: the element of war and struggle for power among states, the element of transnational solidarity and conflict, cutting across the divisions among states, and the element of co-operation and regulated intercourse among states.” Wendt argues that which culture dominates a particular anarchic system must be known in order to understand the role that interest and power play within it (1999:310).

6 Many challenge the theoretical arguments and empirical findings in the democratic peace literature (e.g., Elman 1997, Farber and Gowa 1995, Mansfield and Snyder 1995, and Oren 1995), but we do not thoroughly discuss these debates due to space limitations.

7 Democracies have a further advantage with respect to promoting their norms relative to autocracies because they emphasize community building and working through international institutions, which facilitate norm cascades.

8 One sees a similar pattern when looking at the “out of court” influence of the International Court of Justice on international negotiations. If both disputants recognize the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, they are 20% more likely to reach agreement over a contentious issue, 15% more likely to comply with any
agreement reached, and 4% less likely to experience a militarized dispute (Mitchell et al. 2005). Thus, the presence of a viable third party mediator produces more efficient bargaining outside the courtroom.

9 This figure is based on all third party settlement attempts. Bilateral talks are fairly successful, producing agreements 58% of the time. Breaking down third party settlements into binding and non-binding types reveals more variation in agreement rates. 89% of binding settlements produced agreements, compared to a mere 51% of non-binding settlement attempts.

10 The ICJ’s proceedings on the matter began in 1999.

11 The data for Western Europe includes territorial and river claims, while the data for the Middle East only codes river claims.

12 For territorial claims, the six indicators used to construct the general measure of territorial claim salience include (1) territory that is claimed by the state as homeland territory, rather than as a colonial or dependent possession, (2) territory located on the mainland rather than an offshore island, (3) territory that is contiguous to the nearest portion of the state, (4) territory that is known or suspected to contain potentially valuable resources, (5) territory with a militarily or economically strategic location, and (6) the presence of an explicit ethnic, religious, or other identity basis for the claim. The six indicators used to measure river claim salience are (1) river location in the state’s homeland territory rather than in colonial or dependent territory, (2) navigational value of the river, (3) level of population served by the river, (4) the presence of a fishing or other resource extraction industry on the river, (5) hydroelectric power generation along the river, and (6) irrigational value of the river. The six indicators for maritime claim salience are (1) maritime borders extending from homeland rather than colonial or dependent territory, (2) a strategic location of the claimed maritime zone, (3) fishing resources within the maritime zone, (4) migratory fishing stocks crossing into and out of the maritime zone, (5) the known or suspected presence of oil resources within the maritime zone, and (6) relation of the maritime claim to an ongoing territorial claim (involving maritime areas extending beyond either claimed coastal territory or a claimed island).
For example, the parties may agree to submit the claim to third party arbitration as Chile and Argentina did in 1979 when accepting Papal mediation of the Beagle Channel dispute.

For example, Britain and Argentina have signed a number of functional agreements related to fishing and oil off the coast of the Falkland Islands, but these agreements do not resolve the sovereignty issue.

Third party settlement attempts make up 3.87% of the values in the dyad-year data. Bilateral attempts comprise 9.33% of the data.

30% of the cases for this variable are third party attempts. The rest are bilateral attempts.

23 institutions helped resolve claims in the three regions we examine. They include the League of Nations, the United Nations, the Vatican, the OAS, CARICOM, the EU, the Arab League, and a number of regional courts, boundary commissions, and peace conferences. A full list is available upon request.

The substantive effects for the dyadic model are small for all variables, which is not surprising given the large number zeros for our dependent variable (96%). Increasing the strength of the democratic community from its minimum to its maximum (holding all other variables at their mean or mode) increases the probability of third party settlement by 2.9%. Increasing the total number of joint institutions from zero to 11 increases the probability of third party settlement by 1.3%. The variable with the largest substantive effect is salience, which increases the probability of third party settlement by 8.2% as we move from the least to the most salient claims.

Mitchell (2002) discusses other possible explanations for this negative relationship. For example, the US and the UK are involved in a large percentage of cases involving one or more democratic claimants. Major powers may be better equipped to settle disagreements on their own; and may prefer to resolve them without the assistance of third parties. Mitchell (2002) also finds that the greater the difference between the challenger’s and the target’s capabilities, the lower the likelihood of third party settlement.

This may also be a function of US and UK dominance in the Western Hemisphere and Western European claims data.
21 The Procedural/Functional SA variable is removed from this analysis because such settlements, by
definition, cannot end the overall claim.

22 We thank Will Moore and Bruce Russett for pointing out this possibility to us.

23 We used a (Heckman) maximum likelihood probit model with sample selection. The first stage
assesses the likelihood of third party involvement, and the second stage assesses the likelihood of
compliance given an agreement is reached. The Democratic Community variable is positive and
statistically significant ($p = 0.001$) in the first stage, but negative and statistically significant ($p = 0.002$)
in the second stage. Complete results of this analysis are available from the authors.

24 These analyses are available from the authors upon request.