

A SUPPLY SIDE THEORY OF THIRD PARTY CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

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Abstract: We develop and test a theory of the supply side of third party conflict management. Building on an existing formal model of mediation (Kydd, 2003), we consider the influence of broad, top-down systemic forces on mediator decisions. Our previous work suggests that a strong democratic community and its institutions bolster the likelihood that third party mediation will occur. We integrate this effect of the democratic community into a game theoretic mediation model by adding a simple cost term that punishes a mediator for lying about one side's resolve for fighting and getting caught. By increasing the supply of credible mediators, global movements toward a strong democratic community increase the likelihood that potential mediators will intervene in contentious conflicts. Empirical analyses of dyadic data from 1816-2001 provide support for our theory, with third party conflict management occurring more frequently when the strength of the democratic community and global institutions rises. We also find that democratic and powerful states serve as mediators more often, and that trade ties, alliances, issue salience, and distance influence third party decisions to mediate.

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INTRODUCTION

A healthy and growing literature suggests a systemic relationship between democracy and conflict (Crescenzi and Enterline 1999; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Harrison, 2004; Huntley, 1996; Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; McLaughlin, 1997; Mitchell, Gates, and Hegre 1999; Oneal and Russett, 1999). With little exception, scholars support an optimistic long term prognosis: global levels of democracy ameliorate worldwide levels of conflict. As was the case for research on dyadic democratic peace, the robustness of the empirical finding raises deeper questions about the causal processes responsible for producing the phenomenon. Our previous work (Mitchell, Kadera, & Crescenzi, 2004) emphasizes third party conflict management as an important causal mechanism producing systemic peace. Examining the influence of systemic forces at the dyadic level, we demonstrate that pairs of states are more likely to turn to third party conflict management to help resolve contentious issues when the democratic community and its institutions are strong. We also show that a strong democratic community enhances the chances for agreements to be struck, while the presence of strong institutions bolsters compliance with any agreements reached. Taken together, these findings present an optimistic view about Kantian systemic forces and their influence on conflict management strategies.

Our ideas about the systemic democratic peace emphasize the top-down influence of the democratic community and its institutions. For example, as the democratic community has grown, a norm for third party conflict management has been adopted by non-democratic states even though they lack internal institutions and norms that would make them naturally amenable to outside mediation (Mitchell, 2002). Our top-down

theory of the democratic peace implies that there are evolutionary processes pushing the system towards a realization of the Kantian peace. While domestic institutions are imperative for starting the process of cooperation, they do not tell us the whole story, because the behavior of democratic states in international relations transforms future interactions between *all* states. From the constructivist perspective, Wendt similarly reasons that international interactions transform state identities and interests (1999).

We theorize more carefully about these systemic processes by developing and testing a formal model of the supply side of third party conflict management. In particular, we examine choices by potential mediators, distinguishing when they actually mediate from when they choose to remain on the sidelines.¹ Existing models from Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) and Kydd (2003) guide our research, although they do not consider the influence of broad, top-down systemic forces on mediator decisions. Our previous work suggests that a strong democratic community bolsters not only the likelihood that third party mediation will occur, but also increases the chances for success.

While considering these systemic effects, we also account for dyadic level relationships between potential mediators and states in conflict. We argue that mediators will get involved more frequently when they perceive that ongoing conflicts threaten the viability of a strong democratic community. Further, because democratic states promote the creation and spread of international organizations, mediation by international institutions will also be more proactive when conflicts threaten the larger democratic

¹ In this paper, we use the term mediation interchangeably with third party conflict management. Our dataset includes third party involvement in multiple forms: good offices, inquiry or conciliation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, multilateral negotiations, and peace conferences. Thus while we refer to decisions

community. We also contend that conflicting parties prefer certain types of mediators (democratic states and powerful states), and incorporate Werner and Lemke's suggestion that political (alliance ties), economic (trade ties), and structural (distance) similarities between potential mediators and disputing states will enhance the chances for third party involvement (1997).

Empirical analyses of the Issues Correlates of War (ICOW) project's dyadic Western Hemisphere data on territorial, maritime, and river claims from 1816-2001 support our theory. Third party conflict management occurs more frequently when the strength of the democratic community and the population of global institutions rise. In addition, democratic and powerful states serve as mediators more often, and short distances, trade relationships, and alliance ties between potential mediators and conflicting parties (especially the target) make third party mediation more likely.

A SUPPLY SIDE THEORY OF THIRD PARTY CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Much of the academic literature on third party conflict management (3PCM) focuses on when 3PCM occurs and what factors enhance its success. Scholars identify factors that make conflicting parties more amenable to outside mediation, such as moderate levels of conflict, and factors that promote successful mediation, such as the level of conflict, parties' motivation and commitment, their level of resources, and the type of issue at stake (Wall and Lynn, 1993). Relatively little work examines the supply side of mediation, leaving us with underdeveloped answers to questions about how many potential mediators exist in a given situation, when potential mediators choose to offer their services to conflicting parties, and what kind of actors are likely to intervene.

to mediate, we are using the term broadly to include all forms of third party involvement in interstate conflicts.

Bercovitch and Schneider (2000:146) emphasize this weakness of the conflict management literature: “Unfortunately, we do not know the reasons why certain actors become more active in the mediation market, nor whether features such as impartiality are an important asset in a mediator’s inventory of attributes.”

In an attempt to answer the question of who mediates, Bercovitch and Schneider theorize mediation as a three-step process (2000:151). Whether contending parties will be amenable to mediation, they argue, is a function of their preferences and beliefs, their capabilities, their attributes, and the structure of the global and regional system. In the second stage, the choice of a particular mediator is a function of power, preference, proximity, and the price of mediation. Finally, whether mediation is successful depends on the mediator’s strategies, skills, and beliefs.

Focusing on the second stage of this process, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) develop an expected utility model of a potential mediator in a two-party conflict. The model incorporates fixed (administrative, lost face, etc.) and variable (disutility if mediation fails) costs for mediation, as well as the ideological distance between the mediator’s ideal position and the preferences of the conflicting parties. The model “suggests that potential mediators, if they ever want to be chosen by conflict parties, move rationally towards a neutral position” (Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000:152-153). Fisher (1995) and Young (1967) similarly find that successful mediators are fair and impartial. However, Bercovitch and Schneider (2000:149) further contend that a neutral stance is not sufficient for a mediator to be selected; rather, it must be coupled with the third party’s ability to promote an agreement through the use of leverage, power, and

influence. Thus, it is no surprise that the United States served as a mediator more often than any other state in the Cold War era.

The impact of impartiality on the use and effectiveness of mediation has been the subject of extensive debate in the conflict management literature. Scholarship on democratic institutions, for example, suggests that the neutrality of courts involved in domestic disagreements builds citizens' confidence in their state's use of international courts (Caldeira and Gibson 1995). Yet, Kydd finds that in order to be credible enough to prevent conflict escalation, mediators must be biased in favor of one side (2003). We are left with a dilemma: impartiality improves disputants' confidence in a mediator, but biased mediators are the most credible and successful. A mechanism for making impartial mediators credible would resolve this dilemma. In order to identify such a mechanism, we investigate the mediation marketplace. In particular, we consider the international democratic community's ability to provide credible and impartial mediators.

We begin by incorporating the democratic community's influence into an extant model of conflict mediation (Kydd 2003). The revised model uses the strength of the international democratic community as a method of ensuring the credibility of mediators and thereby lowering the probability of conflict. We then consider an important market force responsible for producing this Kantian supply of mediators: a strong democratic community. In sum, we seek to understand the relationships between democratic community and conflict operating at a systemic level as well as how systemic forces affect micro-level decision making by disputants and mediators.

The Basic Bargaining Game

The study of strategic incentives and mediation is captured nicely by Kydd in a simple bargaining game between two players (2003). Player 1 (P1) and Player 2 (P2) attempt to resolve a dispute over a one-dimensional bargaining space. Player 1 does not know whether P2 is resolved, thus adding the key ingredient of uncertainty that breeds conflict. The role of the mediator (M) is to signal P2's resolve to P1. She does so after Nature determines P2's resolve & signals it to M.² After receiving the signal from M about P2's resolve, P1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to P2. P2 either accepts the offer or the two states engage in conflict.

Kydd's interesting conclusion is that the mediator must be biased towards P1 in order to convey credible information about P2's type. Only a friend's advice to cut a deal is credible. This is driven by the assumption that the mediator's payoff for a peaceful resolution is some proportion ($-1 < \beta < 1$) of P1's piece of the pie (x): βx . When β is positive, the mediator is biased in favor of P1, and has an incentive to work to increase x . When β is negative, M is biased in favor of P2 and works to minimize x . When $\beta = 0$, then M is considered to be unbiased, since she no longer has any incentive to alter the agreement. M's payoff for a conflictual result is $\beta x - c_m$, where c_m is the mediator's cost of war. No matter what the value of β , M always prefers a peaceful outcome. Herein lies the problem in terms of the mediator's credibility.

Kydd demonstrates that unbiased mediators ($\beta = 0$) always have an incentive to send the signal that P2 has low costs for conflict and thus high resolve. Only for certain levels of bias ($0 < \beta^* < \beta < \beta^{**}$) can M credibly signal high resolve to P1. The

² There is some error associated with Nature's signal of P2's type to the mediator. Kydd's results hold for cases in which the error is less than or equal to 0.5, or cases in which the signal is informative.

implication is that unbiased (or P2 biased) mediators will be less successful in their endeavors because they cannot credibly signal P2's resolve. Only when a mediator that is biased in your favor tells you to cut a deal do you have an incentive to listen.

Credibility Derived from the Democratic Community

So how does the democratic community influence this result, if at all? Can the norms that fuel and propagate from this community influence the behavior of the mediator in meaningful ways for the disputants? Here we argue that mediators connected to the democratic community can have unique costs and incentives that make their participation in dispute mediation more credible.

The mediator's payoffs in Kydd's game are strictly determined by β , x , and c_m . This is clearly the place to start, but additional dimensions of the mediation endeavor might influence the mediator. For example, some mediators may worry about their reputations as mediators, as they may be in the business of mediating disputes. Lying during the process (even for the noblest of reasons) could backfire in future attempts with the same or other disputants. Further, the prospect of manipulating private information in the dispute (P2's resolve) may violate the norms that motivate the third party conflict manager in the first place. We propose adding a simple cost function that punishes the mediator for lying *and* getting caught: $-b(S_n - S_m)$, where b is the probability that the mediator will be revealed (busted) as lying in its signal to P1, and $(S_n - S_m)$ captures the degree to which the signal sent by M differs from the signal sent by Nature. Getting caught means public international recognition that the mediator misrepresented the resolve of P2. We assume here for simplicity that this recognition takes place after the game has resolved.

The first component, b , captures the transparency of mediation based on democratic norms. We argue that b increases with the strength and pervasiveness of the democratic community. The transparency of Western-style international institutional processes makes it harder for the mediator to fudge the signal in the interest of garnering peace. Thus, as the democratic community gets stronger, the probability of getting busted for lying increases, making the lying strategy less palatable to the mediator. This probability can also be influenced by the degree to which the mediator is integrated into the democratic community and its norms of conflict resolution. For example, it may be more likely that the World Court gets busted for misrepresenting P2 because it is fundamentally a product and proponent of Western norms concerning property rights and conflict resolution. Its merit as an institution and its ability to attract disputants rely upon its transparency and accessibility. The second component, $(S_n - S_m)$, means that bigger lies represent bigger costs for the mediator *if* she gets caught. When the mediator relays the true signal, this is zero.

By adding this component to the mediator's utility function, we can derive a threshold, b^* , where $b > b^*$ motivates the mediator to stick to the true signal *even if it is unbiased* ($\beta = 0$).³ The threshold is influenced in part by the costs of war for the mediator (c_m) and the degree of deviation from the true signal ($S_n - S_m$). For example, smaller deviations from the true signal increase b^* , making the mediator more willing to venture sending a false signal. Not surprisingly, c_m is positively related to b^* as well; as the costs of failure increase, the incentive rises to use any means necessary to achieve peace.

We can show that this threshold exists when $\beta=0$. Work is in progress for other values of β .

Testable Hypotheses

One conclusion from this discussion is that as the democratic community strengthens, we are more likely to see democratically influenced mediators that are perceived as credible and unbiased. The probability of getting busted is a function of the transparency of the mediation process and the systemic environment. Mediators that are integrated with the democratic community are more likely to get caught if they are lying, and a stronger democratic community brings more opportunity for transparency. In other words, a potent democratic community produces a greater supply of the preferred type of mediators, namely those that are credible and unbiased. As a result, there is a concomitant rise in the frequency of using 3PCMs. Thus the norms underpinning dispute resolution in democratic societies, as well as the transparency of democratic political processes produce an important systemic phenomenon:

H1: Increases in the strength of the democratic community increase the likelihood that potential mediators will serve as third party conflict managers.

Not only will a Kantian culture improve the number of credible mediators and increase chances for third party involvement by states, we also expect an increasing presence of international institutions to enhance the supply of third party conflict managers as well. When Kantian values become deeply internalized, “states identify with each other, seeing each other’s security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own” (Wendt, 1999: 305). Thus conflicts involving others take on more importance as actors come to view security threats to one member of their community as threatening to all. This parallels a citizen’s attitude toward crime in

her neighborhood. Even if her home is not vandalized, she may be concerned because she views it as a threat to her community's security. In this regard, the stronger the democratic community, the more proactive institutions will be in controlling conflict escalation around the globe, which implies that the supply of third party conflict management will be positively related to the global supply of international organizations. And, as noted above, international institutions strongly tied to the democratic community will be more transparent, face higher costs for lying, and thus provide a more trustworthy source for mediation. As the number of these institutions grows, the supply of credible third party conflict management efforts by these organizations and their member states will increase as well.

H2: Increases in global international organizations increase the likelihood that potential mediators will serve as third party conflict managers.

Beyond the systemic effects of the democratic community and its institutions, we also anticipate that states more fully integrated into the democratic community will suffer greater costs and higher chances for getting busted. Because democratic states have stronger ties to the systemic democratic community, they face greater penalties for lying. In other words, $S_n - S_m$ is greater for democratic mediators than it is for non-democratic mediators. Democratic regimes are also more transparent than their non-democratic counterparts, thus they incur larger probabilities of being caught when lying about P1's resolve (i.e., they incur higher values of b). Increases in both terms produce higher costs ($-b(S_n - S_m)$) for democratic mediators that are deceptive, which implies that democratic mediators will be trusted more often to be truthful in the signals they send. These higher costs translate into greater trust in the impartiality of democratic mediators, which should

in turn produce a higher likelihood for mediation by democratic states relative to non-democracies.

H3: As the potential mediator's democracy level increases, the greater the likelihood that state will serve as a third party conflict manager.

To summarize, our supply side theory of third party mediation suggests that increases in the strength of the democratic community and its institutions will increase the supply of third party conflict management efforts. Our theory also predicts that democratic states will mediate more often than autocratic states because the democratic community imposes greater costs on democracies for deceptive behavior. Beyond these key theoretical expectations, we also anticipate that decisions by potential mediators will be influenced by 1) additional characteristics of the potential mediator, 2) the relationships between the potential mediator and states involved in interstate conflicts (challenger and target), and 3) the characteristics of the dispute or issues at stake.

Some mediators should be more attractive than others due to their power and mediation skills (Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000). With respect to state mediators (rather than individuals, non-governmental organizations, or IOs), two characteristics are especially relevant—a state's power and its regime type. As noted above, democratic states should be viewed by disputants as more attractive mediators. We also believe that powerful states will be more attractive mediators and will have the resources to mediate more often. Bercovitch and Schneider's (2000:158) analyses support this assertion: the United States has engaged in by far the largest number of mediations (84), but other

strong states are at the top of their list as well (United Kingdom-16, India-12, France-11, and the Soviet Union-5).⁴

Ties between potential mediators and disputing states also play a role. States with closer ties should be more willing to offer their mediation services in order to protect their allies and investments. We look at three types of relationship variables: geographic distance, trade, and alliances. We expect states farther away from conflicts to be less willing to mediate (unless they are extremely powerful); thus, distance should be negatively correlated with decisions to mediate.⁵ On the other hand, strong trade or alliance ties between a potential mediator and disputing states should increase the potential mediator's willingness to get involved. With respect to trade, third parties have incentives to mediate if they trade a good deal with one of the contesting parties. Trade partners mediate in order to protect their economic interests and avoid wartime disruption of economic productivity and exchange (Russett and Oneal, 2001). Strong alliance ties should also generate more assistance with peaceful conflict management, especially if allies are reliable partners and could be dragged into war (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell, 2000).

Finally, we anticipate that some conflicts will generate more outside management efforts than others. Conflicts over highly salient issues and contests that have escalated to extreme levels of violence will draw more outside attention than less salient, non-militarized issues. Hensel (2001) finds, for example, that highly salient territorial claims

⁴ It is interesting that many of the weaker states near the top of Bercovitch and Schneider's (2000:158) mediation list are located in the Middle East. Syria was the second most frequent mediator in the world from 1950-1990 (31 mediations), followed by Saudi Arabia (14), Sudan (9), Egypt (8), Libya (6), and Iran (5). While we do not capture regional conflict levels in our analyses below, this may become important in the future, especially when we analyze regions other than North, Central, and South America.

⁵ The logic of this hypothesis parallels Most and Starr's (1989) view of geography as a limiting condition for opportunity.

are more likely to attract all forms of peaceful conflict management (bilateral talks, mediation, arbitration, adjudication, etc.) and more likely to become militarized compared to low salience issue claims. In addition, conflicts between states with vastly different military and economic capabilities may generate less interest from potential mediators than those between relative equals. The United States, for example, in a conflict with a weak state (such as Mexico), has the luxury of bargaining for what it wants bilaterally. Strong states, because of their advantaged bargaining position, can avoid outside entanglements and impose their wills. Potential mediators are apt to view these highly asymmetric conflicts as situations where their services are more likely to be rejected; hence, we should observe fewer mediation efforts in these cases.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Research on the supply side of mediation has been hindered by the dearth of conflict management data spanning long time periods. For example, Bercovitch and Schneider's (2000) supply-side analysis of "who mediates," though innovative, examines only the total number of times states mediated in the Cold War era and introduces a potential selection bias by not accounting for situations where potential mediators remain on the sidelines even when clear opportunities for involvement are present. To evaluate decisions by potential mediators, we need to identify 1) a set of conflicts where mediation could have been offered, 2) a subset of cases in which third party conflict mediation occurred, and 3) criteria for determining which states should be counted as potential mediators.⁶ With respect to the first criteria, we utilize Version 1.0 of the ICOW

⁶ The reader should keep in mind that we are looking only at mediation by states in this paper. We do not compare these efforts to third party conflict management by individuals, IGOs, or NGOs, although this would certainly be a fruitful approach for future research. In a different paper, we find that democratic states and international organizations are more likely to serve as third party conflict managers when the

project's Western Hemisphere data on contentious issue claims (Hensel, 2001; Mitchell, 2002; Hensel, Mitchell and Sowers, 2004).⁷ The ICOW project identifies contentious issue claims based on explicit evidence of contention involving official representatives of two or more nation-states over a particular issue.

The ICOW project has collected data on three types of contentious issues:

1) *territorial claims*, where one state challenges sovereignty over a specific piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state, 2) *maritime claims*, which involve explicit contention between two or more states over the ownership, access to, or usage of a maritime area, and 3) *river claims*, which involve explicit contention over the usage of an international river. This database is useful for our purposes because the universe includes all disagreements on "claims," regardless of whether they were resolved peacefully or violently, bilaterally or with 3PCM, or not at all. For each contentious claim, ICOW records every distinct peaceful attempt to settle it, distinguishing between bilateral negotiations and third party efforts.

We begin with the ICOW claim dyad-year unit of analysis. In this particular dataset, every ongoing year of a claim is a separate observation. The project distinguishes between the challenger state that seeks to change the status quo, and the target state that seeks to preserve it. Thus each case is a unique challenger-target-year combination. For example, Canada challenged US ownership of the Gulf of Maine in 1976 and this claim was ongoing until 1984 when it was resolved through an International Court of Justice decision. For this particular claim, there are a total of nine

democratic community is strong and when the disputing parties are members of numerous conflict managing IOs (Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi, 2004).

⁷ This dataset is available at <http://data.icow.org>.

claim dyad-years. For all three issues in the Western Hemisphere ICOW data (territory, maritime, and river), there are a total of 9181 claim dyad years from 1816-2001.⁸

Our next step creates a case for every potential mediator in each ongoing dyad year of each claim. While this makes our dependent variable (3PCM) an extremely rare event (less than 1% ones), this strategy has two key advantages. First, eliminates the selection bias problem associated with analyzing only cases in which at least one mediator intervenes. By considering third parties that did attempt settlements as well as those that were potential mediators but did not act, we can identify the factors that determine when 3PCM will occur and which actors are prone to intercede. Second, it allows us to capture temporal variation in our independent variables. We adopt two approaches for determining the set of potential mediating states. First, we use a generous assumption and include all states (Correlates of War (COW) system members) in the entire Western Hemisphere, as well as major powers and other European states that have intervened in conflicts in the Americas at any time.⁹ Second, we narrow the criteria based on state power, dropping potential mediators that fall below the annual median composite indicator of national capabilities (CINC) score for the Western Hemisphere.¹⁰ Given that powerful states are viewed as more credible and capable mediators, this method strikes us as reasonable. The less restrictive strategy produces 237,930 cases of potential mediator claim dyad-years, while the conservative one reduces the total number of cases to 159,507.

⁸ Territorial claims are coded from 1816-2001, while maritime and river claims are coded from 1900-2001.

⁹ Extra-regional actors include Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Australia, and New Zealand.

¹⁰ We used the median rather than mean CINC score due to the asymmetry in this distribution introduced by US power. We utilized an inductive strategy to determine which criteria might help us narrow down the full set of cases. A comparison of criteria based on contiguity and power status (very similar to those used for identifying politically relevant dyads) revealed power status to be a better predictor of who mediates.

For each of these potential mediator claim dyad-years, our dependent variable equals one if the potential mediator served as a third party conflict manager at least once in that dyadic claim in that year, and zero otherwise. In the full dataset, a potential mediator's services were used in 558 of 237,930 cases (0.23%), while in the restricted dataset, they were put to use in 517 of 159,507 cases (0.32%).

Our model has three primary theoretical variables, the strength of the democratic community, the population of global international organizations, and the regime type of the potential mediating state. To measure the strength of the democratic community, *DemCom*, we adopt the measure developed by Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon (2003), which first multiplies each state's CINC score (the COW measure of industrial, demographic, and military capabilities, first introduced by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey in 1972) by its Polity IV score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). The products are then summed over all states in the international system during each year, creating a systemic measure of the democratic community's strength. This indicator not only accounts for the number of democracies relative to the number of autocracies in the international system, but also captures the strength of democracies relative to the strength of autocracies and the intensity of liberal democratic regimes relative to autocratic regimes (Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon, 2003:238). The measure ranges from -4.998 to 5.604, with the democratic community becoming stronger as the variable's value increases.

Our next variable, *TotalIOs*, assesses the prominence of global institutions. We count the annual number of international organizations using a dataset collected by the COW project (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke; Wallace and Singer, 1970). Data before 1965 were coded in five year intervals, thus it was necessary to interpolate

between these values to create annual scores. Because the growth in global institutions reflects, in part, an increase in the number of states in the international system, we normalize the measure by dividing the annual IO frequency by the total number of COW system members.¹¹

Our final theoretical variable, *Polity_{PM}*, captures the regime type of the potential mediating state. Regime scores are calculated with data from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). We follow Russett and Oneal's (2001) approach, subtracting a polity's autocracy score (0-10) from its democracy score (0-10), which creates a range from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). The democracy and autocracy scales combine information from several institutional characteristics of a polity: the competitiveness of political participation, the level of constraints on the chief executive, and the openness and competitiveness of chief executive recruitment (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995: 471).

Several control variables are employed to capture the characteristics of the potential mediator, the relationships between the potential mediator and the claimants (challenger and target), and the characteristics of the issues at stake. We include a variable for the potential mediator's capabilities, *Caps_{PM}*, as captured by its CINC score (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). Ranging from zero to one, CINC measures a state's average share of global military, economic, and demographic power. Increases in the potential mediator's CINC score should be positively related to decisions to mediate. Relational variables include dyadic trade between the potential mediator and the challenger, *Trade_{PM-Ch}*, as well as dyadic trade between the potential mediator and target

¹¹ We also employed a natural log measure for global IOs, and the results are almost identical to those presented below.

state, $Trade_{PM-T}$. Trade data are taken from Barbieri's (2002) International Trade Data, Version 1.1.¹² The dyadic trade measure denotes the total value of imports to state A from state B plus the total value of imports to B from A. Another relationship variable, $Alliance_{PM-Ch}$, captures similarities in foreign policy positions of the potential mediator and the challenger. And the $Alliance_{PM-T}$ variable makes a parallel assessment for the potential mediator and the target. Both $Alliance$ variables are equivalent to Signorino and Ritter's measure of alliance portfolio similarities, or S (1999). Higher values of the $Alliance$ variables imply stronger similarities in alliance portfolios, and thus we anticipate them to be positively related to third party decisions to mediate.¹³ To represent the enhanced opportunities for conflict management as distance declines, we include a gauge for the distance between capital cities, based on the "great circle" distance formula (Fitzpatrick and Modlin, 1986). Greater distances between the capital cities of the potential 3PCM and the challenger, $Distance_{PM-Ch}$, and between the 3PCM and the target, $Distance_{PM-T}$, should discourage intervention by the third party.

Finally, we measure characteristics of the issue at stake using two indicators: issue salience and challenger/target power asymmetries. Taken from the ICOW data, $Salience$ taps a variety of issue attributes, each of which is thought to increase the issue's value to one or both sides. The salience index combines six dichotomous dimensions, with each dimension contributing up to two points to the salience index, one point per

¹² We make one very important modification to Barbieri's measures for dyadic trade, recoding missing data as zero. This is one of the steps Gleditsch (2002) advocates in improving such measures, due to the enormous amount of missing data. We plan to compare various trade measures more carefully in future analyses to determine if our particular measure produces the results below.

¹³ This data was obtained from EuGene (Bennett and Stam, 2000). We use the S measures that are global and weighted.

claimant state for which the indicator is present, producing a range from zero to twelve.¹⁴

As noted above, more highly salient claims are expected to produce more attention from the international community and should enhance the likelihood that a potential mediator will intervene. Our final variable, $CapRatio_{Ch/T}$, considers the relative power asymmetries between the challenger and target state. We divide the challenger's composite CINC score by the target's CINC score; higher values indicate more pronounced power advantages for the challenger, which should diminish the likelihood of outside mediation. The $CapRatio_{Ch/T}$ variable ranges from .0002168 to 17,691.33.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES

Our theory produces three testable hypotheses: H1) Increases in the strength of the democratic community increase the likelihood that potential mediators will serve as third party conflict managers, H2) Increases in global international organizations increase the likelihood that potential mediators will serve as third party conflict managers, and H3) As the potential mediator's democracy level increases, the greater the likelihood that state will serve as a third party conflict manager. Empirical assessments of these hypotheses are presented in three tables. Table 1 presents logit analyses of third party management

¹⁴ For territorial claims, the six indicators used to construct the general measure of territorial claim salience include (1) territory that is claimed by the state as homeland territory, rather than as a colonial or dependent possession, (2) territory located on the mainland rather than an offshore island, (3) territory that is contiguous to the nearest portion of the state, (4) territory that is known or suspected to contain potentially valuable resources, (5) territory with a militarily or economically strategic location, and (6) the presence of an explicit ethnic, religious, or other identity basis for the claim. The six indicators used to measure river claim salience are (1) river location in the state's homeland territory rather than in colonial or dependent territory, (2) navigational value of the river, (3) level of population served by the river, (4) the presence of a fishing or other resource extraction industry on the river, (5) hydroelectric power generation along the river, and (6) irrigational value of the river. The six indicators for maritime claim salience are (1) maritime borders extending from homeland rather than colonial or dependent territory, (2) a strategic location of the claimed maritime zone, (3) fishing resources within the maritime zone, (4) migratory fishing stocks crossing into and out of the maritime zone, (5) the known or suspected presence of oil resources within the maritime zone, and (6) relation of the maritime claim to an ongoing territorial claim (involving maritime areas extending beyond either claimed coastal territory or a claimed island).

by potential mediators, Table 2 presents robustness checks for our models, and Table 3 provides substantive effects for each statistically significant variable.

Five models are presented in Table 1. Model 1 evaluates the effect of the democratic community's strength on the probability that states will serve as mediators using a bivariate specification. We find support for our first hypothesis, observing an estimated parameter (0.145) that is positive and statistically significant ($p < .001$). The supply of impartial mediators increases as the democratic community grows, which means mediation services are then utilized more often. This result holds, even when adding additional variables (Models 3 and 4).¹⁵ The substantive effect is quite large as well; as we move from the minimum to the maximum observed values for democratic community strength, the probability of third party mediation increases by 243% (for Model 4). We should note, however, that the rareness of the dependent variable produces small predicted probabilities in general, much like other dyadic analyses in the international relations field.

Model 2 in Table 1 evaluates our second hypothesis. As global institutions proliferate, the provision of credible third party conflict management efforts increases as well. International institutions strongly tied to the democratic community provide a trustworthy source of information through enhanced transparency and higher costs for lying. Substantive effects for global institutions are similar in size to the effects for democratic community strength. As we move from the minimum to the maximum value for global institutions observed in our sample, the probability of third party mediation increases by 271%. These results parallel our prior research, in which we find that

increases in the claimants' joint IO memberships make institutional third party conflict management more likely. Analyses here do not directly link state mediators to their institutional memberships, but this would be a fruitful path for future work.

Model 3 (Table 1) assesses the simultaneous effects of democratic community strength and global institutions. Both have positive and statistically significant effects on the probability of third party mediation. However, when we add control variables, the high correlation between these two key variables introduces multicollinearity. Thus, we present two separate “full” models. In Model 4, we estimate the effects of the democratic community and all of the control variables discussed previously. Again we find support for hypothesis 1, with increases in the strength of the democratic community significantly increasing the probability of 3PCM. Similarly, the results for global institutions are robust to the inclusion of various controls (Model 5).

In addition to these systemic hypotheses, we also derived a hypothesis at the state level (H3), predicting that democratic states would serve more often as mediators due to their greater transparency and higher costs for getting busted. This hypothesis finds support in Models 4 and 5 (Table 1): increases in a potential mediating state's democracy score significantly augment its likelihood of intervening. We find that fully democratic states are 91% more likely to mediate in comparison with fully autocratic states. The systemic effects seem to have larger substantive purchase, but factors at the micro and macro levels surely work together because increases in the global democratic community coincide with a greater pool of potential mediators with more liberal regime scores.

¹⁵ One particular model specification does render the strength of the democratic community variable insignificant, which is one which includes all twelve variables. The high correlation between global institutions and the strength of the democratic community introduces multicollinearity in the model.

Several of the control variables have significant effects on decisions by potential mediating states to intervene in contentious issue claims. Consistent with Bercovitch and Schneider's (2000) work, we find that strong states are much more likely to mediate than weak ones. This variable has the largest impact on third party interventions, raising the probability of mediation by 9,931% when we compare the weakest states in our sample to the strongest (the United States). In fact, the predicted probability for US mediation in any given claim dyad-year is 0.1304, which is a huge effect in comparison to all other variables. The US served as mediator in close to 25% of 558 cases where 3PCM occurred, with the next most active third party conflict managers being Argentina (7.7%), Peru (7.5%), Brazil (7.1%), and Chile (6.8%).

Numerous variables capturing relationships between the potential mediating state and the challenger or target states are significant. A large great circle distance between the potential mediator's and challenger's capital cities diminishes chances for intercession (-229% total effect as we move from minimum to maximum distance). The effect of distance between the potential mediator and the target is not discernable from zero. Trade and alliance ties both matter, but only when considering the relationship between the potential mediator and the *target* (i.e., the state trying to preserve the status quo). Increases in dyadic trade significantly enhance the likelihood of third party mediation ($p < .001$); the substantive effect is very large as well, increasing the probability of mediation by 1,763% (moving from minimum to maximum trade levels). Increases in alliance portfolio similarities with the target state also spur potential mediators into action ($p < .001$), raising the probability of 3PCM by 300%.

Characteristics of the issue at stake also appear to be relevant. The greater the issue's salience to the challenger and target claimants, the higher the probability of third party intervention ($p < .001$). Claims with the highest salience level (12) are 278% more likely to witness 3PCM than are low salience claims (1). The relative power of the challenger and target are also significant ($p < .05$). As the challenger becomes notably stronger than the target state, potential mediating states are less apt to serve as third party managers. Third party conflict management is 100% less likely in the most asymmetric dyads than it is under conditions of parity. However, we cannot discern whether this result is due to fewer mediation offers being made (a selection effect), or mediation offers being turned down by strong challengers (a rejection effect?).

DISCUSSION

Our theoretical model finds sturdy empirical support. A strong international democratic community and a vast web of global institutions promote the supply of credible, unbiased mediators. This in turn increases the willingness of disputing states to allow outsiders to intervene. Beyond these systemic effects, we also find that states more closely tied to the global democratic community, namely democracies, are more likely to serve as third party conflict managers. Taken together, our results suggest one plausible causal mechanism by which systemic democracy fosters peace. The greater supply of acceptable mediators provided by democratic community and its institutions helps diffuse contentious issues before they reach the stage of deadly violence, or at least helps to minimize the chances for recurrent conflict. In addition to this augmenting the supply of 3PCM, the democratic community's and global institutions' pacific efforts seem to be fairly effective as well. Our previous research indicates that these key systemic factors

help the parties reach agreements, resolve their underlying issues, and comply with agreements reached (Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi, 2004).

Our theoretical model also sheds new light on the tradeoff between increasing the likelihood a mediator will be preferred because it is objective and improving its chances of being successful by insuring it is biased. We demonstrate that the supply of different types of mediators (biased or unbiased) varies depending on conditions in the international system. Specifically, increases in the strength of the democratic community and the frequency of international institutions alter the supply of objective mediators. Through its greater transparency and penalties for deceitful behavior, the democratic community encourages mediators to send truthful signals to disputing parties, and the community also produces greater trust in mediation efforts. This is why we observe more frequent and more effective mediation efforts when the democratic community and its institutions are strong. Thus Kydd's (2003) conclusions about biased mediators being more effective could be altered if we consider the possibility that global democratic forces make it more difficult for mediators to lie, increasing the supply of neutral mediators.

In the future, we plan to compare conflict management efforts by various types of third parties: states, IGOs, and NGOs. Previous research using the ICOW Western Hemisphere data (Mitchell and Hensel, 2005) reveals that democratic disputants are more amenable to conflict management efforts by IOs, while autocratic disputants turn to state mediators. This finding is consistent with our theory, in that democratic states, having strong ties to the democratic community, view its conflict management institutions with greater legitimacy. Another interesting finding (not reported above) relates to the

institutional memberships of the disputing parties, or claimants. Previously, we found that increases in joint IO memberships by the challenger and target states make third party conflict management more likely¹⁶, and also increase the probability that both sides will comply with agreements reached (Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi, 2004). We added this variable to the analyses in this paper and discovered that the measure for total IO memberships (global plus regional) had no significant effect on third party decisions to mediate. However, when we disaggregated the variable into regional IO memberships versus global IO memberships, an interesting pattern emerged. In the Western Hemisphere, increasing joint regional IO memberships between the challenger and target states *decreases* the likelihood of 3PCM by potential mediating states, while joint global IO memberships between the challenger and target *increases* chances for state mediation. It could be that regional IOs, such as the Organization of American States, are playing a more prominent role as conflict manager for disputes arising among member states. However, definitive conclusions must be put on hold until we are able to compare mediation efforts by all types of third party actors more carefully.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we develop and test a theory of the supply side of third party conflict management. Building on an existing formal model of mediation (Kydd, 2003), we consider the influence of broad, top-down systemic forces on mediator decisions. Our previous work suggests that a strong democratic community and its institutions bolster the likelihood that third party mediation will occur. We integrate this effect of the democratic community into a game theoretic mediation model by adding a simple cost

¹⁶ This measure captures only those IOs that call for peaceful dispute settlement in their charter, and is coded based on the Multilateral Treaties of Pacific Settlement (MTOPS) database.

term that punishes a mediator for lying about one side's resolve for fighting and getting caught. This produces an aggregate expectation, namely that global movements towards a strong democratic community and increases in the population of global institutions increase the supply of conflict management by third parties.

Analyses of Western Hemisphere data on territorial, maritime, and river claims from 1816-2001 support our theory. Third party conflict management occurs more often when the strength of the democratic community and the number of global institutions rise. In addition, democratic and powerful states serve as mediators more often and short distances, trade relationships, and alliance ties between potential mediators and conflicting parties (especially the target) enhance the likelihood of third party mediation.

Our results emphasize the top-down effects of the democratic peace. An important mechanism for producing the aggregate relationship between systemic democracy and peace is the increasing use of third parties to help resolve conflicts in world affairs. The transparent nature of democratic regimes and global institutions enhances their abilities to market credible and impartial mediators, opening up greater possibilities for resolving conflicts and pushing the system closer to a Kantian peace.

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Table 1. Third Party Decisions to Mediate, 1816-2001

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
<u>Primary variables</u>					
<i>DemCom</i>	.145*** (.027)		.104*** (.032)	.120*** (.029)	
<i>TotalIOs</i>		.416*** (.083)	.244* (.100)		.669*** (.100)
<u>Potential mediator (PM) characteristics</u>					
<i>Polity_{PM}</i>				.047*** (.009)	.034*** (.009)
<i>Caps_{PM}</i>				11.35*** (.554)	12.34*** (.554)
<u>Relationship between potential mediator & claimants</u>					
<i>Distance_{PM-Ch}</i>				-.0001*** (.00003)	-.0001** (.00003)
<i>Distance_{PM-T}</i>				.00002 (.00003)	.00002 (.00003)
<i>Trade_{PM-Ch}</i>				-.000004 (.000009)	-.000009 (.00001)
<i>Trade_{PM-T}</i>				.00002*** (.000004)	.00002*** (.000004)
<i>Alliance_{PM-Ch}</i>				-.124 (.249)	.040 (.251)
<i>Alliance_{PM-T}</i>				1.44*** (.241)	1.37*** (.244)
<u>Claim characteristics</u>					
<i>Salience</i>				.115*** (.021)	.124*** (.021)
<i>CapRatio_{Ch/T}</i>				-.002* (.0008)	-.002* (.0008)
Constant	-6.42*** (.085)	-6.608*** (.123)	-6.65*** (.128)	-8.16*** (.279)	-8.91*** (.316)
Observations	237,930	237,930	237,930	198,881	198,881
Chi-square	31.93***	27.35***	37.94***	571.2***	601.2***
Pseudo R ²	.004	.004	.005	.083	.087

*<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-tailed)

Table 2. Third Party Decisions to Mediate, 1816-2001; Robustness Checks

	Model 1 (robust SE)	Model 2 (cluster by dyad)	Model 3 (cluster by claim)	Model 4 (PM > median CINC)
<u>Primary variables</u>				
<i>DemCom</i>	.120*** (.022)	.120* (.061)	.120 (.087)	.142*** (.030)
<u>Potential mediator (PM) characteristics</u>				
<i>Polity_{PM}</i>	.047*** (.008)	.047*** (.006)	.047*** (.011)	.023* (.009)
<i>Cap_{PM}</i>	11.35*** (.489)	11.35*** (.921)	11.35*** (1.05)	10.8*** (.571)
<u>Relationship between potential mediator & claimants</u>				
<i>Distance_{PM-Ch}</i>	-.0001* (.00005)	-.0001*** (.00003)	-.0001* (.00007)	-.0001*** (.00003)
<i>Distance_{PM-T}</i>	.00002 (.00006)	.00002 (.0001)	.00002 (.0002)	-.00004 (.00003)
<i>Trade_{PM-Ch}</i>	-.000004 (.00001)	-.000004 (.000008)	-.000004 (.00001)	-.000005 (.000009)
<i>Trade_{PM-T}</i>	.00002*** (.000002)	.00002*** (.000001)	.00002*** (.000005)	.00002*** (.000004)
<i>Alliance_{PM-Ch}</i>	-.124 (.204)	-.124 (.275)	-.124 (.460)	-.038 (.256)
<i>Alliance_{PM-T}</i>	1.44*** (.232)	1.44*** (.031)	1.44*** (.457)	1.41*** (.249)
<u>Claim characteristics</u>				
<i>Saliency</i>	.115*** (.022)	.115 (.102)	.115 (.109)	.116*** (.022)
<i>CapRatio_{Ch/T}</i>	-.002** (.0006)	-.002 (.001)	-.002 (.002)	-.001* (.0008)
Constant	-8.16*** (.236)	-8.16*** (.140)	-8.16*** (.599)	-7.74*** (.285)
Observations	198,881	198,881	198,881	141,368
Chi-square	900.0***	--	278.7***	491.5***
Pseudo R ²	.083	.083	.083	.080

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (one-tailed)

Table 3: Marginal Effects on State Decisions to Mediate

	Minimum	- 1 s.d.	+1 s.d.	Maximum	Percent change
<u>Primary Variables</u>					
<i>DemCom</i>	0.0007	0.0013	0.0020	0.0024	243%
<i>TotalIOs</i>	0.0007	0.0011	0.0024	0.0026	271%
<u>Potential mediator (PM) characteristics</u>					
<i>Polity_{PM}</i>	0.0011	0.0013	0.0020	0.0021	91%
<i>Caps_{PM}</i>	0.0013	0.0013	0.0028	0.1304	9931%
<u>Relationship between potential mediator & claimants</u>					
<i>Distance_{PM-Ch}</i>	0.0023	0.0020	0.0013	0.0007	-229%
<i>Trade_{PM-T}</i>	0.0016	0.0016	0.0017	0.0298	1763%
<i>Alliance_{PM-T}</i>	0.0006	0.0011	0.0024	0.0024	300%
<u>Claim characteristics</u>					
<i>Saliency</i>	0.0009	0.0012	0.0021	0.0034	278%
<i>CapRatio_{Ch/T}</i>	0.0018	0.0018	0.0006	0.0000	-100%

Note: Values in this table are calculated for Model 4 in Table 1. These values reflect the predicted probability that a state will mediate a claim when setting each variable at various values (minimum, one standard deviation below mean, one standard deviation above mean, and maximum). All other variables are held at their means or modes. Baseline probability for all values at their mean or mode is 0.0016. Values in the final column are the percentage change in predicted probability of mediation across the entire range of the variable (minimum to maximum). The values for “global institutions” are calculated based on Model 5, Table 1. Variables that are not statistically different from zero at conventional levels ($p < .05$) are excluded from this table.