Strategy in Politics

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Spring 2003

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Tuesday & Thursday 09:30-10:45
71 Schaeffer
Frederick J. Boehmke
frederick-boehmke@uiowa.edu
361 Schaeffer
335 2342
Tuesday & Thursday 11:00-12:00, or by appointment.
polisci136
ProfBoehmke

Announcements

April 28, 2003: Here are some results from the third game that involved three parties with the potential for strategic voting. The Ferret party was ranked first by 9 people and received 13 votes. The Mammoth party was ranked first by only 6 people and received 6 votes. The Sabertooth party was ranked first by 8 people and received 4 votes. The average payoff was 160. Here is a histogram of votes by the most preferred party, which shows strategic voting.

April 15, 2003: Here are some results from the third game (p-beauty game, p=2/3) we played in class: a histogram of guesses for both rounds and a scatter plot of each player's round 1 and round 2 guesses. The solid line is the 45 degree line representing equal first and second round guesses. The average guess in round 1 was 36.9 and in round 2 it was 27.

April 02: I checked the final exam schedule, we are at 9:45 a.m., Tuesday, May 13.

April 01, 2003: Class is cancelled on Thursday, April 03.

March 25, 2003: I handed out the exams in class today. The average score was a 78. Also, class is cancelled on Thursday, March 27. I will post some reading for you later today.

March 05, 2003: Here are some results from the second game (centipede game) we played in class: a histogram of the timing of each player's first take decision. The correlation for each individual between the take decision as Player A and as Player B is 0.7. The average payoff for Player A is 4.6 and for Player B it is 5.5.

February 03, 2003: Here are some results from the first game (ultimatum game) we played in class: a scatter plot of offers and minimum rejection values and a histogram of offers and minumum rejection values. 28% of offers were rejected and 19% of participants would have rejected their own offers.

Assignments

  1. Homework set #1 is due on February 13 at the beginning of class.
  2. Homework set #2 is due on Friday, February 28 by 5pm.
  3. Homework set #3 is due on Thursday, April 17 at the beginning of class.
  4. Homework set #4 is due on Thursday, May 1 by 5 pm.

Description

View course syllabus.

This class will serve as a basic introduction to game theory and how it can be used to understand politics. The goal of the class is to develop the skills and perspectives necessary to identify opportunities for strategic behavior by political actors, to distill these strategic opportunities into simple game-theoretic models and to solve for the equilibrium of these models. We will focus on different types of models that are frequently observed in political science: the prisoner's dilemma, collective action, imperfect information and spatial models. While the objective of the course is not to teach mathematics, the ability to manipulate algebraic expressions is assumed (note that familiarity with calculus is not required) and will make the course much easier.

Topics to be covered

  1. Introduction to Expected Utility Theory.
  2. Sequential Move Games.
  3. Simultaneous Move Games.
  4. Nash Equilibrium.
  5. Agenda Setting.
  6. Spatial Models.
  7. Signaling Games.

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Lecture Files

Lecure Topics and Readings

Week 1: Course Introduction.
    Why use rational choice?
    The rules of choice: Preference relations, utility and maximization.
    Readings: Chapter 01 in Dixit and Skeath.
Week 2: Describing strategic interaction.
    Extensive form games, normal form games.
    Readings: Chapters 02 and 03 in Dixit and Skeath.
Week 3: Finding Equilibria.
    Dominance, domination, minimax, cell-by-cell inspection.
    Readings: Chapters 03 and 04 in Dixit and Skeath.
Week 4: Mixed Strategy Equilibria
    What are mixed strategies?
    Why play mixed strategies?
    How to find equilibria in mixed strategies.
    Readings: Chapter 05 in Dixit and Skeath.
Week 5: Mixed Strategies, Subgame Perfect Equilibria.
    Subgame perfect versus Nash equilibria.
    Simultaneous moves in extensive form games.
    Readings: Chapter 06 in Dixit and Skeath.
Week 6: Group Decision Making. Week 7: Group Decision Making.
Week 8: Midterm Exam.

Week 9: Powell Amendment.

    Return exams.
    Discuss Powell Amendment paper.
Week 10: Spatial Models. Week 11: Spatial Models continued.
    Spatial models applied to legislatures and committees.
Week 12: Multi-dimensional spatial models.
    Introduction to multidimensional spatial models.
    Conditions for equilibrium.
Week 13: Finish spatial models.
    Structure Induced versus Preference Induced Equilibrium.
    The Swing Voter's Curse.
Week 14: Cooperation.
    Finite and infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas.
    Collective action.
    Readings: Chapter 08 in Dixit and Skeath.
Week 15: Cooperation continued.
    Collective action.
    Readings: Chapter 11 in Dixit and Skeath.

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Other Information

Please visit the Political Science Department's Website at http://www.uiowa.edu/~polisci. It is frequently updated regarding events and procedures in our department, changes in the Schedule of Courses, plus TA and faculty hours when available. You may also find current information on pre-advising, and registration. Our Vernon Van Dyke Computing Facility (Political Science ITC) is located in Room 21 Schaeffer Hall. Available hours are listed at our website and also posted outside Room 21 Schaeffer.

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Description
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Class Homepages     Fred's Homepage
Last Updated: April 28, 2002
Created: November 28, 2002
Frederick J. Boehmke:
frederick-boehmke@uiowa.edu
Department of Political Science
341 Schaeffer Hall
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa 52242
Phone: (319) 335 2342