THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF SSIP:
HOW METHODS MET MODELS, WITH A SHORT INTERLUDE

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The Scientific Study of International Politics (SSIP) became a section of ISA in 1993, largely out of necessity. Not so long ago, believe it or not, quantitative research in international relations had trouble seeing the light of day. The historically dominated field could not understand the statistical, mathematical and data-based research, and traditionalists often found the results reported in such studies to be trivial and uninteresting, making both publication and convention panel participation difficult.

Initially, SSIP researchers believed that subject oriented panels were best: mixing traditional and quantitative research on a single panel with a common subject focus, such as deterrence, would encourage cross fertilization and provide a greater understanding of the problem under study. This proved to be a false assumption and a misunderstanding of the role that public venues play in the development of research. Conventions, in particular, provide a researcher with the opportunity to get feedback on preliminary results from the intellectual community. If panelists, and consequently the audiences they attract, do not understand the methodology behind a piece of research or are hostile to the approach, panels only become wasted opportunities or fora for exchanging useless barbs. Faced with the challenges of obtaining spots on panels, let alone some that provided a productive exchange, Dina Zinnes and Hayward Alker gathered signatures and drafted the charter that led to the establishment of the SSIP section. Because ISA allocates convention panels to each section based on the size of the section and its panel attendance from the previous convention, formal status as a section guaranteed the SSIP community exposure time in potentially productive public environments where panelists and audiences spoke the same language. How did this group of scholars develop a
research agenda that was substantial enough to warrant the formation of a new ISA section? Our essay traces the progress of those who set down the foundations of SSIP.

In sketching the origins and evolution of the SSIP community, it is tempting to propose a linear chronology from one set of studies to another. To do so, however, would distort the realities of what happened. While some approaches did indeed lead to others, the story line contains several sub plots that begin independently and only much later merge with the rest of the field in intriguing ways. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let us begin by telling the more straightforward, time-ordered tale, explain why it had to be so, and then turn to the parallel but largely distinct narratives. In the end, we show how the story lines have merged and where their shared themes are headed.

**THE LINEAR CHRONOLOGY**

The linear part of the story can be traced to the two world wars. International politics as a field of inquiry did not exist prior to the First World War. And to the extent questions about international phenomena were entertained at all, they occurred largely in the context of law: the rules that should govern the interactions of states with one another. What, for example, was a just war, that is, under what conditions was it morally, and therefore legally, acceptable, for one state to attack another? But the horrors of World War I turned attention away from should, the ethics of state interaction, to questions about why things happen as they do. Hence Realism became the new approach as students of international politics sought to understand the dynamics of state interaction that led to such events as war.

The even greater catastrophe of World War II reinforced this new emphasis on understanding why and how things happen in the international arena. For if you did not
understand the hows and whys of two world wars, what would prevent yet a third from happening? This brought scientists from other disciplines to the study of international conflict and war. Psychologists, sociologists, economists and even physicists and mathematicians sought to use their skills to study and hopefully prevent future major conflagrations. The flurry of research by these scholars reinforced the realist perspective on understanding what is and added to it a demand for observation and the use of rules for measurement. These are the events that set the stage for what has become SSIP, known in its early years by names such as Quantitative International Politics or Interpolimetrics to emphasize the observational/measurement component.

As researchers began to tackle the problem of international conflict, it became clear that existing arguments about the whys and wherefores of interactions between states were vague and underdeveloped. These needed to be spelled out explicitly so they could be subjected to empirical appraisals. What affected what? The first steps towards clarification produced “frameworks” and “propositional inventories.”

Frameworks identified and classified the key variables thought to be responsible for inter-nation interactions, providing suggestions as to how they might be linked. One classic in this genre was Kaplan’s System and Process (1957). Kaplan argued that it was possible to define different types of international systems based on the characteristics of nation participants and the rules of the game, so to speak, that they used in interacting with one another. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962) proposed a very different type of framework. Their goal was to provide a generic outline of the domestic and international variables that structure foreign policy outputs. Rosenau’s “pretheory” (1966) was yet another noteworthy framework. While it was also an attempt to understand the foreign
policy decision process, the goal was to demonstrate the differences in foreign policy outputs of nations as a function of key domestic variables. Propositional inventories, on the other hand were far more specific and focused on particular variables and hypotheses. These inventories were extensive lists of hypotheses about what affected what, largely obtained from a careful reading of the descriptive and historical texts on international politics. Snyder and Robinson (1961) offered one of the most extensive of these inventories, covering all facets of decision making in international politics.

As the arguments about how the international world worked were clarified, it became increasingly obvious that there was a second, more serious, problem. If hypotheses generated by frameworks or inventories were to be subjected to empirical scrutiny one had to have access to data. But what constituted data in this field and how would one obtain relevant observations? The methods of observation used in other disciplines—experimentation, participant-observation, interviews—were either not relevant or not feasible. Two solutions emerged: (1) simulation and (2) what might be called archeology. Let us discuss them in that order, breaking down the archeology investigations into subtypes.

**Data Generation, Part I: The Simulation**

Simulation was an adaptation of the data generation process used in psychology and was spearheaded by Harold Guetzkow, a social psychologist (see, Guetzkow 1962 and Guetzkow et al. 1963). Guetzkow argued that international processes could be studied in a mock laboratory in which people played the roles of national decision makers and teams of 3-4 players were stand-ins for nations. The Internation Simulation (INS) project consisted of 5-7 teams with members of each team playing the roles of head of state,
domestic affairs advisor and foreign policy advisor. At the onset of a simulation period
each team was given a profile describing its resources, decision structure (e.g.,
parliamentarian), and form of government (i.e., its relationship to its citizens). Teams
were also given a scenario of the history of the international system up to the point at
which the run was to begin; for example, who was allied with whom, whether there had
been wars, whether there were existing international organizations, trading partners, and
so on. As the simulation proceeded, teams were permitted to (1) interact through
messages or prearranged person-to-person visits (state visits or summit meetings), (2)
form alliances, (3) create international organizations, (4) declare war, (5) provide aid, and
(6) trade resources.

At the conclusion of a run of the simulation, each team filled out a form indicating
how it was allocating its original resources: a certain amount for trade, aid, for research
and development, for domestic products, and the like. These forms were collected and
while teams took a coffee break, calculations proceeded to determine what happened to
each nation as a consequence of its resource allocation decisions. For example, in
countries that had begun with minimal resources and a history of population unrest,
inadequate allotments to domestic development could lead to a revolution. Alternatively,
large allocations to research and development in one round could mean that the nation
would have a major breakthrough in weapons technology in the subsequent run and
consequently the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. If a war had been declared then
the calculations would determine winners and losers.

It is important to note that the calculations of the consequences of the actions and
allocations of the players were governed by explicit mathematical formulae, not simply
by the judgments of the experimenters. Moreover, these formulae, or rules were constructed based on the INS team’s hypotheses about how the international system worked. In particular, they were based on some of the same hypotheses and arguments that underlay the frameworks and propositional inventories. Hence, the INS researchers made extensive attempts to model the structure of their simulations on what was known about the real-world operation of international politics. This was done in an effort to answer the critics that argued that INS had a serious validity issue: how could teams of high school or college students represent the decisions of national statesmen?

The validity question stalked INS researchers for many years and the attempt to solve or simply answer the charge led these researchers in several directions. One was to attempt to replicate a real world event such as World War I. Structuring the simulation scenario to parallel the principal participants and their relationships prior to 1914, they ran the simulation to see if war would indeed occur. Although the desired result was obtained, questions were raised as to the extent to which the participants (who were not told that the run was an attempt to approximate a real world event) produced war because of their familiarity with the historical context.

Another, very different, approach was to evaluate the underlying propositions that governed the plays and outcomes of the simulations. Thus data on nations were collected and hypotheses about the relationship between national attributes on the one hand and national behavior on the other were tested. Intriguingly, these efforts gave birth to a very different project that soon took on a life of its own: Rudolph Rummel’s Dimensionality of Nations (DON). Rummel was a student at Northwestern when the efforts to validate INS were underway and he was originally in charge of the data collection and hypothesis
testing. But Rummel’s interest in INS was quickly overtaken by his fascination with the data collection and hypothesis testing itself. Rummel’s interest in understanding how the attributes of nations translate into behavior, led him, much later, to propose how the relationship between national attributes across nations might determine their interactions: thus we have one of the non-linear spinoffs: field theory. But again, we are ahead of the story. We will return to Rummel’s spin-off work in our discussion of archeology.

A third, less direct, INS response to the validity critique was to point out that some questions of great concern to the field could only be studied in the laboratory. While the laboratory was not perfect, perhaps, they argued, it could at least provide insights. One of the more important attempts in this direction was Richard Brody’s (1963) study of the Nth country problem: how a widespread change in military technology, the advent of nuclear weapons, could affect the structure of an international system and the interactions among the nations. Brody constructed a bipolar INS system: two major powers (highly resource endowed) with a number of smaller nations in alliance with each major power. The simulation was run for a number of periods under these conditions and the perceptions and actions of the nations recorded. It was found that the smaller nations interacted almost entirely with the superpower in their alliance, having little to do with other smaller nations in their alliance or any of the nations in the opposing alliance. Additionally, all nations within a given alliance saw members of the opposing alliance as threatening. Then nuclear weapons were introduced. Several of the smaller nations discovered at the beginning of a new round that they had struck it rich, so to speak: due to previous investments in research and development, these nations now had nuclear capabilities. The interaction patterns changed dramatically. The bipolar
alliance structure crumbled and the perceptions of threat were now ubiquitous. Every nation became fearful of all the others. Whether these runs provided an insight into the breakdown of social interactions between groups or said something of consequence about international politics is, of course, open to question. The results, however, are nevertheless intriguing. And because there is only one system to observe at any point in time, empirical testing is difficult, meaning such simulations may remain scholars’ best tool for understanding relatively rare, but significant, phenomena at the aggregate level.

**Data Generation, Part II: Archeology of Actors**

The other answer to the data question was to turn to the traces of things that had actually happened—just like conducting an archeological dig. Using the historical record, this approach sought to collect, in a systematic and explicit fashion, information about the characteristics of nations, their behavior and their interactions. Those who chose this route believed that these data were far more real than the information gathered from simulation runs. With time, however, it became evident that the validity problem did not disappear. It now simply showed itself in another form: how do you define a war, an *alliance*, or even an *interaction* between nations?

Thus began the many data generating projects of the 1960s and 70s. While all of these projects rely on some written record—whether it be the historians’ accounts, yearly statistical compilations by various international agencies, or newspaper reports—they were anything but unified. These enterprises varied in the principal questions that drove them, the sources used to extract the data, the definitions of the variables of interest and the methodologies applied. To take but one example of how these data collections differed even in the definition of a single variable, consider the three different datasets on
war. For Quincy Wright (1942), a political scientist, a war existed and was recorded in his collection only if there had been a legal declaration of war by one state against another. When J. David Singer, another political scientist, initiated the Correlates of War (COW) project a war was defined in terms of the number of individuals killed on the battlefield; an event was counted as a war only when 1000 people had been killed (Singer 1979). On the other hand, Lewis Fry Richardson, a meteorologist and Quaker, sought to understand why any disagreement ended up in the death of even a single individual. Thus his data collection focused on “deadly quarrels” and contained murders at one end of the continuum through gangland executions to the world wars at the other (1960a).

Despite these important differences, the many data collection efforts can be classified as being (1) attribute oriented, (2) behavior/interaction oriented or (3) a combination of the two. The attribute collectors were principally concerned with recording, over time, the characteristics of nations—population size, GDP, square miles of territory, number and complexion of minorities, regime type, and so on. These projects became the various World Handbooks (Russett and Banks 1968; Russett et al. 1968; Taylor and Hudson 1975a and b; Taylor, Lewis, and Hudson a and b; and Taylor and Jodice 1968) and Ted Gurr’s Polity enterprise (Eckstein and Gurr 1975).

The behavior/interaction projects on the other hand were concerned with tracking the events that transpired between nations. To a large extent these event data efforts shared a common focus on international crises as a potential prelude to war. The oldest of these is WEIS, the World Event Interaction Survey, initially begun by Charles McClelland (1971). McClelland argued that international crises could be predicted by classifying events into hostile, neutral, and cooperative types and monitoring the co-
occurrence of event combinations. Crises, he posited, were the culmination of sets of particular kinds of interchanges between nations. Using principally the *New York Times* (and later adding the *London Times*), every action taken by any nation towards any other nation was coded by indicating the day on which it occurred, the nation perpetrating the event, the target of the event, and the event type. Thus WEIS was a massive daily chronology of every action directed by one nation towards another. Using indices from information theory such as Hrel (Miller 1964), McClelland (1972) demonstrated how combinations of hostile/cooperative acts could predict the onset of international crises.

Approximately a decade later, and unaware of the ongoing WEIS effort, Edward Azar began work on COPDAB, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (Azar 1980). Born in the Middle East with strong family ties to the region, Azar looked at the interactions between nations from a different perspective. Azar’s concern, like McClelland’s, was with international crises, but unlike McClelland, Azar was focused on recurring crises between the same participants, the ongoing, seemingly endless, Arab-Israeli conflict that would cyclically heat up, cool down, and heat up again. Azar called these crises “protracted conflict” and his data collection efforts were an attempt to chart the course of long, drawn-out interactions. Like McClelland, Azar developed a classification scheme for these events in terms of hostility and cooperation. However, unlike McClelland, Azar saw this classification as a scale that ran from high to low levels of hostility and from low to high levels of cooperation. Sensitive to scaling issues, Azar utilized methodologies from psychology to assign weights to the conflict–cooperation categories so that the intensity of hostility or cooperation could be meaningfully assessed for a designated time period, permitting the researcher to observe the ebb and flow of conflict or cooperation.
In addition to the differences in their classification schemes, WEIS and COPDAB differed in the sources used to extract the events. Azar argued that middle eastern events were inadequately covered in the western press and that reliance on a single source, like the *NYT*, would provide a distorted picture of what was happening in that region. Consequently he turned to the use of multiple regional news outlets. While both WEIS and COPDAB had to struggle with reliability and validity issues in the definition of the various types of events and the training of coders, the use of multiple sources created an additional problem for COPDAB: knowing when an event recorded in one source was the same or different from an event recorded in another source. Unless one could make this distinction, COPDAB would run the risk of over recording events and thus falsely magnifying the amount of conflict or cooperation occurring on a given day.

Although COPDAB began with a focus on the Middle East, it soon expanded to world coverage, rivaling WEIS. This led to comparisons and evaluations of the relative merits of the two (Vincent 1983; Howell 1983) and, to some extent, arguments over the usability of one versus the other. However because the classification schemes differed in their definitions of types of interactions and the fact that COPDAB came with scaled weights, the superiority of one over the other was never clear. This, together with the fact that the two projects had very different funding sources, kept both alive. DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Defense Department, had been deeply involved in supporting WEIS and was reluctant to switch gears after putting so much behind the efforts to create a crisis indicator. COPDAB, on the other hand, began with small university backing and then, on and off, received limited support from the National Science Foundation (NSF).
Three other event data collections emerged: 1) Frank Sherman’s (1994) Sherfacs, which focused on the phases of conflict escalation, 2) Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and their colleagues’ ICB (International Crisis Behavior) project (see Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988; Wilkenfeld, Brecher and Moser 1988), which centered on foreign policy behavior and crises as the units of analysis, and Pearson’s (1974) foreign interventions dataset, which allowed analysis of the outcomes associated with various types of interventions.

What came to be called the 1914 Study represents a very different type of event data collection process. Like WEIS and COPDAB the focus was on international crisis. But unlike these efforts, the 1914 Study was interested in only one particular crisis: the First World War. Looking at this single cataclysmic event, researchers attempted to capture the play-by-play sequence of events that led to the First World War. This detailed account of an international disaster focused on how the principal decision makers in the European capitals reacted to one another—their perceptions and actions—to eventually produce the disaster known as World War I. Using both the classic histories (Fay 1928, Albertini 1957) of this conflict together with original documents that were found in the archives of the Hoover Institution, Stanford researchers, under the direction of Robert North, coded the activities and perceptions of the decision makers as the events unfolded from the assassination of the Austrian Archduke to the declarations of war (see, e.g., Zinnes 1962; Zinnes, North, and Koch 1961).

The event data projects surveyed thus far can all be characterized by their principal focus on actions. There were, however, two projects which were event based but additionally had an important national attribute component: CREON and DON.
CREON, the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (Hermann et al. 1973), grew out of the Rosenau framework mentioned earlier. Like Wilkenfeld and Brecher’s project on comparative foreign policy, CREON was an attempt to understand the formulation and execution of foreign policies. But while Wilkenfeld and Brecher were interested in the foreign policy formulation process, the Hermans, who spearheaded CREON, wanted to evaluate the Rosenau paradigm that linked types of nations to types of foreign policy decisions. Thus the CREON researchers needed to collect data on both the attributes of nations to permit them to properly place a nation in the Rosenau typology and the actions that these nation-types pursued, that is, their foreign policies. They hoped to show that the foreign policy of a small, underdeveloped nation was very different from the foreign policy of a large developed country. This cross-national perspective had a dramatic effect on CREON’s event data collection procedures. Because WEIS and COPDAB were interested in how crises evolve, their datasets were collected through time. CREON’s concern with types of nations and types of foreign policies, however, made time irrelevant. Thus CREON events were extracted from news sources by sampling quarters within the years covered.

The Dimensionality of Nations project, as mentioned earlier, had its origins in the simulation approach to SSIP. As Rummel attempted to provide empirical underpinnings for INS by collecting data on national attributes and events, he became intrigued with an emerging area of statistics known as factor analysis (see Rummel 1963). Factor analysis was being developed in psychology to help researchers identify potential links between large numbers of variables. Given many variables and datasets of considerable size, factor analysis could determine underlying correlations between groups of variables.
Thus Rummel applied factor analysis to his dataset of national variables and found that variables measuring domestic problems were not related to (did not “load” on the same factors as) variables measuring hostility directed externally at other nations (Rummel 1968). This result was noteworthy because it appeared to debunk one of the old literature arguments: nations experiencing domestic turmoil engage in hostile external behavior to redirect the attention of their population from domestic difficulties.

When Rummel left Northwestern upon completion of his PhD, the DON project retained its factor analytical approach and continued its data collection efforts on both the characteristics of nations and their behaviors. However, the principal argument that drove the project changed. The linkage between domestic problems and international behavior was replaced by a focus on how the relationship between the attributes of nations affected their interactions (see, e.g., Rummel 1969a, 1969b, 1986). Field theory, which interestingly had its origins in both the work of Quincy Wright (1942) of decades earlier and Johan Galtung (1964) the Norwegian sociologist, was an attempt to use the mathematical model inherent in factor analysis to demonstrate how differences or similarities in attributes between two nations was a motivating force that was responsible for how those nations interacted.

**Data Generation, Part III: Archeology of the International System**

A significant characteristic of an event dataset is its actor-level perspective, or its focus on who did what to whom when. In contrast, the Correlates of War, begun by J. David Singer at the University of Michigan, represented a systemic perspective. Singer’s initial focus was on what he called “brush-clearing:” an empirical examination of major arguments in the international politics literature (1980). Singer took particular aim at
propositions linking the distribution of power, alliances and the onset of war. To empirically examine these hypotheses, the COW project collected data on measures of national power, alliance configurations and the outbreaks of wars. A number of intriguing indices were formulated to produce systemic measures based on these data. Thus the power distribution of the international system sought to capture the extent to which power was concentrated in a few nations or spread more evenly over a number of nations, alliances were coded in terms of the extent to which the alliance reflected strong or weak commitments on the part of the nations and wars were measured using indices based on the number of participant nations, number killed and the duration of the war.

One of the more important consequences of COW’s initial efforts was the creation of the war dataset. As more time and resources were poured into the effort to refine the collection and coding of the war data, the brush clearing emphasis was replaced by a concentrated effort to understand the war phenomenon itself and why war became the central theme. This new focus led to four further ventures. First, because the war dataset developed in the COW project compiled data only for wars between major powers since 1815, Jack Levy subsequently extended the data to include minor powers and extended the dataset back to the 1600s. Second, wars involving nonstate entities, such as colonial and civil wars, were gathered (Singer and Small 1972). A third important offshoot was the MID (Militarized Interstate Dispute) dataset, which sought to provide an empirical basis for answering the question: why do some international disputes end in war while others do not (Jones, Bremer and Singer 1996)? While every war is at one point an MID, not every MID becomes a war. Thus the goal was to ascertain what characteristics distinguished between these two scenarios. The fourth extension was the
BCOW project (Leng and Singer 1988). It sought to understand the build-up of events that led to the outbreaks of wars. Taking a sample of wars from the initial war dataset, the events preceding each war were coded and classified. Reminiscent of the 1914 Study (though with less detail), or the WEIS project (though backwards in time) the goal was to determine whether pre-crisis patterns might be uncovered.

AN INTERLUDE

Before continuing we need to pause for a few comments. The reader may have wondered why the story thus far has been told principally in terms of datasets rather than the results of the studies that motivated the datasets. The answer is simple. Although every dataset came in to existence as a consequence of a particular set of questions, very few of the analyses that sought to answer these questions yielded findings that have stood the test of time. A principal reason for this was the lack of statistical training and understanding of research design during the early years of the collection efforts, the late 60s and 70s. As late as 1972, International Studies Quarterly (ISQ) devoted space to an article explaining how to use computer programs to generate such simple descriptive techniques as pie charts, time series plots, and frequency histograms (Dow et al. 1972). And even by 1980, training in research methodologies and statistics was not part of the normal political science graduate program, meaning graduate students had to go to departments like psychology, sociology, economics and mathematics to learn how to apply statistical models. Unfortunately, the statistics and methodologies learned in these contexts typically did not address the types of problems found in international politics and, if applied, could be inappropriate because of the assumptions that underlay the statistical models. Psychological statistics, for example, assumed that observations were random
samples from almost infinite populations in which the individual units were all comparable. In what sense could the wars of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century be considered a random sample, much less even a sample?

But while the findings of these early studies have not stood the test of time, the data collection efforts have persevered and datasets like WEIS, COPDAB, COW, and so on continue to be refined, extended and mined, making them a crucial landmark in SSIP. The reasons for this are not hard to find. Despite the many critiques that have been thrown at these efforts regarding the adequacy of the sources used, the validity of the definitions used to code variables, or the reliability of the coding practices (e.g., Howell 1983; Vincent 1983; Burgess and Lawton 1972), one fact has always been paramount: data to evaluate hypotheses concerning international phenomenon are not easy to come by. The international politics researcher is not like other social scientists who can use laboratories, participant observation, interview schedules to obtain data to test their ideas. Obtaining data for the study of hypotheses about international politics is extraordinarily expensive and time consuming. So the mere existence of these data collections has become an invaluable resource for many researchers to empirically assess arguments about how nations conduct their business. In short, these collections have turned out to be useful to researchers other than their original developers.

The existence of datasets, however, has been a two-edged sword. By making research somewhat easier they have also shaped those efforts. Together with the enhanced computing power that came available as massive mainframes were replaced by desktop and laptop computers and ever more sophisticated software, the ease of running even fancy statistical analyses became irresistible. Thus if the 60s and 70s were devoted
to collecting data, the subsequent decades of the 80s and 90s became periods of extensive hypothesis testing: searching for critical independent, dependent, and intervening variables with increasing attention to statistical designs that permitted causal conclusions. The search for recurrent patterns in the large data collections invariably produced the hypothesis testing mind set: the if $X$ then $Y$ perspective with its heavy emphasis on statistics. Only recently has SSIP research begun to consider more carefully the stories behind the hypotheses that were being tested, to attempt to construct the theoretical underpinnings. To understand this development we need to look at what we called earlier the non-linear historical pieces.

**Non-linear Pieces**

The above thread provides a reasonable time line of the principal origins of SSIP. However the complete story must take note of several independent research avenues that were not part of this straightforward chronological development. One of these was the work of Quincy Wright. His two classic volumes on war and international politics were written before the quantitative approach took root, yet reflected the themes later found in the SSIP movement. *On War* brought together information from a wide variety of fields that Wright believed might be of value for understanding the war phenomenon. Thus he surveyed psychology, sociology, economics, and the like to see what was known in these fields that might help one understand international conflict. The appendices of this volume are of special interest. One contains a dataset of all legally declared wars, going back to the 15$^{th}$ century and noting dates and participants. In another, even more surprising, appendix Wright proposes a very simple mathematical model of conflict.
Of even greater consequence for the SSIP movement was the work of Lewis Fry Richardson. Like Quincy Wright, Richardson completed his work long before today’s major data collection efforts were even considered. Working as an ambulance driver in the First World War, Richardson saw the horror of war up close and personal. These experiences, together with his Quaker convictions, left him with a profound commitment to apply his mathematical and scientific skills to the study of human violence.

Richardson was a meteorologist with considerable mathematical training. In the hours not devoted to the study of weather patterns he patiently began his inquiry into the hows and whys of people killing people.

This inquiry had two central paths. On the one hand, Richardson, like the data collectors of several decades later, believed he needed information, or data, to fuel his ideas. His focus, however, was not just on wars. As a Quaker, Richardson was concerned with the broader issue of why people kill one another. He saw wars as being at one end of the continuum of inter-human violence that begins when one person kills another through gang wars, civil wars, and on to small and then large wars. As we saw earlier, Richardson defined these events as deadly quarrels. He then classified them by size, which was given by the number of people killed in the incident: two when the murderer is executed by the state, on up to millions when we reach the world wars (Richardson 1960a). However, because Richardson believed that every death by a human hand was important, he rescaled the magnitude of these events using a log transformation. Thus, the event in which a murderer is executed, a deadly quarrel of size 2, is less dwarfed by a world war in which millions lost their lives.
The dataset that emerged from these efforts is amazing in many respects. Richardson’s goal, somewhat like Singer’s decades later, was to brush clear, to evaluate the ideas that the literature had put forth for why people kill one another. Consequently he needed to understand as much of the context of these events as could be extracted from records. Thus dates, participants, or number killed were insufficient; Richardson also needed information on the reasons for the conflict and the outcomes. Was it differences in religions, economic disparities, old grievances, territorial contiguity, or something else? Thus the dataset that emerged consists of massive tables that record numerous characteristics of each collected event of inter-human violence. To appreciate this extraordinary data one must remember that it was compiled by one dedicated researcher searching through historical archives in his spare time and recording events on scraps of paper. There were no graduate assistants, and of even greater significance, no DARPA or NSF funding and no computing support.

Richardson (1960a) sought to evaluate some of the simple hypotheses using known statistical techniques (e.g., correlations). However, his work is more impressive for the creative ways in which he developed miniature mathematical models to explore questions. Consider for example his exploration of an empirical fact that emerged from his data collection, now recorded in the monograph, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (1960a). Analyzing only those events in which a large number of individuals are killed, instances that he conceptualized as wars, Richardson observed that most wars only involved two participants. Moreover, a histogram in which the number of participants is plotted against the frequency of wars having a given number of participants produces a decelerating curve. Using the mathematics of permutations and combinations and
considering the participation in a war as a toss of a coin, he develops a mathematical model that produces the curve found in the data. The analysis is less important for its result than for the style of thinking that it exemplifies. The assumptions underlying the mathematical model (embedded in the use of permutations and combinations) represent a theory of national war participation. The resulting curve is thus a deduction from the theory. The fact that the curve fits the data indicates that this rather simple model is at least one possible theory of war participation. In this way, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* is a wonderful blend of the inductive and deductive approaches.

Richardson’s second path of inquiry is also a powerful blend of the deductive and inductive. While *Statistics* has a stronger emphasis on the inductive, *Arms and Insecurity* (1960b), the second posthumously published volume, emphasizes the deductive. In *Arms* the reader is again treated to a wonderful excursion into Richardson’s thinking processes. The author dialogues with himself as he puts together a story characterizing the decision makers of two nations who wish only for peace but are driven by fear into a potentially devastating arms race. Using historical quotes from statesmen in the European capitals prior to World War I, Richardson develops a differential equations model to capture how each nation’s fear of its rival pushes its decision makers to develop an armament program, further fueled by long term historical grievances, and tempered only by the drag that the production of armaments puts on the country’s domestic economy. As Richardson describes the conversation between the two nations’ leaders, he demonstrates how verbal statements can be translated into mathematics, making this one of the finest examples of what Lave and March, years later, call the development of theory through story telling (1975). And so we have the now famous Richardson arms race model.
While every student of SSIP should read these first chapters of *Arms and Insecurity* simply for the illustration of how to develop a mathematical model, the value of these pages goes far beyond the simple construction of the model. Two important things happen in the pages that follow the construction. First, Richardson shows how the analysis of this simple two-variable, linear, differential equations model can actually provide answers to the burning questions about *why war*. Using standard phase portrait methods, Richardson demonstrates how it is the relative significance of the key parameters that actually sets the conditions for the outbreak of war. When two nations fear each other to the extent that they do not care about the impact that the armament programs have on their respective domestic economies, then the arms race will spiral off into an infinite arms level for both sides. Infinity is what Richardson equates with war. Only when the economic drain of an armament program outweighs fear will the two nations consider armament reductions and thereby avoid war.

Richardson’s consideration of the model does not end with his mathematical analyses (as, sadly, too many modeling efforts often do). His third contribution to SSIP is his consideration of how one might empirically evaluate the model. Using armament data prior to the First World War, he demonstrates that the solution to the differential equations indeed looks very much like the time line of armament build up.

Again, the model is simple and of less import for what it says than it is for its demonstration of how one can theorize about international conflict. Richardson showed how to move from a verbal story (what we often call a theory) to a mathematical model, to a set of analyses, to deductions and then to an empirical analysis. The presentation, analysis and evaluation of the arms race model, made almost a half century earlier, could
have been the poster child for the NSF’s Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM) program, launched in 2001, that sought to bridge the gap between mathematical modeling and the empirical testing of hypotheses derived from models.

Why, one might wonder, were Richardson’s efforts long ignored; why did no one pick up where he left off? The historical answer is straightforward: Richardson’s work was largely unknown. He published a few of his studies in the magazine *Nature*, but this was a scientific journal not read in the social sciences. When he died in 1953, most of Richardson’s work had not been published and only existed in the form of scattered notes. Had his son not worked steadfastly to convince Quincy Wright to champion the publication process, none of us would have known of Richardson’s historic contributions. It took a number of years for Wright and his collaborator C. C. Lienau to comb through the notes and put them together into two meaningful volumes (1960a and b). Because the various pieces of research were done at different times, there were frequent changes in notation and missing pieces in the mathematical analyses. Thus reconstruction of the arguments was difficult and progress toward publication slow.

As the volumes were reaching publication stage, several historical coincidences occurred. (1) J. David Singer joined the Political Science Department at the University of Michigan, (2) Anatol Rapoport, a mathematical biologist also at the University of Michigan, learned of the unfolding manuscript, and (3) through the joint efforts of Herb Kehlman (a social psychologist), Robert Angel (a sociologist) and then Singer—all at Michigan—the *Journal of Conflict Resolution (JCR)* was born. The birth of this journal was another cross disciplinary effort to spearhead a dialogue among social scientists about war specifically and human conflict more generally. Once again, international
events—this time the Cuban missile crisis—reminded everyone that the Second World War might not be the end of world-wide conflict. Following the publication of several issues of *JCR*, it was suggested that Rapoport write a synopsis/overview of Richardson’s work that would introduce Richardson to the social science community and pave the way for the newly published books. Rapoport was ideally suited to this task because of his mathematical background and the ease with which he could present difficult mathematical concepts to non-mathematical audiences, as was clearly the case among most social scientists. Thus did Lewis Fry Richardson meet the social science, and more particularly the political science, community (Rapoport 1957).

Rapoport’s presentation of the arms race model and explanation of the mathematical analyses was masterful. This issue of *JCR* is certainly a classic. But while it did provide the needed introductions, the absence of mathematical training, as had been true in the statistical realm, made it difficult for fledgling SSIP researchers to grab hold and run with the ideas. Instead, given the data and statistical orientation that the field had begun to assume, the Richardson equations were initially seen as regression equations to be estimated. The power of the mathematical model and the extent to which its analyses provided testable deductions from were obscured by the rush to statistically evaluate the equations in ever new datasets, add new variables, and apply the latest econometric techniques. It was decades before the more exciting and significant aspect of Richardson’s arms race model would be understood and his theoretical ideas extended—decades during which SSIP researchers slowly began to distinguish between statistics and mathematical modeling and then gain sufficient technical sophistication to make it possible to move Richardson’s ideas to another level.
During this period two other trends emerged that would eventually help support the move towards a more theoretically based SSIP. One of these can also be traced back to Rapoport. In yet a second important contribution to SSIP foundations, Anatol Rapoport introduced conflict resolution researchers to ideas in game theory. In *Fights, Games and Debates*, he sought to distinguish between types of conflicts based on their inherent goals. The goal of a fight was to mash the opponent, the goal of a game was to outdo the opponent, while the goal of a debate was to convince and win over the opponent. The SSIP community became intrigued by game theory as a way to characterize and understand international conflict. Unlike the more complicated analyses involved in solving the differential equations of the arms race model, game theory was both intuitively appealing and accessible with little mathematical training. It was easy to think of international confrontations, like the Cuban missile crisis, in terms of a Kennedy and Kruschev trying to outdo one another in a game of chicken. Moreover, concepts like dominant strategies or saddle points which could provide solutions for these models were relatively simple to grasp. So the application of game theory to international conflicts became an important part of the SSIP landscape.

Initially, however, the application of game theory to international politics was descriptive (or even normative) rather than theoretical. It provided a neat way to characterize types of situations, for example, a zero-sum conflict was one in which the winner took all. Brams’ (1980) retelling of biblical stories used game theory as a means of drawing out the critical ingredients of certain types of conflicts to demonstrate why events unfolded as they did. The stumbling block in using game theory as a theoretical tool lies in the construction of the game’s payoff matrices. For game theory to be a
mathematical model like the arms race model and yield deductions (i.e., predictions) that can be empirically evaluated, the numerical values representing the values that players have for outcomes must be determined independently of the solution. If you know the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis, then it is too easy to configure a game matrix so that it reflects the outcome that occurred. Thus the application of game theory to this scenario might simply illustrate, for example, that it is a game of chicken. One of the major moves towards using game theory as a theoretical model came in Bueno de Mesquita’s *The War Trap* (1981), which used expected utility theory, the foundation of game theory, as an explanatory and predictive tool. Brams’ *Theory of Moves* (1994) represents a modification of game theory that also recasts game theory in a theoretical, that is, potentially falsifiable, mold.

The second move towards making SSIP research theoretical harkens back to the days of the Inter-Nation Simulation. As Guetzkow constructed and ran simulations, collected data, and tested hypotheses, he was careful to call his laboratory a man-computer operation. People played the roles of the decision makers, but the outcomes of their decisions were determined by mathematical rules that required computers for calculation. A young graduate student at Michigan State was intrigued by the computer component of INS and approached Guetzkow about the possibility of making INS an all-computer simulation. Stewart Bremer’s (1970) Phd thesis was thus an all computer version of INS, in which the human components of INS were now represented by another set of rules that mimicked human decision makers. This all-computer simulation was, of course, possible because by this point in time computational hardware and software had reached a new peak. But by developing computational rules to represent the humans,
INS took the final step away from being a laboratory for data generation and became a medium for theory construction. Much like Richardson’s arms race model, though far more complex, Bremer’s computerized INS model was a set of mathematical equations about how nations make decisions and interact. By setting the parameters of this computer model and providing initial conditions, one could run the simulation forward and see what happened. In other words, these scholars could obtain deductions. Computational modeling became another addition to the SSIP landscape.

At Berlin’s Science Center for Social Research during the 1980s, Stuart Bremer (1987) next designed one of the largest (at the time) models of international politics, GLOBUS (Generating Long term Options By Using Simulation). GLOBUS was comprised of 25 states and one “rest of the world” component, and each of these 26 model pieces was itself represented by a submodel. Many political and economic variables were included, for example, foreign aid, military expenditures, GDP, the hostility level between two states, domestic protest and organized violence, growth, unemployment, trade, population, and the like. Assumptions about the ways in which these variables were related to each other—the ways they caused each other to rise or fall—were largely determined by empirical results from the hypothesis-testing literature. Once these assumptions were expressed as mathematical equations, GLOBUS could simulate long range projections of what the world would look like from 1970 into the 2000s. A simulation was not a forecast per se, rather, it was a kind of what if experiment. For example, if we were able to reduce arms spending, would economic performance and the chance of war decrease (Bremer and Hughes 1990)?
Like game theory, however, the nature of computational modeling was not initially understood. Some thought that they had just constructed yet a different kind of laboratory and thus believed the outputs of simulation runs were data that could, indeed should, be processed using regular statistical tools. It was not clear that the structure of the computer program was actually a theory, nor that the outputs were in fact the conclusions/deductions of the theory. This realization came only slowly, and with it came a new understanding of the meaning of statistical analyses applied to these outputs.

Computational modeling paralleled game theory in another way: it did not, in its early years, require extensive mathematical background. A minimal amount of training in computer programming made it possible to construct complex models of, for example, decision making. One could then study the consequences of different forms of decision making in various types of settings. Taber’s (1992) expert system and Mintz’s poliheuristic studies (e.g., Mintz 2004) are representative of this genre and provide an interesting opportunity for comparisons in terms of the use or non use of humans, the type of decision maker or structure being modeled, and the underlying assumptions used.

**CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LINEAR MEETS NONLINEAR STORY**

Some of the themes we saw in early SSIP research remain in today’s research programs, characterizing today’s publications and the likely path of future contributions. In their continuing pursuit to understand why international phenomena occur, SSIP are still greatly influenced by salient world events, developments in training, and technological innovations. We have also witnessed significant changes in the diversification of the SSIP community, changes brought about by broader social forces.
**World Events**

Just as major world events spurred the early movement for reliable datasets on war and theorizing on its causes, subsequent happenings have been influential too. The oil crisis of the 70s, the 1995 formation of the WTO (an institutional successor to the GATT), the rising prominence of terrorism and civil wars during the 80s and 90s, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and expansion of NATO, and the birth of the EU are all associated with shifts away from a strong focus on interstate war. SSIP research has broadened to include the gathering of datasets on political-economic phenomena (e.g., Morgan, Krustev, and Bapat’s (2009) Threats and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) dataset), alliance obligations and provisions (Leeds, Long, and Mitchell 2000), mediation (Bercovitch 1997), attributes of international organizations (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004), non-state violence (e.g., Gleditsch and his colleagues’ (2001) collection of armed conflicts, Mickolus and his colleagues’ (2004) ITERATE data on terrorism), and so on.

Emerging concerns of the real world have similarly anchored newer formal models. We have seen, for instance, simulations and game-theoretic models of civil war (e.g., Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004; Fearon 2004), models of the formation and design of international organizations (e.g., Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001), models of third party mediation (Kydd 2003; Crescenzi et al. 2009), and game-theoretic treatments of counterterrorism (Arce M. and Sandler 2005).

**Training**

In addition to shifts in the SSIP community’s substantive interests, we also saw large scale changes in how scientifically rigorous approaches were taught. In the late 80s and
90s, many top-ranked graduate programs in political science added a series of required statistics courses to the initial year of the PhD curriculum. The first-year methods sequence remains prominent, although some institutions no longer require it, finding that healthy numbers of students now choose methodology as a field anyway. Augmenting this shift in standard coursework was the introduction of auxiliary training workshops, many of which had a setting much like a high school summer camp. Participants typically shared lodging, often in campus dormitories; ate all meals together; and worked long, hard hours even after formal sessions concluded for the day. The Inter-University Consortium of Social and Political Research (ICPSR) program at the University of Michigan began offering summer training in methodology in 1963, and by the 1990s, attending the workshop had become a rite of passage for graduate students. At Stanford’s Hoover Institution, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita set up what many referred to as “Hoover Camp,” to which junior faculty and graduate students, mostly IR types, reported for intense training in game theory in the early to mid 1990s. The NSF now funds a new summer modeling institute, the EITM, which, as its name implies, emphasizes connections between formal models and empirical methods. The Merriam Laboratory’s Junior Masters Class at the University of Illinois was a notable weekend workshop emphasizing formal modeling skills in a mentor-based environment.1

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1 A perhaps subtle, yet nonetheless evident and important, outcome of the dependence of SSIP scholarship on mathematics is the leveling of the playing field. Equations are a great equalizer, a neutral arbiter of the soundness of ideas. In principle, anyone who has successfully mastered particular coursework should be able to read and assess a formal
Interestingly, undergraduate education has also reflected a shift toward the SSIP-approach. Paralleling movements in the other social sciences, many political science departments renewed or initiated BS curricula in the late 80s and 90s, with an emphasis on statistics, calculus, and research design. Bueno de Mesquita’s *Principles of International Politics* (first published in 1999 and now in its fourth edition), was possibly the first textbook written for the traditional Introduction to International Relations course entirely from a game-theoretic perspective. Undergraduates have also benefited from summer workshops. At Oklahoma State, promising students converge for six weeks to participate in the Democracy and World Politics Research Experience for Undergraduates (REU) program, which is funded by the NSF. The fact that SSIP’s mode of inquiry has become institutionalized at the undergraduate level is a strong indicator that its lifespan is far from over.

**Technology**

Today, of course, laptop machines are ubiquitous among faculty, graduate students, and BA and BS candidates. We have already mentioned how these changes led to relatively easy, and therefore extensive hypothesis testing. It also produced the automation of data coding, now almost in real time, exemplified by the KEDS (Kansas Events Data System) project (Schrodt, Davis, and Weddle 1994) and its spin-off, PANDA (Protocol for the Analysis of Nonviolent Direct Action) (Bond, Bennett and Vogele 1994). In addition, vastly expanded computing capabilities have augmented the complexity of all-computer simulations and of game-theoretic models. Good recent model published in a leading journal. As more scholars from diverse backgrounds attend training workshops, this mastery has become more accessible to a wider group.
examples can be found in Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson’s (2004) agent-based model of secession and Cederman’s (2001) system-level work on the evolution of democratic peace. Because these formal models have become more complex, years of training at a top-ranked graduate program is now the best route for mastering an understanding of their mechanics and the software or programming skills needed to run simulations, solve equations, or otherwise analyze models to reach deductions.

Perhaps the biggest technological advancement since the advent of the personal computer has been the World Wide Web. Its effects on SSIP research have been many, but all revolve around the theme of accessibility. First off, scholars can now rather easily and quickly find and read historical news sources (e.g., Lexis Nexis, Keesing’s Record of World Events, and the NYT), government documents, and publications by IGOs and NGOs, making data collection efforts far easier for even relatively small teams of researchers with highly specialized substantive interests (e.g., Morgan, Krustev, and Bapat’s 2009 TIES data). Second, datasets are now housed online, so virtually anyone can download them. Codebooks are no longer sought out by trekking across campus to the computing facility serving as the ICPSR liaison. Instead, the analyst simply visits the project web site, such as that hosted by COW. Or, he or she might visit an internet data warehouse, a sort of one-stop shop for accessing variables from multiple projects, best typified by the EUGene (Expected Utility Generation) project (Bennett and Stam 2000).  

A potential drawback of data availability is that researchers performing statistical

\footnote{Bennett and Stam (2000) originally conceived of EUGene as a program that could generate data to test various expected utility models of war (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1985; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).}
analyses are increasingly removed from the conceptual underpinnings of measurement tools.

Another byproduct of the internet can be seen in the widespread availability of authors’ mathematical deductions, raw statistical results, corresponding files with programming code or recorded software commands, and datasets preserved in the format used for the initial analysis. Some journals now even require that authors post all materials needed for reproducing their results. Replication, then, has become relatively easy and therefore more common. So when departmental reading groups gather to discuss a recent publication in the *American Political Science Review (APSR)*, an entrepreneurial colleague will often bring along his or her own analysis demonstrating how the introduction or elimination of a particular variable from the author’s statistical model drastically changes the findings. Additionally, replication has become a wonderful teaching tool. Instructors assign the exercise of duplicating research to even undergraduates.

**Diversification**

Another major development in the SSIP community was the diversification of the academy. The careful reader will have noticed that our summary of early scholarship indicated that it was almost exclusively the realm of men. In this respect the scientific study of world politics mimicked its practice. Issues of the *ISQ* from the 1970s, for example, contain almost no female authors, let alone any doing SSIP-style research. While one of us pursued a major research agenda for decades in this environment, the other benefited from the paths laid down by the former and a handful of others such as Lin Ostrom, Hanna Newcomb, Marie Henehan, and Karen Rasler. During the 80s and
90s, gender barriers were being removed by efforts to train more young women in math and science at the high school and college levels. Faculty like Arnold and Carole Shilepsky at Wells College procured grants to implement math and science teaching methods that catered to what were believed to be female learning styles, methods such as computerized graphing of multidimensional mathematical functions. Women also advanced thanks to more equitable distribution of assistantships and fellowships to graduate students, legal and associated monetary implications of differential standards for tenure and promotion, and grants directed toward supporting female scholars such as the NSF’s Professional Opportunities for Women in Research and Education (POWRE) program. The major entry of women to the SSIP community came, then, at about the same time that giant leaps were being made in computing abilities and in the systematic training of graduate students in statistics and formal modeling. As a consequence, the skirts came with skills, and major datasets, research findings, novel deductions from formal models, and theoretical innovations have become the product of women as well as men.  

3 Nonetheless, evidence of a gender gap persists across a large number of indicators including differences in salaries (Henehan and Sarkees 2006), publication rates in the top political science journals (Bruening and Sanders 2005) and in books and edited volumes (Henehan and Sarkees 2006), and placement at research versus teaching institutions (Sarkees and McGlen 1999). Particularly worrisome is the increasing attrition rates for female scholars at all academic levels (Sarkees and McGlen 1999). Concerned with this trend, and aware of the successes enjoyed by the methodology and modeling training camps, senior women developed spin-off workshops that reinforce analytic skills and add
**PARTING THOUGHTS**

We anticipate a lively, productive future for SSIP scholarship. Our sense is that some of the most exciting work being done today is intentionally at the nexus of methods and models. Experimental research on human subjects, for instance, provides empirical tests of some common game-theoretic modeling assumptions such as audience costs (Tomz 2007) or the (ir)rationality of cooperative norms (Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter 2002). Another promising connection lies in the use of formal models to solve seemingly intractable empirical challenges such as selection bias (e.g., Lacy and Niou 2004; Morrow 1989). Finally, several scholars are now developing estimators of formal models that are mathematically tied to the model’s functional features (Esarey, Mukherjee, and Moore 2008; Lewis and Schultz 2003). Richardson would be delighted.

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strong mentoring and professionalization components, such as the Journeys in World Politics program at the University of Iowa and Visions in Methodology at The Ohio State University.
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