THE DIFFUSION OF DEFERENCE: REGIONAL MACHINE STRENGTH AND FEDERAL ELECTION RESULTS IN RUSSIA

Bryon J. Moraski
Department of Political Science
The University of Florida
Gainesville, FL 32611
bmoraski@polisci.ufl.edu

and

William M. Reisinger
Department of Political Science
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa 52242
william-reisinger@uiowa.edu

Abstract
Federal elections in post-Soviet Russia provide an important opportunity to advance the literature on elections in authoritarian settings. Thanks to a period of democratic experimentation in a federal state, national elections in Russia are more closely tied to center-periphery politics than similar elections in contexts with unitary structures. Therefore, disaggregating federal election results over time, and at a meaningful level, yields valuable insights into the regime’s evolution. By tracing which regions were deferential to the Kremlin over time, we identify those that emerged as newly deferential in 2000. Combining this information with existing knowledge about the relationship between these regions and the Kremlin, we find that electoral deference spread over time across Russia’s regions through a process of learning. The analysis also reveals that the spatial diffusion of deference in Russia has boundaries: Regions in northwest Russia so far have resisted the drift toward deferential outcomes.

Acknowledgements: The authors thank John O’Loughlin for sharing a shape file of Russia’s regions, Joe Aufmuth for his assistance in modifying the shape file, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova and Paul Voss for their suggestions, and Hyemin Joo for her research assistance. Bryon Moraski is particularly grateful to the University of Florida for a Faculty Enhancement Opportunity (FEO) Grant, which funded his participation in the 2010 ICPSR Workshop on Spatial Regression Analysis.
Election outcomes and electoral behavior are commonly conceived as the domain of democratization and democracy. However, as illiberal regimes continue to rely on elections, regardless of how unfair and restricted they are, a growing and steady stream of research has been dedicated to investigating the operation of elections in more or less authoritarian settings (see among others, Karklins 1986; Posusney 2002; Smith 2005; Howard and Roessler 2006; Brownlee 2007; Lust-Okar 2009). The stated goals of such research include understanding how these regimes perpetuate their power as well as how opposition (if not, democratic) groups may find chinks in the regime’s authoritarian armor. Federal elections in post-Soviet Russia provide an important opportunity to advance this literature. Thanks to a period of democratic experimentation that included the creation of a federal system through a national referendum, the politics of electing representatives to Russia’s national institutions is more closely tied to center-periphery politics than similar elections in authoritarian contexts with more unitary structures. In the Russian Federation, even today, regional actors matter. As such, casting Russian elections as universally flawed risks painting the country’s politics with too broad of brush. We argue that disaggregating federal election results over time and at a meaningful level, such as at the level of the constituent “subjects of the federation,” yields valuable insights into the regime’s evolution.

We have shown elsewhere (Reisinger and Moraski 2010) that some regional leaderships use their tight political control to produce strong electoral support in federal elections for the Kremlin incumbent or Kremlin-backed “party of power,” that this shows up in the mid-1990s, well before Vladimir Putin’s presidency, but that it spread widely across the regions after 2000. In this paper, we ask whether the spread of regional authoritarianism in Russia, as measured by electoral deference to the Kremlin (see Appendix B), was shaped by regions’ spatial relations, not just their composite characteristics. We then consider the extent to which diffusion may explain the spatial dimension of electoral deference’s increase over time. Our analysis finds not only evidence of spatial autocorrelation in the distribution of deferential election results by region (from 1999 on), but that defining a region’s federal district as its “neighborhood” helps to explain the region’s deference level. In terms of the mode of diffusion, we look for evidence of what Shipan and Volden (2008) have labeled learning or imitation, but couch these general
notions in context-specific terms: the process of recentralization initiated under President Putin’s regime. Moreover, by tracing which regions were deferential to the Kremlin over time, we identify those that emerged as newly deferential in 2000--that is, at the first signs of spatial autocorrelation. When combined with existing knowledge about the relationship between these regions and the Kremlin, we conclude that electoral deference spread over time across Russia’s regions through a process of learning: Other regions witnessed the behavior of deferential leaders, perceived the likely benefits of such action, and changed their behavior accordingly. In addition, the analysis suggests that the spatial diffusion of deference has boundaries. Specifically, a cluster of regions in northwest Russia has resisted the drift toward deferential outcomes, at least so far. The analysis ends with a discussion of the presence and potential significance of democratic enclaves (i.e., regions with high levels of competition in national elections) in Russia today.

Using Regional Patterns of Election Results to Study Political Trends Within a Federal Polity

Migdal (2001) calls for scholars to reconsider how states and societies transform and constitute one another. He contends that much work on the state since the move in the 1980s to return it to center-stage in political science (see especially Skocpol 1979 and Evans et al. 1985) has relied on a Weberian definition. Yet defining the state as an autonomous and unitary actor with a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in its territory (Weber 1920 [1978]) has fueled a perception not only that the state is distinct from society but that members of society are passive recipients of its policies and goals. In other words, widespread use of this definition has bred certain expectations about what qualifies as a “normal” state. A normal state is depicted as static and uniform while its relation with society is one of domination. The problem for Migdal is that this idealized view obscures the relationship between states and society. As an alternative, Migdal (2001, 15-16) depicts the state “as a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image of a coherent controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practice of its multiple parts” (emphasis in the original).

Like Migdal’s view of the state, we argue that national elections in hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002) may be understood as a field of contestation characterized by inconsistencies between image and practice. In these states, the conventional Western image of elections as
institutions by which the masses hold elites accountable clashes with the practices of electoral
manipulation and fraud that permit elites to turn elections into instruments of authoritarian rule.
Moreover, examining elections over time provides critical insight not only into the direction of
the regime but the evolution of state-societal relations. In a federal state like Russia, national
elections serve as a valuable lens capable of exposing the shifting dynamics of center-periphery
relations, in particular. From this perspective, then, we analyze levels of regional deference in
Russian federal elections over time.

The study of competitive authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2002) and electoral authoritarian
(Schedler 2006) regimes has focused much attention on how countries fail to democratize or
even move from elections that were somewhat free and fair to those that clearly violate such
expectations. The Russian Federation, in particular, has gone from reasonably free and fair elec-
tions in the 1990s to a recent round of elections, in 2007 and 2008, that “only Kremlin apologists
and sycophants had the audacity to argue . . . met standards of good democratic practice”
(Myagkov et al. 2009, 118). (Appendix A provides a brief review of the Russian federal elec-
tions from 1991-2008, including discussion of the political parties we treat as the pro-Kremlin
parties, or “parties of power,” and presidential candidates.)

For the most part, the study of electoral authoritarianism has focused on national dynam-
ics, ignoring lessons that sub-national variation might reveal (important exceptions are the
contributions in an edited volume by Ross and Gel’man 2010). Yet there are clearly advantages
to disaggregating national politics along a sub-national dimension. Snyder (2001), for example,
argues that “scaling down” not only increases the number of comparable observations, but also
allows one to examine the spatially uneven nature of major political processes. Gibson (2005)
illustrates the latter by considering the asymmetric nature of democratization in Argentina and
Mexico (see also Fox 1994). Both countries experienced enough variation in their levels of sub-
national democratization to reveal patterns of “regime juxtaposition”: the presence of pockets of
sub-national authoritarianism operating alongside democratic national governments (Gibson
2005, 103).

Of course, sub-national regime diversity is not limited to democratic states. Authoritarian
regimes may have democratic enclaves, just as democratic regimes possess authoritarian
enclaves. According to Gilley (2010, 408), most authoritarian regimes, including China and
Vietnam, have democratic enclaves—that is, institutionalized democratic spaces within an
otherwise authoritarian regime. So, just as Garretón (1995, 154) submits that authoritarian enclaves can impede democratic consolidation, Gilley (2010, 405) argues that democratic enclaves can create obstacles to authoritarian consolidation and even provide “‘within-system’ opportunities for democratic change.”

An important lesson from these works, then, is that the tendency to focus on national level developments and to treat the state as a unitary actor may lead one to miss other driving forces of political control and change. One place to look for less obvious forces of control and change is at the sub-national level, particularly the relationship between regional governments and the center. Examining continuity and change at the sub-national level in Russian federal elections provides deep insight into the dynamics of the country’s authoritarian turn since a critical dimension of Putin’s rule as president involved reining in unruly regions.

When using electoral data, though, several sub-national levels exist. Depending on electoral rules and related laws, voting results can be acquired at the precinct, city, county/district or regional levels. We employ data on the latter, therefore operating at a different level of analysis from many scholars doing quantitative analyses of precinct- or county-level Russian electoral data, whether with an eye to examining voter preferences (e.g., Clem and Craumer 1995, 1997; Berezkin et al. 1999; Akhremenko 2007) or to identifying fraudulent results (Oreshkin and Oreshkina 2007; Mebane and Kalinin 2009; Myagkov et al. 2009; Mebane and Kalinin 2010).

“Regions” is the generic term for those political units deemed to be subjects of the Russian Federation. In addition to varying widely in size, populace and other characteristics, regions can have the status of an oblast’, krai, city of federal significance (Moscow or St. Petersburg), republic, autonomous okrug or autonomous oblast’. Each region in the latter three categories is named after a non-Russian ethnic group--e.g. the Tatar Republic--and tend to have relatively small proportions of ethnic Russians. Republics have certain constitutional powers that other regions do not and have been much debated as therefore being more prone to authoritarian regional politics (Stepan 2000). The designation “autonomous” signals that the region is entirely located within a larger region. Initially, 89 regions were subjects of the Federation; now 83 are.

---

1The latter point echoes an argument by Mozaffar and Vengroff (2002).
2In the 2000s, at the urging of President Putin, six autonomous okrugs merged into the larger region that surrounded them. On the process, see Chebankova 2010, 171-178.
We and others who analyze regional-level data (e.g., O'Loughlin et al. 1996; Clem and Craumer 2004; Marsh et al. 2004) gain advantages from doing so but must recognize challenges and limitations that accompany the advantages. In a valuable review of the scholarship on Russia’s electoral geography, Clem (2006, 385 & 396) points out that, for studies of voter behavior, regional data obscures significant variation within each region. Also, the large differences in the population sizes of the regions pose challenges for studies of voter behavior. Offsetting these disadvantages is the fact that Russia’s regions are critically important “places” in Agnew’s (1987) sense of contexts shaping interests, influence and identities (Clem 2006, 384; cf. O'Loughlin et al. 1996, 382). For many political issues, it is fruitful to conceive of the regions as actors struggling with the federal center or competing with each other; we regularly return to this theme to understand the spatial dynamics evident in our analysis. Regional-level social, demographic and economic data are more plentiful than data at lower levels. Another advantage is that changes in the boundaries of voting districts do not complicate over-time comparisons, since such changes do not cross regional boundaries (Clem 2006, 385).

As the Soviet Union crumbled, Yeltsin urged Russia’s constituent regions to take as much autonomy as they could swallow as he battled with Soviet President Gorbachev for their support. By the time Putin had ascended to the presidency, Russia’s federal system was widely regarded as too devolved, or at least more asymmetric toward regional power than other federal systems.³ Throughout much of the 1990s, the republics in particular tended to enjoy more instruments of sovereignty, such as control of tax revenues, than other regions thanks to their large ethnic minorities and ability to negotiate better bilateral treaties with the federal government (see Kahn 2002).

Putin’s ascent to the presidency signaled a new direction in federal-regional relations, one characterized by a push for recentralization. First, the Putin administration moved to curtail the power of regional executives through the addition of a new layer of federal bureaucracy. On May 13, Putin grouped Russia’s 89 regions into seven federal administrative districts and appointed a presidential representative for each who would monitor the economic, political,

³ As Stepan (1999, 31) notes, all federal systems are asymmetric due, among other things, to variance in the populations and geographic sizes of their constituent parts.
security, and social situations in their districts’ regions. (In January 2010, President Dmitrii Medvedev announced an eighth district, the North Caucasus district, comprising seven regions formerly in the Southern District.) The presidential representatives were tasked with seeing that regional laws and policies did not violate federal law and that the center had control over regional departments of key federal ministries and agencies (Hyde 2001; Teague 2002; Alexander 2004).

In addition to this new administrative layer, Putin reorganized the composition of Russia’s upper chamber of parliament, the Federation Council, to limit the influence of regional leaders. Although members of the Federation Council were elected in 1993, from 1995 onward the two representatives from each region had been the heads of each region’s executive and legislative branches. On 17 May 2000, Putin proposed a bill replacing these “senators” with representatives nominated by the regional chief executives and regional speakers of parliament and confirmed by the regional parliaments. This reform was promoted as being in the best interests of regional residents: If regional executives and parliamentary speakers are to effectively govern their regions, they should be in their regions not in Moscow serving in the Federation Council. (For a detailed analysis of the effects of this change, see Remington 2003).

President Putin’s push to strengthen the vertical hierarchy of executive power and to limit the power of Russia’s regions took a decidedly undemocratic turn at the beginning of his second term in office. Following the Beslan school hostage crisis in September 2004, President Putin called for replacing executive elections in the regions with presidential appointees. (For an analysis of how the Kremlin’s interest in gubernatorial elections likely influenced this decision, see Moraski and Reisinger 2007). Thanks to a strongly pro-presidential majority in parliament, the reform was quickly passed into law.

We expect, then, that the dramatically different relationship between the federal executive and regional governments since the collapse of communism and the significant attention that the Putin administration paid to federal-regional relations during Russia’s authoritarian turn is likely to be associated with significant variation in which regions were initially willing to defer to the Kremlin’s in federal elections. Yet we are also interested in whether the demonstration of

\[4\] However, Treisman (1999) demonstrates that the ability to leverage such autonomy was not limited to republics.
deference by one region can spur spatially proximate regions to act more deferential than would be expected based on their regional characteristics alone.

We have shown in other papers (Reisinger and Moraski 2009, 2010) that it is possible to identify regions with authoritarian regional political settings by examining the regional vote totals and turnout levels in federal elections. In particular, we develop a measure of regional deference to the Kremlin from the level of support for the Kremlin-supported candidate or party. Appendix B explains how we constructed this measure. Our measure highlights regions in which the governor’s team has sufficient control of the political levers to manufacture electoral outcomes so extremely favorable to the Kremlin that they could not have been the result of popular choice.

As our earlier work shows, deference to the Kremlin is not a phenomenon only of the Putin years. It shows up clearly in 1996 and even is in evidence in 1991. Nonetheless, its frequency across the regions expands dramatically after 2000. We turn now to exploring the spatial patterning of regional deference to the Kremlin.

**From Composite Characteristics to Spatial Relations**

For many political scientists, there is a sense that geographic patterns found among countries—or regions within countries—reflect traits that are best understood as stemming from variation in histories, cultures, and patterns of development. Przeworski and Teune (1970) are widely known for having urged researchers to “replace proper names with variables.” McAllister (1987, 45) argues that, when it comes to behavior, neighborhood or contextual effects are “either non-existent or, at best, negligible.” Likewise, Przeworski (1991, 191), questions whether geography even matters: “geography, with whatever that implies, is just not enough to shape economic and political fortunes,” and King (2001, 161) argues that “if we really understood politics, we would not need much of contextual effects.”

Despite these contentions, recent work has made the case that geographic characteristics and spatial relations among polities matter. Beissinger’s (2002) work on the “tides of nationalism” leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union illustrates how otherwise inexplicable developments—like the crystallization of a Ukrainian secessionist identity—makes sense only when human action is understood as being dependent across time and space. More recently, his work on modular revolutions in the post-communist region demonstrates that Galton’s problem (i.e.,
the lack of independence among cases) continues to shape political developments in the region (Beissinger 2007).⁵

Even in theories of democratization, where domestic forces and calculations are largely seen as the driving explanations (Schmitter 1986, 5), scholars have begun to take international spatial relations, like neighborhood effects, into account. Indeed, Przeworski has revised his earlier premise, noting that “international conditions predict regime survival better than does the level of development” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 171). O’Loughlin et al. (1998) studied democracy in the world from 1946-1994 and found strong spatial autocorrelation. To understand why this might occur, Pevehouse (2002, 522) submits that international organizations, specifically regional organizations, spur democratization as democratic states use these venues to pressure non-democratic neighbors to liberalize. According to Pevehouse’s findings, an authoritarian regime’s prospects for a democratic transition increases from about 6 percent to nearly 10 percent for each country in its region of the world that is democratic. Similarly, Gleditsch and Ward (2006, 916) find that the estimated probability of a country’s democratic transition increases sharply as the proportion of its neighbors who are democratic grows. Since social and economic conditions change slowly over time, Gleditsch and Ward doubt that the observed variability in democracy across the globe over time stems solely from the relationships between social requisites and democracy. And, given the spatial clustering observed, they offer democratic diffusion as a complementary explanation. For them, democratic diffusion occurs as 1) authoritarian rulers become more willing to initiate difficult reforms after witnessing the experiences of other states and realizing that the costs of reform are not as bad as anticipated, or 2) a changing international environment (specifically, the end of the Cold War) threatens to isolate regimes that eschew reform. In both of these instances, distance between polities matter. In the first, insights are gleaned from proximate states and they inform the actions of authoritarian elites. In the second, the fear of isolation—a term with explicitly spatial connotations—motivates action that would not have occurred otherwise.

While contextual differences and democratic diffusion are generally understood as country-level phenomena, O’Loughlin et al. (1994) illustrate how the two may not only operate within

---

⁵Certainly, concerns about Galton’s problem have existed for a while, see especially Ross and Homer 1976.
countries but also can have important effects on electoral politics. The authors reexamine leading explanations for public support for the Nazis in Germany’s 1930 elections. Using electoral data from 921 cities and towns residing within one of six German regions, the scholars find that the power of different explanatory factors depended on spatial context—that is, the explanations that hold true in, say, the East, do not necessarily hold in Middle Germany. As a result, their work illustrates the analytical leverage that disaggregating national electoral results can yield since no single theory of the Nazi vote proves adequate by itself (ibid, 372). Equally important, O’Loughlin et al.’s work reveals that even the kind of spatial explanation for electoral outcomes can vary within the same country. In the regions of Central and Northwest Germany, the Rhineland, and Bavaria, support for the Nazis could be explained using variables commonly associated with extant theories, even if those variables performed differently in different regions. However, in the cities and towns of two German regions—the East and Baden-Württemburg—spatial autocorrelation effects persist despite what should be a sufficiently specified model.\(^6\)

Our analyses will therefore be of the sort that geographers call “spatial econometrics” (O’Loughlin 2003, 32), which “blends regression analysis with spatial autoregression methods that use geographic data coordinates to check if location has a significant impact on the compositional relationships (e.g., class on voting choice).” Our analyses below begin by examining the global Moran’s I values for each federal election. When these values are significant, they indicate the presence of some spatial patterning that requires investigation. The next step will be to examine a series of hypotheses about what underlying processes might account for the patterning that is present. We turn now to developing and testing those hypotheses.

**Spatial Analyses**

We test our hypotheses through a combination of standard data analysis and techniques of exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA), which combines more traditional statistics with maps to test hypotheses regarding spatial patterns. In a study of the geographic spread of

\(^6\)The presence of spatial autocorrelation, after controlling for relevant variables capturing spatial heterogeneity, indicates spatial dependence. In this work, in particular, the Nazi vote in the cities and towns of two regions were not spatially independent of one another. A failure to have controlled for spatial dependence would have biased the magnitudes of the model’s coefficients for the cities and towns comprising these two German regions. Although the magnitudes of the coefficients would be biased, their
homicide, Messner et al. (1999, 425) point out that a crucial aspect of any diffusion process is the location of the initial “shock” to the system or “innovation” relative to the location of “adopters” across time and space. Likewise, applying ESDA to regional voting results in federal elections in Russia over time allows us to examine the spatial dynamics of regional deference to the Kremlin.

**Testing for Spatial Autocorrelation**

Among ESDA techniques, the Global Moran’s I is a commonly used statistic to test whether the null hypothesis of spatial randomness can be rejected. The Moran’s I “gives a formal indication of the degree of linear association between a vector of observed values y and a weighted average of the neighbouring values, or spatial lag” (Anselin 1996, 115). Table 1 provides the global Moran’s I statistics for each of Russia’s presidential elections in which the vote in at least two regions exceeds what could be reasonably seen as a genuine reflection of public choice. Since our focus is diffusion, we use the Moran’s I to explicitly test for spatial effects.

When exploring spatial effects, geographic neighborhoods can be defined on the basis of contiguity or distance. Due to the wide variation in the territorial size of Russia’s regions square kilometers, defining neighbors on the basis of distance is problematic. According to data from 2006, the regions range from a minimum of approximately 1,100 square kilometers (the city of Moscow) to around 3,083, 500 square kilometers (Sakha). As a result, distance measures create significant disparities in the data: A distance value large enough to capture Sakha’s immediate neighbors will categorize many regions as Moscow’s neighbors even though they separated from Moscow by several other regions. On the other hand, smaller distance values would treat Sakha as a spatial island—that is, as though it lacks other regions that share its boundaries—which is clearly not the case. Therefore, instead of defining the regions’ neighborhood on the basis of distance, we define spatial neighbors using the notion of contiguity. Specifically, the spatial weights matrix used in the analysis to test for spatial randomness is a “first-order queen”, meaning that the neighbors of any given region “A” are defined in relation to those other regions that share a common boundary with “A” in any direction. Under this scenario, Kaliningrad is treated as a spatial island. As a Russian exclave with no other Russian regions on its borders, this

significance levels would not change. In this case, O’Loughlin et al. corrected the lingering spatial autocorrelation using a spatial lag based on distance contiguity.
categorization of Kaliningrad makes sense. As a result, we exclude it from the analysis. The only other region that raises an issue for the contiguity option is Sakhalin, which is in fact an island. However, rather than exclude Sakhalin from the analysis, we coded it as possessing one neighbor, Khabarovsk Krai, which lies directly across the Strait of Tatary (a little over seven kilometers away). Likewise, we added Sakhalin to the list of Khabarovsk’s neighbors.

According to the global Moran’s I statistics, presented in Table 1, the null hypothesis of spatial randomness in our deference measures cannot be rejected until the 2003 Duma election. In other words, for the earlier elections, we lack the clear evidence of spatial patterning that would merit an analysis of region-to-region diffusion. On the other hand, the Moran’s I proves significant for the 2003 Duma election while both its size and significance increase dramatically between the 2003 Duma and 2004 presidential elections, which occur only three months apart. The presence of spatial autocorrelation, in a univariate sense, continues for the 2007 Duma and 2008 presidential elections, though its degree appears to have diminished over time. Due to space limitations and the importance of the presidency as the locus of power in post-Soviet Russian politics, we concentrate subsequent analysis on presidential elections.

Location

While the work by O’Loughlin et al. (1994) demonstrates how spatial relations may shape electoral politics within a country, Lankina and Getachew (2006) provide excellent insight into the dynamics of diffusion across Russia’s regions, specifically. Their work, however, focuses on democratic diffusion and pressure from a power outside of Russia (the European Union), not the diffusion of deference and pressures from within Russia, which is our focus.

By relying on the regions’ proximity to the most Eastern capital of a European Union (EU) state, Helsinki, and the flow of EU aid to Russia’s regions within the framework of the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program, Lankina and Getachew (2006) find that Russian regions closer to Helsinki received more TACIS aid and were more democratic than more distant regions. Moreover, they show that proximity matters less when the EU wished to reward democratic achievers. Put differently, reward in the form of EU aid was not necessarily dependent on proximity to the EU. Remote regions could, and did, receive more support by simply performing better democratically. In a multivariate analysis of panel data, both distance from the West (a region’s geographic stock) and foreign aid (an estimate of flow) emerge as significant predictors of regional democracy scores when controlling for
urbanization, religion, and openness (the latter is measured using foreign investment, newspaper readership, and telecommunications data) (ibid, 562). With Lankina and Getachew’s work in mind, then, one of the spatial patterns we consider is whether regions closer to the West are less likely to demonstrate electoral deference to the Kremlin— that is, more likely to conform to the democratic principle of openly competitive elections— than other regions.

H1: Regions located farther from Helsinki (more southeasterly) will become deferential earlier.

H2: Regions located farther from Helsinki (more southeasterly) will become more highly deferential.

An initial way of testing these two hypotheses involves mapping the distribution of deference toward the Kremlin in presidential elections over time. A benefit of this approach is it provides a visual representation of spatial patterns of deference’s ebbs and flows that inform the rest of our analysis. Maps 1-5 are standard deviation maps. Created in GeoDa™, the maps present the mean value of deference for the presidential election in question. They also list the regions falling within one of the three standard deviational units above the mean.

Maps 1-5 confirm our previous finding that deference to the Kremlin is not merely a phenomenon of the Putin years. Both the mean value and the number of regions lying two and three standard deviations above the mean was higher in Yeltsin’s first election in 1991 than in Putin’s in 2000. Evidence of electoral deference exists for Yeltsin’s 1996 reelection bid. Note as well that although the mean value of our deference measure in 1996 falls below the 2000 mean, the number of extreme outliers—those regions lying three deviations above the mean—is higher in 1996 than in 2000.

Focusing on the 1991, 1996, and 2000 presidential elections, it is difficult to determine conclusively that regions farther away from Helsinki (or the EU in general) were more likely to show electoral deference to the region. In 1996, all of Russia’s highly deferential regions, except

7 The authors flesh out the dynamics of these findings using process tracing in two Western regions, Karelia and Pskov. They demonstrate how the receptivity of geographic units to information and resources from outside their borders serves as a critical determinant of diffusion. The possession of the right stock, proximity to the West, is not enough to guarantee diffusion. The presence of flow matters as well (Lankina and Getachew 2006).

8 GeoDa™ is a trademark of Luc Anselin. The software incorporates licensed libraries from the Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESRI) MapObjects LT2. It is available from the website
Moraski & Reisinger - 13

Moscow, are appreciably distant from Helsinki, but so too are many seemingly non-deferential regions. Meanwhile, in neither 1991 nor 2000 did regions in Siberia or Russia’s Far East fall above the mean on the deference measure. Yet a number of regions in the south, especially in or near the Caucasus, qualify as both deferential and relatively distant from Helsinki. Of course the reasons for this spatial pattern may have little in common with their relationship to the EU. In 1991, ethnic regions, like Chechnya, were probably responding favorably to Yeltsin’s call that republics take as much sovereignty as they could swallow. By contrast, in March 2000, acting president, Vladimir Putin, had deployed a significant number of troops to the region for a second war with Chechen rebels. In other words, center-periphery relations were not only at play, but the differences in them over time are reasonable explanations for the difference in deference levels. Meanwhile, and not surprisingly, Yeltsin’s home region of Sverdlovsk proves deferential in the 1991 election. The same cannot be said, however, for Putin and St. Petersburg or Leningrad oblast.

Proximity to Helsinki seems at best, therefore, to serve as a barrier to deference.\(^9\) Maps 4 and 5 provide some support for this interpretation. Despite a dramatic jump in the number of deferential regions between the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, not one of the regions scoring above the mean reside in the northwest portion of the Russian Federation. And, by 2008, a northwestern resistance to deference persists, with the raw number of deferential regions increasing from 26 to 28 even though the Federation now has six fewer subjects.

Table 2 tests the distance-from-the-EU hypothesis more systematically. For each presidential election, our deference measure is regressed on the location of each region’s capital, with higher numbers indicating more easterly and/or more southerly locations.\(^{10}\) Table 2 first presents the results of a bivariate regression analysis in which the only independent variable is location. The second set of results is for a more specified model that includes key socioeconomic indicators of the regions. They are the infant mortality rate and percentage of urban residents for the


\(^9\)For a discussion of spatial “barriers”, especially in the context of diffusion, see Messner et al. (1999).

\(^{10}\)To create the location variable, we subtracted the latitude of each regional capital from 90 and added that value to the longitude of the capital. We then subtracted that sum from 360: 360-[Longitude + (90-Latitude)].
year in question, as well as the percentage of non-Russians residing in the region based on the most recent census (i.e., 1989 or 2002). In this and subsequent regression results, our tables report the standardized coefficients (beta weights) along with the statistical significance. The standardized coefficients indicate the extent to which change in the explanatory variable correspond to change in the dependent variable. A standardized coefficient of .20, for instance, indicates that a change in the explanatory variable of one standard deviation leads to the dependent variable changing by a fifth of a standard deviation.

As Table 2 suggests, location along the northwest-southeast diagonal (roughly, distance from Helsinki) alone performs poorly in explaining variance in electoral deference. For the more fully specified model, location makes a substantive contribution only in 1991 and 2000. Moreover, the r-squared is so low in 1991 that the coefficients are of little interest, which makes sense from Lankina and Getachew’s (2006) perspective. It is only by the late 1990s that EU aid had the potential to influence regional politics. From Map 3, however, we also know that the highly deferential regions driving this outcome are located in the south. To explore this further, we differentiate regions based on the latitudes of their capitals and find that this variable produces better results than a location variable that treats eastern and southern distance from Helsinki equally (see Table 3).

Because latitude is higher for more northerly regions, the negative coefficients indicate that more southerly regions are more deferential. The impact of southerly location remains when incorporating the other regional characteristics, although percent non-Russian has far stronger impact most years. (Latitude and percent non-Russian are correlated at -.23 [.030], which is insufficient to produce multicollinearity in the regressions.) Once again, it seems that the most we can ascertain from the distance-from-the-EU hypothesis is that regions to the northwest are not deferential.11

11 Implicit throughout our discussion so far is the possibility is that the proximity of a potentially influential actor may determine the regional provisions of deferential election results. This “actor” is the Kremlin, which is located in Moscow. Accordingly, we conducted regressions similar to those presented in Tables 1 and 2 to see whether the distance of the regions (or more precisely, their capitals) from Moscow shaped deference levels. The results were even worse than those for our distance-from-the-EU measure (unreported but available from the authors).
**Proximity to Deferential Regions**

An alternative approach is to focus on other regions as influential actors. According to this hypothesis, the presence of highly deferential regions may have an effect on other geographically proximate regions. As the literature suggests, similar phenomena may occur in proximate polities because those sharing spatial neighborhoods either possess similar cultural, political, or socioeconomic characteristics or because the ideas are likely to spread, first, to spatial neighbors. Hypothesis 3 captures this notion.

**H3:** The probability of any region becoming deferential or more deferential grows as the amount of deference in its neighboring regions increases.

It is worth pointing out that the distance-from-deferential-neighbor hypothesis may operate in conjunction with the distance-from-the-EU hypothesis. Specifically, it is plausible that being further removed from the West contributes to the rise of “deference leaders” or “innovators” while subsequent acts of deference may reflect the proximity of other, newly deferential regions to the initially deferential polities. In other words, Hypotheses 1 and 2 may identify the locations of “innovators” while Hypothesis 3 provides a sense of how that innovation spread, through a process of diffusion based on spatial proximity.

To examine the impact of neighborhood on regions’ becoming deferential, we begin by treating a region’s neighborhood as its federal administrative district. As discussed above, in 2000, the creation of federal districts aggregated the regions in a formal manner and the move has been understood broadly as a fundamental component of the Putin administration’s recentralization program with the president’s envoys charged with overseeing regional developments (economic, legal, and political) within their designated domains. Moreover, the boundaries were not without precedent but rather conformed loosely to economic and military zones from the Soviet era. From this perspective, then, defining the regions’ neighborhoods on the basis of the federal districts makes empirical and theoretical sense. For each presidential election, we calculated the mean deference level by federal district and assigned that score to each region in that district. We then use these variables to explain the levels of deference exhibited by regions in the next presidential election.

Table 4 shows the results of regressing the previous election’s district averages on deference, with and without control variables for percent non-Russian, urban percent and infant mortality. H3 receives strong support from 2000 on. The average deference value for a given district at time $t_1$ strongly predicts its member-regions’ deference values at $t_2$. In 2004 and 2008,
the correlation between the average deference by district in the preceding elections and the percent non-Russian is high enough so that the regression results have some multicollinearity. It is not extreme, though, and the larger finding holds that a region’s neighbor’s performance in the preceding election corresponds to a region’s deference level in the subsequent election.

As noted, diffusion may occur because polities are spatial proximate or because polities share common characteristics. And, based on previous multivariate statistical analyses (Reisinger and Moraski 2010), we have already identified at least one political characteristic that robustly correlates with electoral deference in federal elections: having a high percentage of residents who are ethnically non-Russian. The republics dominate the top of this list, with nine of the ten least Russianized populaces and 13 of the 15 in which Russians are a minority. Revisiting Maps 1-5, the presence of republics among highly deferential regions is significant, especially in later elections. In 1991, five of the twelve regions lying two or three standard deviations above the mean were republics. In 1996, republics were three of the six outliers with two more of the regions being autonomous okrugs and also falling into the category of “ethnic” regions. Meanwhile, although 2000 has the lowest number of deference outliers, all four are republics. By 2004, the range of federal categories represented among the highly deferential regions increases to include a number of oblasts, of those regions lying two or three standard deviations above the mean all are either ethnic regions (i.e., republics or okrugs). The same can be said for Medvedev’s election in 2008, save the addition of Tiumen to the group of regions situated two standard deviations above the mean.

Table 5 reinforces this point. It divides deferential regions into “ethnic” regions (i.e., republics, autonomous okrugs and the autonomous oblast’) and non-ethnic regions, as well as just those having the status of a republic. For every election, the proportion of ethnic regions that exhibits electoral deference is substantially higher than the proportion of non-ethnic regions. By 2004, two-thirds of the country’s 21 republics are deferential, compared to 9% of the oblasts, krais and federal cities. This suggests, then, that learning by one region comes mostly from examining the experiences of regions of the same constitutional status. For example, republics may look primarily to other republics to emulate. Accordingly, one should explicitly consider the attributes of the regions comprising any spatial neighborhoods of electoral deference. Doing so allows one to assess whether the diffusion of deference travels freely from one region to the
next, or whether a particular attribute, like constitutional status, might facilitate or stem the spread.\footnote{For a discussion of “barriers” to diffusion, see Messner et al. (1999).}

**H4:** The probability of any region becoming deferential or more deferential grows as the amount of deference in regions of the same constitutional status increases.

To test this, we divided the regions into three categories: republics, the other ethnic regions and the oblasts, krais and federal cities. We determined the mean deference score within each category for each presidential election. We then regressed deference in a given election against the score from the previous presidential election for regions having the same status. Table 6 provides the results.\footnote{Because the constitutional status of the regions’ flow from the ethnic composition of their populaces, our tripartite variables for each election are highly correlated with the variable for percent of non-Russians (from .41 to .84). We therefore cannot include percent non-Russian in the regression because it causes excessive multicollinearity.} From 2000 on, this variable achieves a notable substantive impact in the bivariate regression equation, becoming very strong in 2004 and 2008. Even when we add in the control variables, the impact remains strong in 2004 and 2008. It is striking that patterns from Boris Yeltsin’s re-election in 1996 would relate at all to patterns found in Vladimir Putin’s 2000 election, even if the multivariate equation weakens that link somewhat. Even the strong impact of the results from 2000--when Putin’s efforts to establish a vertical of power were barely getting started--on 2004 patterns might seem counter-intuitive. What this shows is that, as electoral deference to the Kremlin spread over time, it spread more readily and earlier from republic to republic and less readily and later among the non-ethnic oblasts’, krais and federal cities. From the perspective of center-periphery relations, this finding is surprising. In the 1990s, the republics were at the forefront of federal devolution, seizing opportunities to increase sovereignty. In the 2000s, regions in this federal category seemingly reversed course, not only accepting the Kremlin’s recentralization reforms but yielding vote totals well above those one might expect from even the most supportive of regions in a free and fair contest. Below we consider how this about-face informs the mechanisms by which deference has diffused across the Russian Federation over time.
Mechanisms of Transmission

The analysis so far provides some important clues as to how electoral deference has evolved in post-Soviet Russia. With these results in mind, we conclude our analysis with some consideration of the mechanisms that might be at work. Shipan and Volden (2008) identify four mechanisms of diffusion: learning, economic competition, imitation, and coercion. For now, we distinguish between learning, broadly speaking, and imitation. According to Shipan and Volden (2008), diffusion by learning involves adopting policies that have been successful elsewhere. For learning to be at play, then, the emphasis is on whether a policy or action was effective, or yielded desirable consequences. Imitation, on the other hand, occurs when one actor simply wishes to look like another—that is, a polity may wish to be wealthier or more cosmopolitan. With this distinction in mind, one can use tools like the standard deviations map already presented to identify potential deference leaders. Combining this information with knowledge of the particular regions indicates whether a learning or imitation hypothesis makes the most sense.

H5: IMITATION HYPOTHESIS: THE PROBABILITY OF ANY REGION BECOMING DEFERENTIAL OR MORE DEFERENTIAL GROWS AS THE AMOUNT OF DEFERENCE IN REGIONS POSSESSING DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS INCREASES IRRESPECTIVE OF THE REGIONS’ RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KREMLIN.

H6: LEARNING HYPOTHESIS: THE PROBABILITY OF ANY REGION BECOMING DEFERENTIAL OR MORE DEFERENTIAL GROWS AS THE AMOUNT OF DEFERENCE IN REGIONS POSSESSING ENVIABLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE KREMLIN INCREASES.

Reconsidering Maps 1-5 from a contagion or diffusion perspective, the first three maps corresponding to the first three presidential elections reveal diminishing levels of deference across the federation. The number of highly deferential regions drops consistently from twelve to six to four, with the two elections following the 1991 election having more regions falling below the mean of our deference measure than the previous election. This trend conforms to conventional assessments of the post-Soviet period, in which elections are seen as more or less com-

14 Future research should consider whether electoral deference might best be understood as an artifact of economic competition (i.e., more deferential receive federal subsidies at the expense of less deferential ones), coercion (i.e., federal money is withheld from less deferential regions), or learning (i.e., acts of deference by some regions brought in federal money so other regions pursue the same tactic).

15 As Shipan and Volden (2008, 843) observe, “a classic example of learning is avoiding touching the hot burner after observing someone doing so with bad effects, whereas imitation is jumping off the garage roof after observing your older brother doing so, without regard for the consequences.”
petitive and as having met some minimal degree of freedom and fairness. It also suggests that, at least during the Yeltsin era, acts of deference were not contagious. The lack of significance for the global Moran’s I also supports this conclusion. One noteworthy exception to the downward trend between 1991 and 2000, however, is the mean value of our deference measure. While it drops in 1996 relative to 1991, the deference mean in 2000 is higher than it was in 1996 despite fewer regions proving deferential in 2000. With 2000 marking the first election of Vladimir Putin as president and with the 2004 elections producing more than double the number of deferential regions (26) than any previous election, the 2000 election appears to represent a critical turning point. As such, highly deferential regions in 2000 stand out as potential leaders in any diffusion process.

As Map 3 indicates, the deference leaders in 2000 were Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Tatarstan. Of these four, Ingushetia proved highly deferential in 1991 and 1996, as well as in 2004 and 2008. In each presidential election, its regional vote totals returned support for the Kremlin lying three standard deviations from the mean. Dagestan, meanwhile, clearly proved deferential in 1991, but not in 1996. Since both regions had behaved in a deferential manner during the period in which deference to the Kremlin was declining, it would be unreasonable to identify either as catalysts of the diffusion dynamic. Both may have been deferential leaders in the 1990s, but they were leaders without followers. On the other hand, Kabardino-Balkaria and Tatarstan are new additions to the highly deferential camp. And Tatarstan, in particular, stood out consistently over the course of the 1990s as a leader among Russia’s regions.

In 1991, Tatarstan elected its own president, Mintimer Shaimiev, in elections that coincided with Yeltsin’s own election and as part of the 1991 “parade of sovereignties” (Kahn 2002). In 1993, Tatarstan boycotted the Duma elections and constitutional referendum due to the failure of the 1993 Russian Constitution to recognize republics as having greater sovereignty within their borders than other regions. Tatarstan also was the first region to sign a bilateral power-sharing treaty with the federal government following the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. In the treaty, Shaimiev negotiated substantial autonomy in tax collection, control over natural resources, and foreign policy for Tatarstan (Orttung 2000, xiv). More proximate to the 2000 presidential election, Shaimiev spearheaded the formation of All Russia in April 1999. This bloc would merge with Fatherland (headed by Moscow mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, and Kemerovo governor, Aman Tuleev) to compete as a rival--and regionally based--party of power during the
December 1999 Duma elections. Like Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria is a republic that moved to create an independently elected president while the Soviet Union was collapsing around it. In January 1992, Valerii Kokov became the first person elected to the post (Orttung 2000, 163). Also, like Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria signed a power-sharing treaty with Yeltsin in 1994, and the treaty gave the republic the status of a free economic zone (Treisman 1999, 134). However, unlike Shaimiev, whom Orttung (Orttung 2000, 542) describes as having a “simultaneously supportive and belligerent” relationship with Moscow, Kokov proved to be a “Yeltsin loyalist” (164). And, leading into the Duma elections, Kokov remained allied with the outgoing party of power, Our Home is Russia (Lussier 2002, 60).

Given the tumultuous relationship between Tatarstan and the Kremlin and the fact that Shaimiev helped to found an electoral bloc independent of, if not rivaling, the Kremlin’s interests in 1999, other regions throughout the federation likely perceived the highly deferential results coming out of Tatarstan--if not from Kabardino-Balkaria--as a signal that the game of Russian politics would be played differently in the 2000s than it had been in the 1990s. This conclusion gains credence to the extent that these seemingly powerful yet electorally deferential regional leaders were deemed to have the new administration’s ear. Thus, it is worth noting that, when the Kozak Commission took up the issue of reforming local government in 2001, both Kokov and Shaimiev enjoyed seats on the commission’s two key working groups, on “Development of Inter-Budgetary Relations” and “Economic development” (see Lankina 2003). To the extent that knowledge of this and other such influence became widespread, the subsequent diffusion of electoral deference may be interpreted as a learning process, but one well-situated in the context of the changing center-periphery relations in the Russia Federation at the time. That is, given the emergence of a highly popular president actively pursuing reforms that directly weakened the region’s position vis-à-vis the center, more vulnerable regions in Russia took a cue from Kabardino-Balkaria and Tatarstan. The apparent lesson to be learned is that showing deference to the Kremlin during federal elections represent one potentially effective method for earning an audience with the Kremlin and its increasingly powerful occupant.

---

16 Among, the earliest supporters of All Russia were the presidents of Ingushetia, Bashkortostan, as well as the mayor of St. Petersburg (see Slider 2001, 231).
Conclusion

Using electoral deference to the Kremlin as an indicator of regional authoritarianism, we have used Russia’s federal election results—particularly those from presidential elections—to better understand the dynamics of the country’s authoritarian turn. Focusing on Russia’s regions as the level of aggregation makes sense because these polities may be conceived of as actors with their own interests vis-à-vis the Kremlin. Indeed, a focus on the dynamics between national-level and regional-level interests drives much of our analysis. Meanwhile, Russia provides a particularly interesting case of authoritarian revival due to its federal nature and experimentation with democracy. Thanks to almost a decade of freedom from federal intervention as well as relatively competitive elections at the national level, it is evident that a resurgent authoritarian regime had to take center-periphery relations seriously, and the Putin administration clearly did so. More novel is our exploration of the spatial patterning of the Russian Federation’s political development. Our analysis not only shows that electoral deference to the Kremlin was more likely in republics, specifically, and regions with more non-Russians, generally, but that its spread over time corresponded with important spatial dimensions that themselves reflected changing federal-regional relations in the country.

First, while republics in southern Russia, like Dagestan and Ingushetia, appear perennially deferential, regions located in northwest Russia have consistently resisted either the temptation or the pressure to produce deferential election totals. If the latter suggests the presence of a potential barrier to the spread of regional authoritarianism, the former represents a “hot spot.” Equally important is our finding that these two types of spatial clusters, by themselves, were not enough to produce spatial autocorrelation in our deference measure. Some regions in Russia’s south were likely to behave deferentially in the 1991 and 1996 presidential election with no obvious effect on the diffusion of deference. At the same time, while regions in the northwest scored low on our deference measure, such behavior was not anomalous during the 1990s. Only when the act of deference spread beyond the usual suspects, coinciding with the change from the Yeltsin to the Putin administration, do we witness a sizable jump in the number of highly deferential regions in the subsequent elections. Moreover, while the global Moran’s I statistics reveal that this spread assumed a spatial dimension in the 2003-04 election cycle, the variation of interest comes as growth beyond the traditionally deferential south and presumably more independent northwest.
Turning to the question of diffusion, our regression analyses indicate that electoral deference spread at significantly higher rates among regions sharing the same federal district and the same constitutional status. The information available in Map 4 illustrates this point. By the 2004 presidential election, the number of regions providing deferential results three standard deviations above the mean jumps from four to seven. More to the point, these regions share the same constitutional status, republic, and come from the same federal districts, Caucasus and Volga, as the two regions we identify as deference leaders, Kabardino-Balkaria and Tatarstan. While we provide a rationale for why the diffusion of electoral deference is more likely to be a result of learning, broadly speaking, and changes in center-periphery relations, in particular, future research should consider the mechanism of diffusion more closely. Specifically, comparative case studies may be useful in determining whether its spread can best be understood as an artifact of 1) economic competition (e.g., more deferential regions receive more federal subsidies at the expense of less deferential ones), 2) coercion (e.g., federal money is simply withheld from less deferential regions), 3) learning (e.g., acts of deference by some regions brought in federal money so other regions pursue the same tactic), or 4) a mixture.\textsuperscript{17}

Although the number of regions providing deferential electoral results and the overall amount of deference--as indicated by our measure’s mean--has continued to increase since the 2000 presidential election, the one glimmer of hope for competitive politics in Russia appears to be those regions closest to the West. Even in 2008, demonstrations of deference remain foreign to the regions of Russia’s northwest. To the extent that numerous scholars (e.g., Shevtsova 2001; Colton and Hale 2009; March 2009; Hale 2010) are right to label Russia’s current system a hybrid regime, our work suggests that it may be best to think of the country as a spatially distributed hybrid of politically competitive and uncompetitive regions. A lingering concern, of course, is whether the momentum from previous elections will continue: Will deferential politics capture the competitive outpost of northwest Russia in 2011-12?

\textsuperscript{17}As Shipan and Volden (2008, 843) note, in practice diffusion does not always fall neatly into distinct theoretical categories.
Appendix A: Russia’s Federal Elections

Russia’s federation-wide elections span 1991 to 2008 (for more information, see, among others, Belin and Orttung 1997; McFaul and Petrov 1997; McFaul 1997; Wyman 1997; Gel’man et al. 2000; Gel’man et al. 2002; Marsh 2002; Hesli and Reisinger 2003; Clem and Craumer 2004; Marsh et al. 2004; Sakwa 2005; Gel’man et al. 2007; Ivanchenko and Liubarev 2007; Turovskii 2007; Buzin and Liubarev 2008; Colton and Hale 2009; White 2009). Although the June 1991 presidential election occurred before the USSR had ended, it bears inclusion with post-Soviet Russian elections because it was decoupled from Soviet-era election processes, and the result—the election of Boris Yeltsin as president—was maintained when Russia became an independent country at the end of 1991. (For more on this election, see White et al. 1997a, 35-40; Gel’man and Elizarov 1999, 27).

Federal legislative elections were held in 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007. Besides 1991, presidential elections occurred in 1996 (two rounds), 2000, 2004 and 2008. In analyzing the legislative elections, we employ regional totals from the proportional representation (PR) balloting for seats in the lower house, the State Duma. From 1993-2003, half of the Duma’s seats were allocated through the PR system, which involves a single ballot used nationwide, with parties’ totals determining how many seats they received. From 2007 on, all Duma seats are allocated through PR.\textsuperscript{18}

The three elections from 1993 to 1996 were battles over whether the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), or perhaps some other opponent of President Yeltsin’s administration, could come to power (for more on the CPRF, see Sakwa 1996; Tsipko 1996; Urban and Solovei 1997; March 2002).\textsuperscript{19} The December 1993 election took place two months after a bloody showdown between Yeltsin and his opponents in the then-existing legislature (Kutsylo 1993; Buzgalin and Kolganov 1994; McDonnell 1994; Zakharenkov and Shutov 1994; Bakhtiaiarova 1995; Ivanov 1995; Zevelev and Pavlov 1995; Zheleznova et al. 1995; Shevtsova 1996; Remnick 1997, 37-83; Charnyi 2004). All three of these elections occurred during the

\textsuperscript{18}The 2005 electoral law also raised the threshold for parties to receive seats from 5% to 7%. On this law and its impact, see Moraski (2007).

\textsuperscript{19}McFaul and Petrov (1997, esp. 509-11) argue that “all of the binary votes” from 1990-1996 were driven by attitudes for or against “reform,” broadly understood.
worst period of economic privations following the Yeltsin administration’s economic reforms. Yeltsin’s launching of military action against Chechen rebels in late 1994, and the Russian army’s poor performance, also contributed to a sharp fall in his popularity. Yeltsin was able to defeat CPRF leader Gennadii Zyuganov in 1996 in part by framing the race as a referendum on a return to communism (for an account of this election, see Remnick 1997, 317-354). In the legislative elections, however, Yeltsin’s supporters did extremely poorly, and executive-legislative struggles continue to be sharp through the close of the 1990s.

With Yeltsin constitutionally obligated to step down in 2000—and with his health too poor to push the issue—everyone understood that the 1999 Duma election would be a turning point. The most important development shaping this election was the series of terrorist attacks in September of that year, which led newly appointed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to initiate a second war in Chechnya. This time, Russian forces performed more capably, and Putin’s tough response earned him growing public popularity. Unity, the political party created to support Putin, did surprisingly well in the voting, and Putin became President on New Year’s Eve when Yeltsin retired. Putin then won the presidential election in March 2000 in the first round.

The four elections from 2003-2008 saw little competition and no suspense. Putin’s party, now called United Russia, won outright majorities in 2003 and 2007. Putin received 71% of the votes in winning re-election in 2004; his designated successor, Dmitrii Medvedev was elected with 70% of the votes in 2008. In addition to Putin’s genuine public popularity (Colton and Hale 2009; White and McAllister 2010), he and his team had successfully put an end to electoral competition (Shevtsova 2004; Buzin and Liubarev 2008; Hassner 2008; Stoner-Weiss 2010). Much of the responsibility for ensuring the “correct” outcome lay with political machines at the regional and local levels, whose leaders increasingly came to be members of United Russia.

A key characteristic of the Duma elections is that one of the parties on the ballot represented (or was perceived to represent) the federal executive. Russians dubbed these “parties of power” (see, inter alia, Colton and McFaul 2000; Makarkin 2000; Likhtenshtein 2002; Smyth 2002; Glebova 2004; Myagkov et al. 2005; Oversloot and Verheul 2006). The extent of executive-branch involvement with a given election’s party of power varied over the period. So, too, did whether the party leadership was based in the Kremlin (symbolizing the offices of the presidency) or in the White House (symbolizing the prime minister and the agencies comprising the
government). Despite this variation, the appellation party of power has held meaning for both voters and elites during electoral periods.

In 1993, the party known as Russia’s Choice best fit this category. Although officially unaffiliated with President Yeltsin, it saw itself as representing loyalty to Yeltsin (McFaul 1998; Gel’man and Elizarov 1999, 31-33). Even though some scholars exclude Russia’s Choice from their list of the parties of power (e.g., Turovskii 2002, 920), it did enjoy tacit support from the President in the form of more access to state resources than its rivals (Colton and McFaul 2000, 202; Golosov 2004, 30; White 2007, 25). In 1995, Our Home is Russia was created with the approval of President Yeltsin and headed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Compared to Russia’s Choice, it represented centrist and less economically radical policies. Like Russia’s Choice two years earlier, Our Home had an advantage in access to state resources and the media due to Kremlin backing and was considered a party of power (Badovskii and Shutov 1997, 36; White et al. 1997b, 771; Gel’man and Elizarov 1999, 34; Colton and McFaul 2000, 202; Easter 2001, 56; Remington 2008, 172-73). In 1999, two rival parties of power contended. Putin’s Unity was one. The other, which came out of the merger of two groups headed by such regional leaders as Moscow Mayor Yuri Lushkov and Tatarstan’s President Mintimer Shaimiev, was Fatherland/All Russia. In 2003 and 2007, the party of power was United Russia, the title given to Unity when it swallowed Fatherland/All-Russia in 2001.

All of Russia’s presidential elections have featured a candidate who was actually or functionally the incumbent. Yeltsin held the highest executive office, prime minister, when he was elected president in June 1991, and both he and Putin were sitting presidents when they sought election in 1996, 2000 and 2004. Dmitrii Medvedev ran in 2008 as Putin’s hand-picked successor and had tabbed Putin as his prime minister, essentially making the race another test of support for Putin. Thus, central executive authorities, the Kremlin, had a clear preference in each race.

---

20For regions with the status of republic, the regional executive has the title of president, but it is common for the term governor to be used for all regional chief executives. Similarly, the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg are included among Russia’s “governors.”
Appendix B: Electoral Deference to the Kremlin as a Measure of Regional Authoritarian Control

For each federal election from 1991 on, we calculate the votes received by the Kremlin’s candidate or party as a percentage of the total eligible voters in that region. The Kremlin’s candidates were Yeltsin in 1991 and 1996, Putin in 2000 and 2004, and Medvedev in 2008. The pro-Kremlin parties, or “parties of power” as they are dubbed in Russia, were Russia’s Choice in 1993, Our Home is Russia in 1995, either Unity and Fatherland/All Russia (whichever received the most votes in a given region), and United Russia in 2003 and 2007.

Using the percent of all eligible voters is a way to incorporate both high vote totals and high levels of turnout. Regions that produced high turnout were doing the Kremlin a favor both because some of Russia’s federal elections required certain turnout levels to be valid and to enhance the democratic legitimacy of a victory. From 2003-2008, achieving high levels of turnout was a stated aim of the Kremlin. In some elections in the 2000s, quite a few regions produced turnout above 80% and, among those voters, pro-Kremlin totals also above 80%. Ingushetia, for instance, reported 98% voting for Putin in 2004 with 96% of the republic’s eligible voters turning out. Clearly, totals of this sort cannot reflect public choice, whatever the level of Putin’s popularity. By contrast, take Orenburg Oblast’. Its turnout of 62% was at the median for the regions. It gave Putin 59% of the votes, a dominant victory in most settings but well below the mean. Calculating the votes for the Kremlin candidate or party as a percent of all eligible voters in the region is an arithmetically simple way to allow both voting and turnout to influence the region’s score. Ingushetia’s score on the measure of pro-Kremlin votes as a percent of all eligible voters in that election is 94.4. Of all eligible voters in Orenburg, by contrast, Putin received 37%. For all the regions in 2004, pro-Putin votes as a percent of eligible voters ranged from 30.5% to Ingushetia’s 94.4%. The mean was 47.8 and the median 42.9. (The much lower median reflects the minority of regions with very high scores.) Figure B1 shows the distributions of these percentages for each of the federal elections.

Calculating these percentages is the first step in our measure of deference to the Kremlin. Only regions with particularly high scores can be treated as evidencing authoritarian control. Below a certain level, lower scores do not necessarily mean less deference and higher scores more; other factors relating to public choice can explain the difference between Irkutsk’s 32% of eligible voters for Putin in 2004 and Ulianovsk’s 40%. Relatively low scores indicate regions in
which the leadership either does not seek to or is not able to manufacture higher levels of turnout and pro-Kremlin voting. Thus, after calculating the percentage of eligible voters, we apply a cut-off of 50% in presidential elections and 35% in legislative elections. This requires rather high totals for both turnout and pro-Kremlin votes. To reach the presidential cut-off of 50%, for example, a region with 70% turnout would need 71% pro-Kremlin voting. A region delivering 80% pro-Kremlin voting but with lower turnout of 63% would also pass the cut-off. Generally, the regions with very high scores on pro-Kremlin voting also have very high turnout levels. For the Duma races, the cut-off of 35% would require a party to receive, for example, half of all votes cast on 70% turnout. (No party received over half of the votes cast in any of the regions in 1993 or 1995, and this only happened in two regions in 1999.)

With these cut-off points, we acknowledge the risk that we will include a few regions where genuine high enthusiasm for the Kremlin’s candidate or party results in the high score. For example, voters in several regions in 1991 were genuinely enthusiastic about Yeltsin, producing scores above 50%. These regions included Sverdlovsk, Yeltsin’s home region, and others with populaces that were demographically more pro-reform. Even in 1991, though, several of the highest scoring regions lacked those demographic characteristics—notably Chechnya-Ingushetia (one region at that time), with 63% of the eligible voters supporting Yeltsin—indicating pressure from the regional leaderships not pro-reform enthusiasm. By comparative standards, moreover, any combination of voting and turnout that produces over 50% of the eligible voters supporting one candidate is highly unlikely in democratic settings.21 Similarly, even dominant legislative victories in democratic multi-party settings seldom exceed 35% of eligible voters.22 Below the cut-off, we assign each region the average score for the set of regions below the cut-off. This retains information about the overall trend in turnout and pro-Kremlin voting.

21Barack Obama’s decisive victory in 2008 came with 32% of the eligible voters nationwide voting for him. Ronald Reagan’s 1984 win rested on votes from 31% of the eligible population.

22A rare exception was the victory of the Canadian Progressive Conservative Party under Brian Mulroney in 1984, the largest victory in Canadian history, which just exceeded our cut-off level by getting support from 37% of the eligible voters. Most other landslides fall below it. In the 1957 West German federal election, the Christian Democratic Union received votes from 34.8% of the eligible voters. Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party won the 1983 British general election in what was considered a landslide with votes from about 31% of the eligible voters. In April of this year, the Hungarian Fidesz Party won an outright majority of seats against nine other parties, the largest victory in Hungary post-1989, and their votes were 31% of the eligible voters.
but reflects our belief that differences among regions below the cut-off should not influence our measure of deference to the Kremlin.

Even with the changes in the average level from election to election, our measure correlates across elections very well. Excepting the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections, which have no deferential regions, the measures for every election is significantly positively correlated with every other. The 1991 presidential election correlates least well with the other elections (from .30 to .40), but these are nonetheless statistically significant at the .01 level. The deference measure for the 1996 second-round correlates from .36 to .45 with those for the elections of Putin and Medvedev. The correlations among the elections in the 2000s range from .53 to .93 (the 2007 and 2008 results).

Another validity check is that our measures, which are calculated from published election results, correlate well with experts’ ratings of the different regions degree or absence of democracy. The Carnegie Moscow Center gathered both quantitative measures and expert evaluations of each region’s democratic characteristics on numerous dimensions. (Petrov and Titkov 2008). In Table B1, we show the correlations between our deference measures and three of the Carnegie measures: a summative quantitative index of how democratic the elections are in the region, a measure of the qualitative of elections and a measure of democracy overall in the region. Since our deference measures capture non-competitive electoral situations in which elite control is evident, the signs of the correlations should be negative. Notice that, although several regions had excessively high scores for Yeltsin in 1991, the correlation is positive, albeit insignificant. This reflects the split noted above between some regions having genuinely supportive voters and others not. In the 1993 and 1995 elections, no region surpassed the 35% cut-off, so no correlation is possible. Strikingly, our measures of deference are significantly negatively correlated with all three Carnegie measures in every election from 1996 on, with the exception of 1999 when the correlation with Carnegie’s quantitative index of electoral democracy is negative but insignificant.
Figure B1: Distributions of Pro-Kremlin Voting as a Percent of Eligible Voters in Federal Elections, 1991-2008
### TABLE B1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DEFERENCE MEASURES AND PETROV AND TITKOV’S RATINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Election:</th>
<th>Quantitative Index of Electoral Democracy</th>
<th>Quality of Democratic Elections</th>
<th>Index of Regional Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yeltsin, 1991</td>
<td>+.11</td>
<td>+.15</td>
<td>+.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia’s Choice, 1993</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Home is Russia, 1995</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeltsin, 1996, 2\textsuperscript{nd} rd.</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity or OVR, 1999</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putin, 2000</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Russia, 2003</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>-.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putin, 2004</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>-.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Russia, 2007</td>
<td>-.54</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>-.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medvedev, 2008</td>
<td>-.51</td>
<td>-.52</td>
<td>-.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bolded figures are statistically significant at .01 or lower.
Table 1: Global Moran’s I Statistics for Deference Measures from Federal Elections (Empirical Pseudo-Significance Based on 999 Permutations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Election</th>
<th>Moran’s I</th>
<th>Permuted Mean</th>
<th>Permuted Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Permuted Z-Score</th>
<th>Pseudo P-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yeltsin 1991</td>
<td>0.194***</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>2.623</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeltsin 1996, 2nd Round</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>1.913</td>
<td>0.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity-OVR 1999</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putin 2000</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-0.333</td>
<td>0.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Russia 2003</td>
<td>0.140*</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>2.056</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putin 2004</td>
<td>0.325***</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>4.497</td>
<td>&lt; 0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Russia 2007</td>
<td>0.203**</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>2.829</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medvedev 2008</td>
<td>0.157*</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>2.237</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One asterisk indicates significance (i.e., presence of univariate spatial autocorrelation) at the .05 level for a two-tailed test. Two asterisks indicate significance at the .01 level for a two-tailed test. Three asterisks indicate significance at the .001 level for a two-tailed test.

Sources: Deference calculated by the authors; see Appendix B. Data on regional voting and number of eligible voters for 1999-2008 come from Golosov 2008. For 1991-1996, the percent of eligible voters is calculated by multiplying the percent received by the Kremlin’s candidate or party by the turnout level, with data on voting and turning taken from McFaul and Petrov 1998, passim.
MAP 1: STANDARD DEVIATION MAP FOR DEFERENCE IN THE 1991 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (YELTSIN)

**37.54–40.03 (76)**

Mean = 40.03

**40.03-46.70 (o)**

**46.70-53.37 (8)**

Dagestan
Karachayevo-Sirkassia
Mordovia
Nizhni Novgorod
Penza
Perm
Samara
Tula

> **53.37 (4)**

Chechnya
Chelyabinsk
Ingushetia
Sverdlovsk
MAP 2: STANDARD DEVIATION MAP FOR DEFEATORIZATION IN THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, SECOND ROUND (YELTSIN)

34.65–36.08 (82)
Mean = 36.08

36.08–41.53 (0)

41.53–46.99 (0)

> 46.99 (6)
Chechnya
Chukotka
Ingushetia
Kalmykia
Moscow city
Yamalo-Nenets
MAP 3: STANDARD DEVIATION MAP FOR DEERENCE IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (PUTIN)

36.41-37.77 (84)

Mean = 37.77

37.77-44.33 (o)

44.33-50.88 (0)

> 50.88 (4)

Dagestan
Kabardino-Balkaria
Ingushetia
Tatarstan
MAP 4: STANDARD DEVIATION MAP FOR DEFERENCE IN THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (PUTIN)

40.98-48.30(62)
Mean = 48.30

48.30-62.21 (14)
Adygeya
Aga-Buryat
Evenk
Kemerovo
Kalmikia
Komi-Perm
Koryak
Orlov
Rostov
Sakha
Saratov
Taimyr
Tiumen
Udmurtia

62.21-76.12 (5)
Chukotka
Karachayevo-Sirkassia
Tatarstan
Tuva
Yamalo-Nenets

> 76.12 (7)
Bashkortostan
Kabardino-Balkaria
Chechnya
Mordovia
Dagestan
North Ossetia
Ingushetia
MAP 5: STANDARD DEVIATION MAP FOR DEREERENCE IN THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (MEDVEDEV)

41.76-49.37 (54)
Mean = 49.37

49.37-62.29 (14)
Altai
Belgorod
Kemerovo
Kirov
Komi
Khanty-Mansi
Lipetsk
North Ossetia
Omsk
Penza
Rostov
Sakha
Saratov
Tambov

62.29-75.21 (6)
Chukotka
Krasnodar
Marii-El
Tatarstan
Tiumen
Tuva

> 75.21 (8)
Bashkortostan Kabardino-Balkaria
Chechnya Karachayevo-Sirkassia
Dagestan Mordovia
Ingushetia Yamalo-Nenets
TABLE 2: REGRESSION OF DEERENCE ON LOCATION OF REGIONAL CAPITALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>.12 (.273)</td>
<td>-.05 (.622)</td>
<td>.05 (.621)</td>
<td>-.06 (.541)</td>
<td>-.01 (.935)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations:</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R^2</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Location | .19 (.083) | .04 (.739) | .20 (.047) | .10 (.218) | .03 (.773) |
| Percent non-Russians | .23 (.059) | .34 (.004) | .57 (.000) | .83 (.000) | .67 (.000) |
| Urban percentage | .14 (.245) | .20 (.096) | .14 (.199) | .14 (.116) | -.11 (.274) |
| Infant mortality | .23 (.060) | .21 (.095) | .20 (.073) | .14 (.108) | -.04 (.644) |
| No. of observations: | 89 | 88 | 88 | 89 | 82 |
| Adj. R^2 | .08 | .09 | .31 | .62 | .49 |

Note: Coefficients are standardized (beta weights).


TABLE 3: REGRESSION OF DEERENCE ON LATITUDE OF REGIONAL CAPITALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latitude</td>
<td>-.22 (.040)</td>
<td>-.08 (.457)</td>
<td>-.32 (.002)</td>
<td>-.29 (.006)</td>
<td>-.25 (.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations:</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R^2</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Latitude | -.19 (.075) | -.00 (.996) | -.28 (.003) | -.15 (.035) | -.01 (.879) |
| Percent non-Russians | .21 (.080) | .33 (.005) | .55 (.000) | .81 (.000) | .67 (.000) |
| Urban percentage | .20 (.101) | .20 (.104) | .20 (.069) | .17 (.055) | -.11 (.323) |
| Infant mortality | .16 (.169) | .19 (.094) | .13 (.208) | .10 (.188) | -.06 (.523) |
| No. of observations: | 89 | 88 | 88 | 89 | 82 |
| Adj. R^2 | .08 | .09 | .35 | .63 | .49 |

Note: Coefficients are standardized (beta weights).

Sources: See Table 2.
**Table 4: Regression of Deference in Presidential Elections on Average Deference Among Regions in the Same Federal District in the Preceding Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federal district average in prev. election</td>
<td>.25 (.019)</td>
<td>.50 (.000)</td>
<td>.66 (.000)</td>
<td>.61 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations:</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal district average in prev. election</td>
<td>.04 (.753)</td>
<td>.36 (.000)</td>
<td>.31 (.000)</td>
<td>.22 (.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent non-Russian</td>
<td>.31 (.021)</td>
<td>.41 (.000)</td>
<td>.63 (.000)</td>
<td>.53 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban percentage</td>
<td>.20 (.113)</td>
<td>.08 (.432)</td>
<td>.13 (.099)</td>
<td>-0.09 (.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
<td>.19 (.087)</td>
<td>.07 (.441)</td>
<td>.12 (.101)</td>
<td>-0.09 (.319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations:</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Coefficients are standardized (beta weights).

Sources: See Table 2.

**Table 5: Regions Above the Cut-Off for Pro-Kremlin Percent of Eligible Voters in Federal Elections, 1991-2008, By Constitutional Status of Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republics Only</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Ethnic Regions</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ethnic Regions</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See Table 1.
**Table 6: Regression of Deference in Presidential Elections on Average Deference Among Similar Regions in the Preceding Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Similar regions in prev. election ........</td>
<td>.05 (.620)</td>
<td>.26 (.015)</td>
<td>.58 (.000)</td>
<td>.57 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations:</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similar regions in prev. election ........</td>
<td>.04 (.744)</td>
<td>.19 (.127)</td>
<td>.54 (.000)</td>
<td>.47 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban percentage .................</td>
<td>.07 (.557)</td>
<td>.17 (.156)</td>
<td>-.10 (.355)</td>
<td>-.19 (.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality .................</td>
<td>.22 (.059)</td>
<td>-.03 (.187)</td>
<td>.19 (.059)</td>
<td>.04 (.725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations:</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Coefficients are standardized (beta weights).

Sources: See Table 2.
References


Skocpol, Theda. 1979. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China (New York: Cambridge University Press).


