Doctoral Dissertation Research:
The Role of Ideology in Foreign Policy Attitude Formation

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Project Summary

Intellectual Merit
With funding from the NSF, this project would conduct a large N survey that combines a wide range of foreign policy ideological questions, an equally wide range of questions tapping individual characteristics, traits, values, experiences, and political dispositions, and a survey experiment to assess executive support and audience costs. A survey combining such diverse topics is unfortunately not available but has the potential to contribute greatly to scholarship in a wide range of areas. First, this research would provide scholarship with a broader understanding of how a foreign policy ideology is formed and what leads into that formation. Secondly, it assesses the role that individual beliefs and ideology plays in foreign policy attitude formation and decision-making. It integrates the notion of individual differences with the dominant explanations of external influences on attitude formation. Current scholarship tends to focus on the role of the stimulus but omit much analysis on individual level differences. This study will incorporate both aspects (stimulus and individual differences) to more completely model attitude formation and decision-making when it comes to foreign policy.

This project also crosses interdisciplinary boundaries by integrating research from sociology, psychology, and political science to form a more complete picture of ideological formation and individual decision-making. Dominant explanations in foreign policy ideology and attitude formation provide an incomplete picture because they lack these more individual level explanations proposed by these diverse fields.

Broader Impact
While the focus of the research is on a foreign policy ideology and its impact, it also has a number of wider implications. First of all, it adds to the growing argument supporting a move to a more domain specific ideology compared to the very broad and generic liberal/conservative ideology (Kinder 1998, Feldman 1988, see also Jost et al. 2009, Sniderman, Brody and Kuklinski 1984, Sears, Huddy and Schaffer 1986, Layman and Carsey 2002). While previous arguments have focused on separate economic and social ideologies, this project provides support for the extension into a foreign policy ideological dimension as well.

Also, a big picture contribution of this research is to help clarify many of the individual and micro-level assumptions made by scholarship in the international relations field. In general, the assumption is that individuals will all act the same in specific conflict or crisis situations. This research helps clarify and refine some of the more micro-level assumptions by clarifying the conditions for when individuals will or will not support specific foreign policies. Findings from this research could be significant factors for a wide range of international relations topics such as audience costs, casualty tolerance, diversionary theory, and rally effects.
I. Introduction and Overview

Scholarship has long attempted to piece together how individuals form their attitudes regarding foreign policy issues. Research has advanced significantly from the notion of a fickle public with “non-attitudes” (Lippmann 1955, Almond 1950, 1956, Converse 1964) to the notion that issues positions tend to be stable and coherent (e.g. Wittkopf 1990, Peffley and Hurwitz 1993, Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, Holsti 1979, Bardes and Oldendick 1978, Chittick et al. 1995). When considering what drives these positions, scholarship has tended to fall upon two theories of attitude formation. One posits that attitudes are the product of rational calculations of the context (e.g. Mueller 1973, Gartner and Segura 1998, Gartner 2008, Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, Larson 2000, Jentleson 1992.). The second theory argues that the public relies on cues and heuristics from party elites and the media to aid in attitude formation (e.g. Berinsky 2007, Baum 2002, 2004, Baum and Potter 2008, Powlick and Katz 1998). While these explanations have taught us much, they focus on the role of the stimulus but rarely attempt to consider how the stimulus interacts with the individual. What my dissertation adds to this line of research is a focus on one major individual level difference, specifically; it explores the formation and impact of a foreign policy ideology. Interestingly, a significant amount of research in the late 1970s and early 1990s focused on this idea that individuals vary in a foreign policy ideology (Wittkopf 1990, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, Holsti 1979, Bardes and Oldendick 1978, Holsti and Rosenau 1990, Chittick et al. 1995). Despite this significant research, little work linked ideology to attitude formation, and even less research attempted to explore how a foreign policy ideology was formed in the first place.

The purpose of my dissertation is to revitalize research on the role of a foreign policy ideology. Essentially, my research draws from previous research on foreign policy ideology (especially the heirarchical models from Hurwitz and Peffley 1987 and Page and Boutton 2006) and expands this research in two ways. First, I will assess what leads to a foreign policy ideology in the first place. What we currently know is limited to a handful of studies (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Page and Boutton 2006, Barker et al. 2009, Schoen 2007) that have given some insight, but focus on specific pieces and lack a comprehensive evaluation. Drawing from these studies, along with insights from psychology and sociology scholarship (Adorno et al. 1950, Jost et al. 2009, Altemeyer 1996, Schwartz 1992), I will create a more comprehensive picture of how individuals form their ideology when it comes to foreign policy. Secondly, I will assess the importance of a foreign policy ideology in the larger scheme of attitude formation and leader evaluation. Considerable work in political psychology (Taber 2003, Taber and Lodge 2006, Lodge et al. 1995, Zaller 1992) has demonstrated that individual level differences and their interaction with external stimuli matter greatly in attitude formation. This research, however, has been limited to domestic issues. My research applies these more domestic level explanations to investigate how they improve our understanding of policy preferences when it comes to foreign policy issues.

To study both what leads to the formation of an individual’s foreign policy ideology and how that ideology influences policy preferences, I seek funding from the National Science Foundation to fund a large N survey. The survey will combine a substantial number of foreign policy questions along with a wide variety of questions
concerning individual values and traits. Unfortunately, I know of no survey that combines such questions. In addition, I seek to integrate a survey experiment that assesses the role of ideology on leader evaluations, specifically on individual audience costs (an expansion of Tomz 2007). In the pages below, I will briefly describe my conceptualization of a foreign policy ideology, the formation of such ideology, the theoretical link between ideology and foreign policy attitudes, and how I plan to empirically study these connections.

II. Project Significance

There are a number of significant contributions which can stem from this research. First of all, research has shown that public opinion actually has a significant impact on foreign policy (Aldrich et al. 1989, 2006, Russett 1990, Sobel 2001). This signifies that the attitudes individuals have regarding foreign events actually matters and shapes the policies of government leaders. Because of this, it is essential to have a better understanding of how individuals form their policy preferences in the first place. If people do make a difference, then what shapes their attitudes one way or another is an important piece of information for researchers and policy makers.

Another contribution this research provides is a more refined understanding of a foreign policy ideology and shows why we should consider such an ideology in models of foreign policy attitude formation. The usefulness of a liberal/conservative ideology to explain foreign policy attitudes is quite lacking (Kinder 1998, Feldman 1988, see also Jost et al. 2009) and so scholarship has sometimes advanced from the generic view of ideology to more refined approach that breaks ideology into economic and/or social dimensions (Feldman 1983, 1988, Sniderman, Brody and Kuklinski 1984, Sears, Huddy and Schaffer 1986, Layman and Carsey 2002, Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). What has not been incorporated is a foreign policy aspect. Much research has demonstrated that ideological dimensions for foreign policy do exist (Wittkopf 1990, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Chittick et al. 1995), but rarely is that leap taken from showing an ideology exists to explaining how it shapes attitudes and policy preferences. By demonstrating that a foreign policy ideology shapes attitude formation directly and indirectly, this research demonstrates the importance of ideology and how it can shape attitudes. If scholarship is moving to embracing a more domain specific ideology, this research should demonstrate the need to incorporate a foreign policy domain.

Finally, a big picture contribution of this research is to help scholarship get a better understanding of why people support executives during times of war. Existing literature bases itself on elite cues, rally around the flag effects, or some contextual/environmental effects. This dissertation presents an exploration that looks directly at the individual. Instead of considering all these external factors, I argue that maybe there are just some people that are more inclined to support conflict in general and others based on certain conditions. As discussed previously, this eliminates the assumption that individuals are the same and allows researchers to consider another factor that should help make a more complete model of attitude formation and executive support. This is important because it clarifies assumptions held by some theories in international relations (e.g. audience costs, rally effects and casualty tolerance).
III. Conceptual and Theoretical Background

Conceptually, a foreign policy ideology is similar to normal definitions of ideology but is specifically aimed at foreign policy. While there are a wide variety of definitions of ideology (see, for example, Jost et al. 2009, Converse 1964, Holsti 1962) they all essentially argue that individuals have some abstract view of how the world works and how individuals and governments should act within this frame. These views are abstract in the sense that they are broader and more general in scope instead of on specific issues or attitudes. Stemming from this general definition of ideology, I define a foreign policy ideology as an individual’s general theory of how the international environment works, and how governments should act within this international framework. A foreign policy ideology should provide an individual with a lens on how he or she should perceive international events. This ideology should also aid the individual in the formation of more specific policy prescriptions to address these events. Given this definition, I conceptualize a foreign policy ideology as consisting of three separate dimensions (for examples, see Wittkopf 1990, Holsti 2004, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Herrmann et al. 1999, Chanley 1999, Chittick et al. 1995): 1) militarism, 2) cooperativism, and 3) isolationism. Together, these three dimensions form a worldview, or foreign policy ideology. They form a worldview on if an individual believes a state should interact with the world in the first place and then how that interaction should occur (militarily and/or cooperatively).

What Leads to a Foreign Policy Ideology

While scholarship has been quite successful in identifying the existence and structure of a foreign policy ideology among the mass public, explaining the formation of such an ideology has not been explored to any significant degree. Hierarchical models point to ideology as being a product of a wide range of factors, including core values, individual traits, fundamental beliefs, and environmental factors (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Page and Boutton 2006). While these models provided a starting base for research, theoretical and empirical explorations are limited (Barker et al. 2008, Schoen 2007, Kam and Kinder 2007).

Drawing from research on the bottom-up, value driven conception of ideology from political psychology (e.g. Jost 2009, Jost et al. 2003, Adorno et al. 1950, Eysenck 1960), the basic premise is that individuals have a wide range of influences on their ideological viewpoints. These influences consist of both psychological factors (values, beliefs, traits) or sociological (groups, environment). These different factors should all impact an individual’s ideology but there is also a hierarchical nature to these influences (Page and Boutton 2006, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), with the more exogenous and long-term forces influencing both the individual’s ideology and some of the other less exogenous factors. The hierarchical path goes from the most exogenous factors at the top (environmental effects and personal characteristics and traits, to less exogenous factors (core values and beliefs), to an individual’s political dispositions (which consist of both ideology and party identification). Now, I will briefly discuss the theory behind each of these factors to an individual’s foreign policy ideology.
At the top of the model are the two most exogenous factors (external environment and individual characteristics). Environmental context provides networks of meanings, customs and relationship, as well as restricting what is “normal” or at least typical behavior in a culture (Winter 2003, pg. 128). Depending on the context, shifts in beliefs can occur (Bonanno and Jost 2006, Jost et al. 2008, Jost et al. 2003, Ulrich and Cohrs 2007). For example, Bonanno and Jost (2006) found that individuals in or near the World Trade Center on 9/11 were much more likely to experience a conservative shift compared to a liberal shift. At the same time, major “shock type” events are probably rare and the interpretation of those events may be conditioned on other factors in the model, such as partisan identification. However, the inclusion of environmental events is important to mediate how the other factors influence ideology.

Individual characteristics are also exogenous factors and at the top of the hierarchy. For example, we are born with our race and gender and factors like religion do not change much. Personality traits should also be quite important. Given the high stability of personality traits (Block and Block 2006, Caspi, Roberts and Shiner 2005, Jost et al. 2003) and links between personality and domestic ideology (Jost et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2008, Carney et al. 2008), personality traits should have an important link. This link between personality traits and foreign policy ideology has some evidence through a study of Germans (Schoen 2007) that linked a number of traits and ideology.

One level below personal characteristics/traits and environmental effects are an individual’s core values and beliefs. This category consists of the basic values people hold dear in their life. They are the very core essences of individuals; what they really believe and feel. Core values and beliefs should be influenced by personal characteristics and environmental conditions to a degree. At the same time, we should expect core values to have an independent influence on ideology formation (Feldman 1988, Kinder and Sanders 1996, Miller and Shanks 1996, Schwartz 1996). Capara and colleagues (2006, pg. 2) note, “Basic personal values refer to the broad goals to which people attribute importance as guiding principles in their lives. …Basic values, … , apply across domains and situations. As such, they underlie and are broader than the political values and attitudes typically examined in research on voter preferences. We see basic personal values as the crucial grounding of ideology.” Essentially, individuals draw from their basic core values and beliefs to fill in the blanks when forming their worldviews, or ideologies.

Finally, all of the factors above should work together to shape an individual’s political disposition. This political disposition consists of party identification as well as an individual’s ideology (domestic and foreign). At the same time, the political dispositions, themselves, should have some influence on each other. For example, party cues have a strong impact on individual opinions and beliefs (e.g. Lau and Redlawsk 2001, 2006, Popkin 1991). However, one could argue that individuals rationally pick their party identification based off their issue stances and beliefs (Fiorina 1981, Feldman 1988), which might indicate a reversal in the causal direction. Given this, the causal relationship between the two is not one way.

Combining all these above factors, we have a model that points to a number of long term psychological and sociological factors that work together to form an individual’s foreign policy ideology. In addition, the relationship consists of a number of
complex causal relationships that are not completely straightforward. The goal of this research is to clarify and empirically test this complex web of relationships.

The Role of Ideology on Policy Preferences
Extending from the above discussion is now the other side of the model in considering how a foreign policy ideology shapes more specific preferences when it comes to foreign policy. Wittkopf and colleagues (Wittkopf 1990, Holsti 2004, Chittick et al. 1995) have shown us that individuals have a consistent and coherent ideology when it comes to foreign policy. At the same time, individuals have very different ideologies dictating how the world works and the proper role of states within this world. This ideology should certainly have an impact on how individuals formulate their policy preferences regarding foreign policy events. Furthermore, this impact should consist of both a direct and indirect effect. The direct effect is the direct link between how one’s ideology shapes his or her attitudes. The indirect effect is how a foreign policy ideology modifies the impact of other factors of attitude formation, specifically, environmental effects and elite cues.

First, let us begin by considering that an individual’s foreign policy ideology directly influences how he or she forms preferences for foreign policy events. Individuals tend to be cognitive misers (Popkin 1991, Fiske and Taylor 1984). At the same time, foreign policy issues tend to be harder issues (Carmines and Stimson 1980) where individuals do not have lots of information to begin with. Because of these factors, individuals draw on their ideology as a schema to help fill in the blanks on foreign policy issues Feldman 1988, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Peffley and Hurwitz 1993, Lau et al. 1991, Hamill et al. 1985, Conover and Feldman 1984, Taylor and Crocker 1981). In essence, individuals draw from their prior generic foreign policy information and knowledge (which would be their foreign policy ideology) to structure their attitudes regarding foreign policy. For example, an individual with a more militant ideological outlook will look at situations differently from an individual who is not militant and that ideological viewpoint will, to some degree, steer how the individual forms his or her policy preferences regarding that foreign policy event.

As for the indirect effect, the theory assumes that ideology is formed prior to foreign policy events, and given that, it can shape and bias how individuals perceive these events. This bias comes from individuals seeking out consistency when forming attitudes. When individuals encounter new information, how they perceive this information is shaped by their prior beliefs (or ideology). New information that challenges an individual’s ideological belief may be filtered. Taber (2003, pg 436) notes, “external factors do not directly cause aggregate public opinion but rather pass through the perceptions and information processing of individual citizens.” Individuals prefer consistency and will actively seek out consistent information (Taber and Lodge 2006) while actively attempt to discredit inconsistent information (Redlawsk 2002, 2010). In essence, prior beliefs color the way new information is interpreted and accepted. They can act as a gatekeeper to new information. Prior information may allow consistent information to update beliefs where it may deny inconsistent information from doing that or altering the interpretation beforehand.

What we essentially get is a situation where an individual has a prior belief on a certain issue. When this individual is exposed to new information from elites, the media,
or other information sources, we should expect it to update this individual’s preference or attitude. What Lodge, Taber and others have found (Taber and Lodge 2005, Taber 2003, Taber and Lodge 2006, Redlawsk 2002, Redlawsk et al. 2010, Taber et al. 2001) however, is that this updating is heavily dependent on the prior beliefs held by the individual. This can be especially powerful for an ideology because not maintaining cognitive consistency challenges an entire worldview. Jost et al. (2003, pg. 341) comment, “Ideology is perhaps the quintessential example of hot cognition, in that people are highly motivated to perceive the world in ways that satisfy their needs, values, and prior epistemic commitments.” The proposed study applies this theory to a non-domestic instance to investigate how strong this indirect effect from ideology is.

IV. Overview of Proposed Study

The proposed study’s goal is to make better sense of the complex web of connections between individual traits, values, and the environment with how an individual forms his or her ideology, along with how that ideology shapes more specific policy preferences with regards to foreign policy. To ideally achieve this, a large N public opinion survey that contains all of these aspects in the same survey would be necessary. As for conducting the survey, I plan to contract YouGovPolimetrix to conduct the survey. Given the diversity in questions, the number of questions needed, and the format of the survey experiment below, the internet based format of YouGov would be ideal. Also, YouGov has a strong reputation within the field and has conducted some very large public opinion surveys that have been used by research in some of the top political science journals. In a preliminary inquiry with YouGovPolimetrix, an 8 to 10 minute survey with an N of 1000 would cost approximately $11,250. Below is a discussion of how I wish to measure and use each of these aspects.

Conceptualizing Foreign Policy Ideology

To begin, the most important aspect to properly capture is a measure for a foreign policy ideology. There is unfortunately no definitive standard for how this measure is achieved. Researchers have used a number of different questions and empirical techniques to achieve ideological measures (e.g. Wittkopf 1990, Holsti and Rosenau 1990, Chittick et al. 1995, Herrmann et al. 1999). My strategy will be to draw from a number of these different techniques to attempt to get as powerful and accurate a measure as possible. First, I will ask a battery of foreign policy importance questions that mirror those used in the Chicago Council for Global Affairs (similar to Chittick et al. 1995). This allows for a strong battery of questions to factor analyze into different ideological dimensions. In addition, I will incorporate a number of different questions from studies by Herrmann et al. (1999) and Holsti and Rosenau (1990). This allows for a robustness check of the measures to ensure that these different ideological dimensions are accurately tapped. Given this multitude of questions, statistical techniques like factor analysis would
allow for the identification of any underlying latent dimensions that tap into these different ideological dimensions.

Exploring the Formation of Ideology

Beyond the ideological measure, there are a wide variety of measures necessary to explore what leads into a specific foreign policy ideology. I essentially require measures to tap into individual characteristics and traits, core values, political dispositions, and environmental effects. First, with individual characteristics, I would begin with the standard socio-demographic questions found in most public opinion surveys (e.g., age, education, income, religion). Research by Holsti (2004) and Page and Boutton (2006) uncovered some significance for socio-demographics but largely minor impacts, if any. For example, there is gender gap (men tend to be more militant than women) but again the impact is minor. Page and Bouton also noted the surprising impact of religion (see also Guth 2010). In addition to socio-demographics, measures for personality traits would be incorporated. The role of personality traits have been explored in great detail by scholars in the sociology field and have been used widely in attempting to get a better understanding of ideology formation (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950, Eyseneck 1960, Jost et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2008, Jost 2006, Block and Block 2006, Carney et al. 2008), but has only recently been embraced by political science scholars (Gerber et al. 2010, Mondak et al. 2010). In order to measure personality traits, I will incorporate the Ten Item Personality Measure (TIPI) (Gosling et al. 2003). While not as detailed as other personality measures, it provides significant explanatory power in a small package of only 10 questions.

The environment also can play a role in shaping ideology formation. While measuring environmental context is substantially more difficult than the other variables measures, I can attempt to tap personal experience with foreign policy events. Specifically, questions exploring military service would provide some sort of contextual difference to consider. Especially with foreign policy issues concerning conflict, we should expect military experience to provide a unique outlook for individuals. Another contextual measure may be personal ties to military personnel who have been killed or injured in recent wars (Gartner 2008). These ties may shift individuals towards viewpoints less supporting of conflict or militant views. While certainly not ideal measures, they provide a contextual difference that may be likely to induce ideological shifts. An experiment inducing a strong enough environmental effect would be ideal but is not possible.

Another set of measures would be in regards to an individual’s core values. Given that foreign policy issues are likely to be hard issues (Carmines and Stimson 1980) and parties do not always give clear cut cues on foreign policy issues, individuals may have to rely on their own core values to form their beliefs when it comes to foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). The question then is what core values to measure. Given the wide range of core values possible and also that no one has attempted to tie core

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1 Using factor analysis on the 15 foreign policy importance questions in the 2004, 2006, and 2008 CCGA surveys along with the 2004 and 2008 American National Election Study allowed for the identification of ideological dimensions along the theoretical lines.

Finally, measures of political dispositions would mirror the majority of other public opinion surveys. Essentially, measures of domestic ideology (liberal or conservative) and party identification would mirror questions used in the American National Election Study.

By combining all of these value, trait, and contextual variables with a wide variety of variables to tap into a foreign policy ideology, I am able to perform complex multivariate analyses to understand what factors shape ideology formation and who is more likely to have certain worldviews. Basic regression models, like OLS or logistic regression, can help get at some of these relationships, but given the hierarchical nature of the model along with the complex web of causal relationships, structural equation models would be useful tools to help sort things out. Also, while none of these different blocks of measures are unique or new, combining all of these into one data set provides a very powerful tool for understanding the worldview of the average American.

Exploring the Impact of Ideology

The second half of the dissertation is to explore how a foreign policy ideology shapes policy preferences and interacts with the other dominant explanations of elite cues and rational choice. To accomplish this, a survey experiment would be added to the end of the proposed survey. This experiment would be used to judge how ideology shapes evaluations of executives in the specific context of audience costs. The reason for a survey experiment is to be able to control specific factors of a situation in order to analyze how ideology interacts with environmental and partisan influences. Also, an experiment focusing on audience costs is useful because it taps into a specific attitude on foreign policy and an established experiment for audience costs already exists (Tomz 2007). While Tomz’s study was path-breaking in demonstrating audience costs, the proposed experiment furthers the experiment by looking directly at who penalizes executives for backing down, under what situations can this happen, and what are the causal connections behind it.

To accomplish this, I plan on performing an experimental study very similar to Tomz (2007). The experiment by Tomz (2007) consisted of describing a foreign policy event in which a country threatened to militarily take over another country. A number of contextual situations regarding the conflict are manipulated, as is the response of the President of the United States. The President can go from stating that the US will not intervene, to threaten intervention, to take small intervention steps (destroy an invader’s military base). However, in each situation, the President eventually declines to use the military to stop the invasion. What Tomz (2007) was looking for in this experiment was if individuals would look less favorable upon President’s who promised to stop the invasion but then backed down. This promising to stop the invasion but then backing down, and then be punished by the citizens for it, is the audience cost that the IR community has been unable to empirically prove. Through this experiment, Tomz was
able to show that individuals looked less favorably upon the President in situations where the President promised to prevent the invasion but then eventually did not compared to just stating the US would stay out in the first place.

The proposed survey experiment would be similar to Tomz (2007) but would incorporate a few modifications to better suit an analysis of how ideology interacts with context and partisanship. Like Tomz (2007), the experiment would begin by describing a foreign policy situation. The context would be randomly assigned to be one of Jentleson’s (1992) policy objective typologies (humanitarian intervention, internal political change, foreign policy restraint). The experimental manipulation would consist of a state committing genocide (humanitarian intervention) or attempting to produce a nuclear weapon (foreign policy restraint). This manipulation would allow for a measure of how environment shapes attitude formation and also will allow for an exploration of how ideology and environment interact together. In addition to the manipulation, the subjects would be told that the international community has condemned the act by the foreign country and the action (genocide or building a nuclear weapon) was estimated to be complete in three months. The subjects are also told that it would not take a major effort by the United States to stop the action.

Following the contextual explanation, a question asks the subject if he or she believes the US should intervene. Then the subject is told that the President has either 1) threatened to intervene to end the action or 2) stated the US would not intervene. Also, the party identification of the President is revealed at this time. The President would either be Republican, Democrat, or none specified. Following this information, another question asks if the subject agrees with the action of the President. After this question, the last bit of information is given to the subject. The subject learns that Congressional leaders of the party opposite the President (or no party is stated if the President’s party is not stated) have criticized the President for his actions. The subjects also learn that the President decided to not intervene to stop the actions of the country. Finally, a question asks the subject if he or she approves the actions of the President.

While the above experiment is fairly straightforward and only has 3 manipulations, it allows for a complex analysis of how ideology, partisanship, and the situation interact to produce the foreign policy attitude and leader evaluation. The context manipulation (humanitarian intervention or stopping the production of a nuclear weapon) allows for an analysis of how individuals with different ideologies view foreign events. Specifically, it looks if some ideological types are more concerned with some types of foreign events versus others and how does that impact their evaluation of the President. The partisanship manipulation for the President and opposition leaders allows for an analysis of how ideology and partisanship interact. For example, I expect that partisanship to have a smaller influence on individuals who have a foreign policy ideology that conflicts with the message of the partisan elites. In those situations, I expect the individual to attempt to discount the partisan message because of the dissonance between partisanship and ideology. This is quite different from situations where ideology and partisan messages are in accordance. In addition, by measuring subject attitudes at different stages in the experiment, I am able to assess if attitude

2 I elected to not include a manipulation for an internal political change situation because this would add additional cells to the experiment.
change is due to partisanship, or if partisanship matters depending on the ideological stance of the subject and context of the event. Finally, the manipulation for the action of the President (threaten to intervene or state no intervention will occur) is important to be able to compare between groups and look for audience costs. Tomz (2007) showed the presence of audience costs by noting that individuals had lower opinions of the President who threatened but then backed down compared to the President who stated he would stay out in the first place. Like in Tomz (2007), this manipulation will allow me to compare the other factors to see who is more likely to penalize a President and under what conditions.

Given the proposed research design above, the experiment would consist of 12 cells (3 for party cue manipulation, * 2 for presidential action * 2 for context = 12). The most important manipulation for this experiment is the presidential action one (President promises action but backs down compared to promising no action) because this is where the presence of audience costs can be assessed. Tomz (2007) compared the favorability of the President by this manipulation to see if audience costs exist. For my experiment, I will be comparing the same two groups but breaking it down even more because I am interested in looking at who is more likely to penalize the President and under what circumstances. So basically I am assume that audience costs will exist since Tomz (2007) showed this, but I also assume audience costs are not uniform. What I am now doing is looking within the different subgroups (broken out by ideology, partisanship, context) to see when we will see this audience cost. The result will be looking across a wide number of cells to see when we are more likely to see audience costs. With this design of comparing across different groups and cells, simple comparison of means tests and ANOVA would be appropriate methods. It would also be useful to use some other multivariate techniques such as OLS or logistic regression with multiple interaction effects for the different manipulations and primary explanatory variables (i.e. ideology type, partisanship, etc).

V. Research Schedule

If funding through the NSF is acquired, the survey through YouGovPolimetrix would be conducted in the summer of 2011. Between now and then, a final draft of the survey instrument would be completed along with final Human Subjects approval. Upon completion of the survey (which should take no more than a few weeks), the remainder of the year would be used to analyze the results, finish the dissertation, and present results at numerous conferences.

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3 If funding is not acquired, these steps will still be required for more limited studies planned as a backup.