U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL NONPERMANENT MEMBERSHIP: EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION FOR EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION?

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Abstract:

Does descriptive representation based on regional affiliation produce substantive representation for states within the United Nations Security Council? While calls for reform of the UNSC consistently reference the need for better representation, little research has explored whether greater descriptive representation actually produces a corresponding level of substantive representation in the UNSC. This paper explores this question by examining the American politics literature on the link between descriptive and substantive representation. It then applies this to the international level. Finally, whether descriptive representation based on region or identity produces substantive representation in the UNSC is explored empirically by comparing voting similarity in the UN General Assembly as a proxy for similar preferences, a precursor for substantive representation. The results show that while states in regions do tend to have higher patterns of vote similarity, this effect is not present when comparing actual states voted onto the UNSC with states in their region.
Since the end of the Cold War, it has been widely observed that the United Nations Security Council has taken on a more prominent role in the international community (Forman and Greene, 2004; Wallenstein and Johansson, 2004; Malone, 2000). Increases in peacekeeping missions and major involvement in the Gulf War, along with a sizable jump in membership and the rise of Japan and Germany—and with it the enhanced influence of the Security Council through binding Chapter VII actions—prompted calls to reform the United Nations to make it more reflective of the political realities of the modern era. The primary focus of these calls has been on the membership and composition of the Security Council, with an emphasis to make the Council more “credible, effective, and representative” (Martin and Pigott, 1993: 6). The aim of representation, however, has been vaguely defined. Most recommendations for increases to the membership of the Security Council have focused on the first clause of Article 23 of the U.N. Charter that seats are allocated according to an “equitable geographical distribution,” maintaining representation by the regional groupings from which nonpermanent members are elected (Fassbender, 2004; Bourantonis, 1998; Martin and Pigott, 1993).¹

The ten nonpermanent Security Council seats are distributed according to four regional electoral groupings: Africa and Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Western European and Others group.² Apart from forming the basis for selective seats in the Security Council and ECOSOC, these groupings are not active as political caucuses as the Non-Aligned Movement or the Group of 77 are (Schreuer, 1995). Thus, the aims of representation from regional groupings largely appear to be descriptive, in line with the Charter's focus.

¹ Exceptions to this have been calls from New Zealand and Australia to create a new regional group for the Oceanic and Southeast Pacific Member States (Fassbender, 2004).
² The African and Asian group is technically one electoral group, but the two regions divide their seats (three for the African members and two for the Asian members) and act mostly autonomously. They occasionally align to allocate a seat to a Middle Eastern state (Malone, 2000; Daws, 1999).
Reforms that would increase membership according to these lines improve the descriptive representation of the Council, but may not improve the substantive representation that is the focus of reform calls from states like Germany and Japan or Member States from the Southern hemisphere (Bourantonis, 1998; Drifte, 1998; Russett, O'Neill and Sutterlin, 1996). Nonetheless, the adherence to this system of allocation suggests that substantive concerns are at stake at the level of geographical regions.

In line with the calls to make the United Nations Security Council more “representative,” we investigate the descriptively representative structure of nonpermanent member elections and its impact on substantive representation. The continuing adherence to the regional representation system poses the question whether “equitable geographical distribution” leads to the election of nonpermanent members that align with the policy orientations of their regions. Further, if descriptive, geographic representation according to continental divides does not produce a substantively representative Council, what allocation strategy might?

The connections between descriptive and substantive representation have been of enduring interest to scholars in American and minority politics (Preuhs, 2006; Owens, 2005; Pitkin, 1967). When minority constituencies identify with their co-ethnic representatives, the presence and incorporation of African Americans and Latinos into local and national politics improves the alignment of policy with their co-ethnics' interests (Preuhs, 2006; Pantoja and Segura, 2003). Furthermore, when election rules are based on geographic districts as opposed to at-large seats, substantive representation improves because elected officials align with the preferences of the median voter in their district—which in a ward-based system is more likely to favor minority interests (Meier, Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard, 2005). With respect to the United Nations Security Council, we expect that if geographic regions are relevant identities for
Member States, then the election of nonpermanent members to the Council according to those groupings will lead to the substantive representation of those interests in Council policy. Additionally, the substantive representation of Member States within the region should be better than would be produced if elections were held at-large among the entire U.N. membership because regional representatives are able to focus more closely on the local preferences necessary for nomination than on the concerns of the total population of Member States.

However, as Daws (1999) notes, it may be inaccurate to associate the concern with “equitable geographical distribution” with an expectation of “equitable geographic representation” (16). Member states have a number of incentives to seek membership on the Security Council that have little to do with representation of interests other than their own. Nonpermanent members on the Security Council have been shown to receive more foreign aid from the United Nations, the United States and United States-led organizations, like UNICEF, during their tenure (Kuziemko and Werner, 2006). Beyond material incentives, membership on the Security Council gives a state the opportunity to participate in the Security Council on binding resolutions and enhance its prestige in the international community (Hurd, 2008, 2002; Malone, 2000; Russett, et. al, 1996). Thus, states are intensely competitive for seats within their respective groupings (Malone, 2000). According to this view, representation on the Council is equivalent to the individual members' interests, rather than a regional collective interest (Hurd, 2008; Forman and Greene, 2004).

Conversely, other political cleavages, such as the Non-Aligned Movement, Cold War alignments, democratic identification, or North-South development concerns, may cause divisions in regional groupings (Voeten, 2004, 2000; Bourantonis, 1998). Nonpermanent members elected to the Security Council might substantively represent those interests, though
they are elected on the basis of geographic distribution (Mansbridge, 2003). In such a case, we would expect that nonpermanent members would more closely align with the preferences of states politically (as opposed to geographically) similar to them.

To evaluate the connection between descriptive and substantive representation in nonpermanent membership on the U.N. Security Council (SC), we use data on UN General Assembly voting similarity to test whether 1) all UN members have more similar voting records within their regions and 2) whether those non-permanent SC members actually have more similar voting records with states in their region. If descriptive representation based on “equitable geographical distribution” leads to substantive representation, we should expect that states elected from this region will align with their regional cohort on policy in the UNGA.

Evidence from descriptive and substantive representation in the American politics literature demonstrates that the subject of representation, in general, is complex and often conditional (Mansfield, 2003; Preuhs, 1996). As calls for reform to the Security Council demand better representation it is important to consider what representation in this context means. The adherence to regional groupings, while consistent with Charter outlines, may not be compatible with Member States' expectations of how the Security Council ought to be representative, but it is a logical place to start given the primary arguments given for reform. Consideration of other political cleavages beyond geography addresses alternative implications of reform proposals, such as the fostering of less representation, and provides further clarification to the goals of Security Council reform. Though there are other areas of concern in the reform debate (efficiency and transparency), membership and representation remain among the most tractable, and most likely to succeed, reforms (Voeten, 2008; Martin and Pigott, 1993).

“EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION”
The basis for the current configuration of nonpermanent membership in the Security Council is outlined in Article 23 of the U.N. Charter. According to the Charter, nonpermanent members are elected for two-year terms based,

... in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organizations, and also to the equitable geographical distribution (Charter of the United Nations).

While the “equitable geographical distribution” requirement is secondary in the relevant concerns of nonpermanent membership to a state's ability to contribute to collective security, it has been a focus of Security Council composition since the drafting of the U.N. Charter, apart from the Permanent Members' status as veto-powers (Hurd, 2002). The concept is tied to the notion of the sovereign equality of states guaranteed in the Charter (Agam, 1999). Member states should, as legally equal entities, expect a reasonable chance to serve on the Council and be instrumental in security policy-making (Russett, et. al, 1996). This expectation turned into a precedent for allocating Security Council seats according to regional groups (Daws, 1999). The earliest arrangements for geographic representation were informal but were incrementally institutionalized as membership increased and Cold War hostilities became more entrenched, prompting the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement (Malone, 2000). Ultimately, this secondary principle of representation became the rule according to which the Security Council and other U.N. organs would seek to foster representation (Daws, 1999). Given this history, it is unsurprising that recent membership increases and political change have again prompted calls for change.

Despite the political nature of the membership debate, the first allocations based on geographic representation were designed according to a decidedly amicable (though not unproblematic) “Gentlemen's Agreement” among the Permanent Members. To appease the
various interests of the major Cold War alignments, the first nonpermanent members of the Security Council were selected from the following groups, based on Great Britain's recommendation (Malone, 2000; Daws, 1999):

- Two seats for Latin America,
- One seat for Western Europe,
- One seat for the British Commonwealth,
- One seat for the Near and Far East,
- One seat for the “Russian Camp.”

This 1945 formula for allocating seats largely remained in place until 1965 when formal changes were made to the size of the Security Council. Modifications were made in 1946 to the names of the Near and Far East and the “Russian Camp” groups to the Near East and Africa and Eastern Europe groups, respectively, to better indicate the states contained in those groupings, however, the allocations remained the same (1 seat for the Near East and Africa and 1 seat for Eastern Europe) (Daws, 1999).

From 1945 to 1965 there was a sizable increase in membership as states were going through decolonization. Membership grew from 51 members to 117 members (120 percent increase), the majority of which were from Africa and Asia. The composition of the Security Council was no longer representative of the political interests of the United Nations, in either size or geographical distribution (Russet, et. al, 1996). Thus, in 1965 the Security Council was expanded to fifteen members (from eleven), increasing the number of nonpermanent members from six to ten. Accordingly, to reflect the precedent adherence to “equitable geographical distribution,” the seats were allocated according to the new regional proportions:

- Five seats for Africa and Asia (3 – Africa, 2 – Asia),
• Two seats for Latin America and the Caribbean,
• One seat for Eastern Europe,
• Two seats for the Western European and Others group (Malone, 2000; Daws, 1999).

These changes formally institutionalized regional groupings as the relevant category for representation not only for the Security Council, but for other representative organs of the United Nations such as the Secretariat, ECOSOC, and the Committee on Conferences (Daws, 1999).

Since the 1965 reforms to the composition of the Security Council, the United Nations has undergone further changes in its membership. Since 1984, membership has increased 21 percent (64 percent since 1965) corresponding with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states resulting from revolutions in Eastern Europe.

**EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION**

From the earliest design, the regional groupings representing the Charter's requirement for “equitable geographical distribution” were intended to preserve sovereign equality of all member states (Agam, 1999), however, the design became more entrenched throughout the institutionalization of the United Nations (Daws, 1999). Contemporary observations on the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council point to its lack of representativeness (Hurd, 2008; 2002; Russett, et. al, 1996). In many ways, these observations are not unfounded. The United Nations membership has undergone significant changes in both size and political alignments. Despite these changes, the Security Council continues to operate—and indeed makes more and controversial decisions—under the political realities of an out-dated international order (Wallenstein and Johansson, 2004; Caron, 1993). However, these observations are without context as to what representation ought to look like in the Security Council. Appeals to the current interpretation of “equitable geographical distribution” are based
on a norm that may not be the only consistent interpretation of this clause (Agam, 1999).

Therefore, it is important to ask how the United Nations Security Council has become less representative, but not without also asking what it means for the Security Council to be representative.

**Theories of Representation: Descriptive and Substantive**

In significant ways, the debate over the representativeness of the Security Council is linked to the discussions of descriptive and substantive representation that are more prevalent in American politics research. Descriptive representation defines an elected official's sharing identifying characteristics with his or her constituents (Pitkin, 1967). These are usually characteristics that are easily observed and that are attributable an identity such as ethnicity, race, or gender—that is, the representative looks like the electorate (Owen, 2005). In the United Nations, members are descriptively represented in the Security Council according to their geographic region: African states are represented by other African states, Latin American and Caribbean states are represented by other Latin American and Caribbean states, etc. A critical requirement of descriptive representation is that the constituents identify according to the particular descriptor (in this case, geography) and find it to be a salient part of their identity (Pantoja and Segura, 2003).

Substantive representation describes how well the policies produced by an elected body align with electors' interests (Pitkin, 1967). A substantively representative body passes laws or resolutions that advance the interests of its constituents, and an official who substantively represents his or her district is one who writes or administers policy that aligns with constituents' preferences. In American politics this concept is usually associated with a minority representative improving welfare or education spending, aligning him- or herself with the
interests of co-ethnic constituents who demand more of these services (Owens, 2005). In the context of the United Nations, we would expect that Member States elected to the Security Council would align with other Members in their regional cohort on policy.

Though they are distinct concepts, descriptive representation and substantive representation are intimately linked as scholars investigate whether descriptive representation leads to substantive representation. The primary hypothesis in this research is that substantive representation improves when the elected body looks more like the electorate—that is, it is descriptively representative (Owens, 2005). In the American politics literature, the focus of this question is on the substantive policy gains for minorities when they are descriptively represented. In general, the conclusions from this debate are mixed, though the synthesis is that descriptive representation leads to substantive representation under certain circumstances. When the elected body is small, such as a school board or city council, the mere presence of descriptive representation leads to improvements in substantive representation for minorities. However, in larger, more professionalized bodies, like state and national legislatures, substantive representation only improves when minority representatives are incorporated into the hierarchy and given leadership positions (Preuhs, 2006). These effects are further conditioned on electoral rules. Meier, et al (2005) find that ward-based election rules that break up the population into districts result in better substantive representation than at-large rules. In any given district, candidates appeal to the median voter in order to win a majority. Ward-based districts produce better substantive representation because wards are more likely to have populations that have significant minority populations that bring candidates to those concerns.

In discussing the representativeness of the Security Council, then, it is useful to think of its descriptive representation and the effect that it has on substantive representation of the general
membership. The implications for the United Nations are that regional groupings ought to improve substantive representation over the alternative of having all 187 eligible states run for the ten available nonpermanent seats and that the presence of every region on the Security Council may achieve the goal of “equitable geographical representation” through “equitable geographical distribution.” There is room to be cautious, though. There are structural rules that hinder the amount of incorporation that any nonpermanent member can achieve on the Security Council to make it an effective advocate (Voeten, 2008; Russett, et al, 1996). Additionally, states may not find the geographic divisions as relevant identities (Forman and Greene, 2004), geographic groups may not be cohesive enough to promote a set of interests that can be represented (Schreuer, 1995), or, membership on the Security Council—though achieved through channels of representation—may not be viewed as bearing the responsibilities of representation (Hurd, 2008).

**Descriptive and Substantive Representation on the UNSC**

As discussed, the United Nations has undergone several changes that have influenced the descriptive representation of the Security Council. Two significant deficiencies, in particular, have been brought forward as evidence of the Council's lack of legitimacy and have motivated calls for reform to improve the representativeness of the Council. The first is the dominance of the Council by Western states (Russett, et al, 1996). Including the United States, Great Britain, and France along with the two nonpermanent Western European and Others group (WEOG) seats, Western states make up one-third of the Security Council while these states only make up 14 percent of the number of states in the United Nations. No other regional grouping is as over-represented on the Security Council as the WEOG. Eastern Europe is almost perfectly

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3 192 members in the United Nations minus the five Permanent Members (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, United States).
represented with respect to proportionality. With one seat, plus the Russian Federation, Eastern Europe makes up 13 percent of the Council while accounting for 12 percent of the Member States. All of the other regions are well under-represented in comparison to their relative membership: Africa, with three seats makes up 20 percent of the Council, yet 27 percent of the total membership. Asia, including China, has three seats, making its descriptive representation equivalent to Africa's. And, the Latin American and Caribbean group makes up 17 percent of the membership while only occupying 13 percent of the seats in the Council. This mismatch between the membership of the United Nations and its descriptive representation on the Security Council supported by the interpretation of the “equitable geographical distribution” clause has been the basis of reform recommendations to increase the size of the Security Council by groups most disadvantaged by the current configuration—the African and Asian groups (Fassbender, 2004; Russett, et. al, 1996).

The other gap in the descriptive representation of the Council comes from the lack of representation with respect to political, as opposed to geographic, organization (Russett, et. al, 1996). With their re-emergence as industrialized, economic powers, Germany and Japan have taken on a larger share of the United Nations budget. Germany and Japan each contribute more to the U.N. budget than every other Permanent Member, except the United States (Voeten, 2008; Russett, et. al, 1996). Because of their significant role in providing the resources necessary for the U.N. to carry out its mandate, Germany and Japan have asked for permanent seats on the Security Council (Drifte, 1998). In this regard, the United Nations Security Council is not descriptively representative according to political interests, rather than the geographic interests discussed above. However, the desire to build a consensus has turned this question into one based on geographically descriptive representation. Adding Germany and Japan as permanent
members to the Security Council would make the Security Council even more politically oriented toward Western, industrial interests. Thus, concurrent proposals have recommended that permanent seats be added according to equitable geographic distribution, with Latin America and Africa each receiving one permanent seat and Asia possibly receiving two (Japan and India) (Russett, et. al, 1996; Martin and Pigott, 1993).

While the evidence that the UNSC is descriptively unrepresentative according to its Charter, the motivation for reform on both of these fronts is that Member States believe that the current composition of the Security Council decreases the quality of substantive representation (Russett, et. al, 1996). If more states were allowed membership on the Council from other geographic groups, then the Security Council would adopt policy that more closely matched the interests of the membership at-large. In particular, Members in the Southern Hemisphere note that large shares of the peacekeeping operations that the Security Council approves are within their geographic sphere (Bourantonis, 1998; Canon, 1993). Thus, the UNSC is passing policy without more representative membership, possibly moving policy away from those groups' interests. The focus on substantive representation is further supported by the coalition between Germany and Japan and developing states on the issue of representation and membership in the Council. Germany and Japan, who have demonstrated the willingness to assume the responsibility of permanent members (O'Brien, 1999; Drifte, 1998), nonetheless support the inclusion of less capable states based on regional considerations as permanent members to support their case (Voeten, 2008). Meanwhile, few alterations to the regional grouping system have been put forth and reforms that do exist reinforce representation according to regional groupings, rather than undermine their relevance (Martin and Pigott, 1993). Calls for reform suggest that Members are interested in improving the substantive outputs of the Security Council.
Council. Adherence to the regional groupings as the primary form of representation suggests that geographic location is a sufficient basis for descriptive representation. From this, we should expect that descriptive representation according to geographic groupings supports substantive representation by the elected nonpermanent member.

*Hypothesis 1: Voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly between the elected, nonpermanent Security Council member and its geographic cohort are likely to be positively correlated.*

A positive correlation between the voting patterns of nonpermanent Security Council representatives and their fellow regional Members in the U.N. General Assembly indicate that the members share similar values and that the geographic region is a relevant descriptor for representation.

**LIMITS ON SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION**

*Structural Limitations*

A consistent voice in the debate on U.N. Security Council representativeness is on the need for improved substantive representation through improved descriptive representation. Yet, evidence from the literature on descriptive representation warrants that we pause on this prediction. Pantoja and Segura (2003) argue that minority representatives need to be incorporated into the elected body's leadership structure in order to have an effect on policy that leads to substantive gains for their co-ethnic electorate. Additionally, Pruehs (2006) validates this theory and shows that presence of minority representatives, alone, does not lead to substantive representation. With respect to representation on the Security Council, incorporation is not possible according to election rules; thus, regional representatives may not have the chance to
gain enough experience to counteract pressures from the Council's major powers (Voeten, 2004; 2001; Hurd, 2002)

Nonpermanent members to the Security Council are elected to two-year terms and cannot run for consecutive terms (Charter of the United Nations). This, alone, significantly reduces the level of incorporation of any state into the Security Council. But, while nonpermanent members have the disadvantage of having only temporary and sporadic presence on the Security Council, the Permanent Members have a representational advantage in that they may retain permanent delegations committed solely to matters on the Security Council's agenda. They do not need to be socialized into the rules or procedures and they have an information advantage above their capability advantages (Hurd, 2002; Russett, et. al, 1996). In context of the literature, the Permanent Members are fully incorporated into the Security Council and, therefore, ought to have an advantage in shaping policy over nonpermanent members. This should reduce the quality of substantive representation by nonpermanent members that is unrelated to their descriptive representation as regional delegates.

Additional structural features of the U.N. Security Council work against the nonpermanent members' role as regional representatives. Hurd (2002) notes that the notion of representation on the Security Council may be unnecessary given the opportunities for nonmembers to control the Security Council's agenda and to be present during debates relevant to their interests. Any member of the United Nations may request that an item of concern be placed on the Security Council's agenda and may, further, request that the Council remained seized of the matter effectively for as long as that member desires (Hurd, 2002). This allows any state, whether it is a member of the Council or not, to have control over the agenda. In this way, substantive representation concerns by the regional group decrease as any member within that
group could otherwise propose any agenda item it wishes. This effect is compounded by the relatively high frequency of invitations to non-Council members to formally participate in Security Council proceedings. Nearly one-third of Council meetings extend such invitations to non-Council members (Hurd, 2002). Because these states can participate formally in the debate, the need for substantive representation, again, decreases. Thus, as inferred from Preuhs (2006), there could be structural reasons why the regional groupings are not effective models for substantive representation in the U.N. Security Council.

**Geographical Salience and International Prestige**

The other challenge to predicting a relationship between descriptive and substantive representation is that members of the descriptive group need to find the identity relevant for their interests and their representation needs (Pantoja and Segura, 2003). While some structural rules may lead to a decreased relationship between a representative and its regional cohort in the UNSC, if geographic region is not a relevant source of identity, we should not expect there to be a relationship between the policy preferences of the regional representative and the region's members, all else equal. Instead, regional groupings may serve as some other tool or referent for nonpermanent member elections.

One reason why geographic region may not be a relevant source of identity leading to descriptive (and subsequently substantive) representation is that geographic regions are not strong political identities and that states may identify with more cohesive caucusing groups within the United Nations General Assembly (Forman and Greene, 2004; Bourantonis, 1998; Schreuer, 1995). This “surrogate representation” (Mansbridge, 2003) leads states to seek to represent other coalitions such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Democracy Caucus, the Non-Aligned Movement, or the Group of 77. Each of these groups are active in
lobbying and drafting resolutions within the United Nations and serve as important veto groups in a measure's approval (Forman and Green, 2004; Bourantonis, 1998). Thus, while states may be elected to the Security Council based on the norm of regional representation (Daws, 1999), states may actually substantively represent constituencies outside their district. Therefore, it may be reasonable to expect substantive representation according to political grouping, as opposed to geographic grouping.

If Member States focus more on surrogate representation than descriptive representation based on geographical region, then reforms that increase membership according to the current regional groupings may not produce the desired effect of improved representation on the Security Council. Conversely, if members are motivated by political alignments more than regional alignments, reforms to make the Council more substantively representative on this dimension may require careful consideration of what “equitable geographical distribution” requires.

A second reason why regional geographic distribution may not provide a basis for descriptive and substantive representation is that Member States may not view their role on the Security Council as being representative of any interests other than their own (Hurd, 2008). There are substantial material and symbolic benefits to being a member of the Security Council, which makes competition for the comparatively few seats costly and intense (Malone, 2000). Kuziemko and Werner (2006) show that during their tenure, states' foreign aid receipts from the United Nations, the United States and UNICEF (a U.S.-controlled arm of the U.N.) increase, providing material incentives for states to constantly seek election to the Security Council. Further, voting in the Security Council is highly strategic and nonpermanent members may be further courted by Permanent Members attempting to secure votes (Voeten, 2001).
Beyond the material benefits, members of the Security Council earn additional influence through the prestige of being on the Security Council (Hurd, 2002; Malone, 2000). In this case, regional allocation of seats may be a means to improve the chances of election to the Security Council. There are 33 members of the Latin American and Caribbean group, which has two seats on the Security Council. In any given year, this gives a member of the Latin American and Caribbean group a one in 31 chance of being elected (approximately 3.2 percent). Compared to the five in 177 chance of being elected if the system were at-large (approximately 2.8 percent), the state seeking election from the regional group has a slightly better probability of being seated, without taking into the consideration the norms of nominating “slates” of candidates (Malone, 2000). Given the electoral advantages of regional groupings, it may be reasonable to expect that Members will continue to advocate reform on the basis of regional groupings while increases in Security Council membership from reforms improve their probability of serving on the Council. If this is the case, we should not expect there to be a relationship between descriptive and substantive representation in nonpermanent member selection.

Though there are a number of reasons to be apprehensive about finding descriptive representation in the U.N. Security Council nonpermanent members, there are also reasons to be optimistic. As Malone (2000) details, candidates are highly strategic in deciding when to run for a seat on the Council because running is often costly as candidates court delegations with promises, side-payments, and bribes (Hurd, 2002). Within this, though, regional groupings have the opportunity to nominate worthy candidates. Further, states that seek to have repeated seatings on the Security Council will have to demonstrate their commitment to substantive, collective interests (Malone, 2000). This, incidentally, produces candidates that often meet both the Charter's membership requirements: capability to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security and regional representation (Agam, 1999). The material and political incentives for running repeatedly may induce states to more closely match the preferences of the region in order to get repeated nominations—reintroducing regional representation as a salient identity for substantive policy positions.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To test whether descriptive representation translates into substantive representation, this paper uses two different sets of empirical analyses. For both, substantive representation is measured by examining similarity in UN General Assembly votes. The analyses differ based on the sets of states studied. For the first set, all pairs of states are examined to determine whether regional affiliation significantly influences similarity in UNGA voting patterns, while the second looks only at pairs of states where the first state is a UN Security Council Member. The former data consists of all non-directed dyads from 1951-1996, while the latter is directed dyads from 1951-1996 where the first set is limited to UN Security Council Members. Data on UN Security Council Members is from the UN's website.

As discussed, the dependent variable for all empirical analysis is similarity between two states' UNGA voting record. This is a useful measure of substantive representation for a few reasons. First, while actual voting in the Security Council is often strategically motivated, UNGA voting is more likely to express true state preferences because of the lack of action associated with GA votes. Thus, these votes are a good way to determine state preferences over particular issues. Second, similarity, especially for the Security Council (SC)-all state analysis, allows for an examination of whether SC members actually share the same preferences over issues as other members. While we do not know how all states would vote on SC matters (nor do we know how SC members would vote on all SC matters since not all of these come to a vote), we do know
how they did vote on specific issues in the GA, and more importantly, we also know how other states voted, allowing us to determine whether the representatives have the same preferences over issues as their constituents. Finally, this measure provides a very direct test of substantive representation by analyzing whether two states have similar preferences over issues and more importantly whether SC members have similar preferences as their constituents. While most measures of substantive representation look at legislative behavior unique to a particular identity (e.g. do female legislators vote more for bills on women than male legislators), similarity of preferences looks at whether a representative and constituent actually share the same views over issues as opposed to whether a representative voted for a particular issue, which is likely to be influenced by other legislative dynamics. While the similarity variable does not measure whether substantive representation is carried out in terms of Security Council action, it does allow us to determine at a more basic level what factors influence when SC representatives have the same interests as non-SC members, a crucial first step for these SC representatives to then pursue actual representation through policy.

This paper uses Signorino and Ritter's (1999) S score to measures similarity in votes over a UN session, which is applied to a particular year. The S score has been used in other research on UNGA votes (Lai and Morey 2007) and provides a more sophisticated spatial representation of vote similarity than simple agreement. Specifically, it allows abstentions to be considered less of a dissent than voting the opposite of a state. So for agreement measures, if state A votes yes, State B votes no, and State C abstains, B and C are treated as being equally in disagreement with A. The S measure allows C's abstention to be interpreted as less of a disagreement with A than B. This measure has been used in other research on UNGA voting (Lai and Morey 2007).

The primary independent variables measure descriptive representation between two states.
These variables are meant to capture the degree of descriptive similarity between pairs of states. The first is whether the two states are in the same UN Security Council voting region. As previously discussed, for purposes of voting for non-permanent members, states are divided into regional groupings. If descriptive representation produces substantive representation, those voted to the Security Council from a particular region should share the same preferences as other states in the region. So, being part of a region (a descriptive identity) should produce similar preferences over issues (the dependent variable) leading to advocacy in the SC on behalf of the region's interests (substantive representation). Data on what states are in what regions is from the UN website. In general, countries' regional affiliations match those in the Correlates of War state numbering, though there are some exceptions. Specifically, Eastern and Western Europe are divided on primarily Cold War lines in the UN data. Also, advanced industrial democracies (with the exception of Asian ones) are placed with Western Europe (e.g. Israel, Australia, Canada, etc) as opposed to their geographic region. From this regional data, we produce four exclusive dichotomous variables. The first is whether two states in a dyad are in the same region and are not permanent UN Security Council members (US, UK, France, Russia, China). The second is whether a dyad is composed of a permanent security member and any state that is not a permanent SC member. The third is whether a dyad is composed of two permanent SC members. The fourth is whether a dyad is composed of two non-permanent members from different regions. This latter variable is the excluded category in all the empirical models.

The next set of descriptive representation variables are based on sharing similar identity characteristics. Similar to the idea that women or minority legislators are likely to advance the agenda of their respective groups; states with similar identity characteristics might share the same preferences and thus advance the agenda of that identity group within the UN Security
Council. Three sets of identity characteristics are analyzed: religion, ethnicity, and language. For each, a dichotomous variable is constructed which indicates whether a pair of states' highest percentage group is of the same religion, ethnicity, or linguistic group, producing three variables, one for each type of identity measure. Data is from Ellingsen (2000).

In addition to these measures of descriptive representation, several other variables are used to control for substantive interests between pairs of states that should influence preference similarity especially in terms of UNGA voting. The first is the joint regime type of a dyad. States with similar political systems are more likely to ally (Leeds 1999; Lai and Reiter 2000) and Gartzke even argues that the lack of conflict between democracies may be driven by their shared preferences (Gartzke 1997). Looking at the dimensions of UN voting, some find that democracies are also more likely to vote together (Voeten 2000; Kim and Russett 1996), so two measures of political similarity are employed. The first is a simple measure of joint democracy which is 1 if both states have a Polity IV score of 6 or greater and 0 otherwise. The second measure examines how far apart the two states are on the Polity scale. It is simply the absolute value of the difference between the two states' Polity IV scores with 0 indicating they share the same score and 20 indicating maximum difference.

The next measure is the similarity in development levels. Again, research on examining UN votes has found that wealthier states tend to vote together (Voeten 2000; Kim and Russett 1996) and recent research has begun to postulate a capitalist peace instead of a democratic peace (Gartzke 2007). Similar to regime type, states at similar levels of development are likely to have similar preferences over not only economic issues that might arise, but may view international politics in general through the lens of their economic class (e.g. the classic North South divide). Three measures are use to gauge similarity in economic interests. The first attempts to directly
capture similarity in development levels. It is the natural log of the absolute difference between two state's GDP/capita. So a score of 0 indicates that both states have the same level of development and increasing positive values indicate a divergence in development level. The next measure examines how open the state's economy is to trade. Open economic states should have similar preferences given their shared interest in maintaining open international markets. This is again measured as the absolute difference between the two states' openness measures. Openness is measured as a state's total trade divided by its GDP. The final economic variable is the degree of trade dependence between the two states. High levels of trade and dependence may shape the preferences of states and align their interests given their intertwined economies. Unlike the other measures, this is not measured as the absolute difference; rather it is the lower of the two state's trade dependence score. Trade dependence is total trade between the two states divided by each state's GDP. This variable is measured as the lower of the two states' value as opposed to the absolute difference because similarity is likely to be based on how dependent the two state's economies are on each other. So two states that are not dependent on each other's economies (score of 0 for both) are not likely to have similar preferences because of this lack of trade dependence. Conversely, two states that are heavily dependent on each other are likely to have aligned preferences given how important one state's economy is for the others. Data for all three variables is from Gleditsch (2002).

In addition to economic similarity between states, this paper also controls for security similarity. First, a variable indicating whether two states are in an alliance together or not is included. Allies should have similar preferences given their shared security fates. This variable is coded 1 if the Correlates of War alliance data indicates that had any type of alliance. A second variable examines the differences in power between two states. Similar to development level,
states with similar levels of power are likely to have similar preferences. A state's level of power ought to influence what it can do internationally, which in turn is likely to structure their preferences over issues. More powerful states are likely to seek greater freedom and less restrictions given their advantage in unregulated interactions while less powerful states are likely to align together to bind these more powerful states. This variable is simply the relative capability difference between the two states in a dyad, measured as the stronger states Combined Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) score from the COW material capabilities data divided by the sum of the two states' CINC score, producing a score of .5 to 1, with .5 indicating parity and 1 indicating complete disparity. A third measure is based on whether two states share a common international foe. States that share a common source of conflict may share preferences either because their disagreement with the same state indicates a shared view of international politics or their shared disagreement leads them to align on issues against the common foe (e.g. enemy of my enemy). This variable is coded as the number of shared militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as coded by the COW MID data for the two states against a shared opponent. A fourth variable is simply whether the two states experienced a MID in the year prior to the measure of the dependent variable. Again, similar to the previous variable, a MID might indicate divergent preferences that led to the MID or the MID may cause states to diverge over an issue because of their shared security concerns about the other side. A final set of variables is to control for Cold War alignments. One variable is whether a pair of states is aligned with the US. They do not need to be aligned with each other, but they need to share an alliance with the US. For example, a dyad composed of a member of NATO and the RIO Pact would be coded as sharing the US as an ally though they are in different alliances. Also, any US alliance dyad is included as a 1 in this measure. In addition, a Soviet bloc variable is used. This measure is
constructed identically to the US alliance variable. A variant of this variable uses the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as the basis for the Eastern Bloc as opposed to shared Soviet alliance as several prominent Eastern bloc states like China and Vietnam did not have formal alliance with the Soviets.

Because this analysis is based on cross-sectional time series data, certain statistical issues need to be addressed. The first is temporal autocorrelation within each panel. To account for this, a lag dependent variable is included in the model. The other problem is heteroskedastic variance in the error terms across and within the panels. To address this problem, two approaches are used. The first is simply to cluster the standard errors based on the dyad and apply Huber-White standard errors. The other is to use Panel Corrected Standard errors. A third problem that is checked is the lack of a true continuous variable as the S score ranges from -1 to 1. To check that this is not biasing our results, Tobit models are analyzed.

One final issue that needs to be addressed is the nature of UNGA voting data. There is lots of variance in the nature of issues covered in the UNGA, ranging from political issues (e.g. condemning the use of force by a state) to membership issues (e.g. admitting new members) to administrative issues (e.g. passing the budget). Some of these votes are likely to be less useful for distinguishing the preferences of states. To address this problem, different sets of UN votes are used in addition to all the votes. First, the votes are classified as close or not close votes. Votes that pass by less than a 65% majority are considered close votes and are the only ones included for determining preference similarity. The second approach is to subject code each vote and use only votes on particular issues. For this paper, three subject codes are analyzed. Analysis is done on security votes, economic votes, and votes about a government's treatment of its citizens.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Table 1 presents the results of the non-directed dyad data from 1951-1996. The five models differ on the votes used to calculate the dependent variables, which is why the number of cases varies across models as the number of missing cases varies by which votes are used. The regional measure of descriptive representation for the non permanent SC members (Joint Region) is statistically significant. Compared to dyads of states in different regions, dyads compared of states in the same region have a higher vote similarity. The substantive effect varies across models with the smallest effect for all votes, a .011 increase for a variable that ranges from -1 to 1, to close votes, with a .087 increase. This effect is relatively small substantively as it represents less than 5% of the range of the dependent variable. Looking at the similarity with the permanent members reveals perhaps more similarity between non-permanent members in general as compared to across region compared to similarity between non-permanent and permanent members and between permanent members. For both of these variables, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, indicating that permanent members have lower similarity amongst themselves and with non-permanent members, compared to non-permanent members from other regions. Also, the largest effect size across all size models for these two variables is more substantively relevant with a .2 difference (about 10% of the range of the dependent variable) for similarity between permanent and non-permanent and .187 for joint permanent member dyads for economic votes.

These results suggest two things. First, representation (as measured by similarity of preferences) is greater between non-permanent members compared to any combination that involves permanent members. There is a disjuncture between the similarity of votes for permanent members and everyone else, suggesting the importance of having non-permanent
members on the SC for providing representation on it. This disjuncture in similarity could be for a variety of reasons including the global interests of the permanent members that may often lead them into conflict with other states in the UN who may seek to resist the expansion of foreign powers into their regions. The other implication of this finding is that states in the same region do appear to have greater levels of similarity compared to other UN dyad member pairings and thus possibly provide better substantive representation for members in their region, though the substantive difference across regions for non-permanent SC members is not substantively large. However, these results are suggestive that descriptive representation based on region produces substantive representation and this effect is even more pronounced when compared to representation by the permanent SC members.

The results for the other measures of descriptive representation are mixed across the models. Only Joint Ethnicity is consistently signed in the right direction but it is only significant in three of the five models (and significant at the .1 level in a fourth model) and the effect size is very small with the largest coefficient being .019 (or about 1% of the range of the dependent variable). Joint language is negative and significant in two models and positive and significant at the .1 level in one model. It appears that states sharing the same language have dissimilar preferences over security issues. The joint religion variable is positive and significant for two models and negative and significant for one model. When there is similarity in preferences appears to be based on the issue of the votes. For both of these variables, the effect sizes are small with the largest being .016. One explanation for this lack of similarity and possible substantive representation based on similar identities is the variance in types of states with similar identity characteristics. Evidence of this is based on the type of votes where identity either produces similarity or differences in UN voting. For example, states with similar religions
have less vote similarity on economic issues. Looking at the data, there is large variance in levels of economic development across states with similar religions. States whose dominant religion is Christianity have GDP/capita that range in the 100s to the 10,000s of dollars. While identity may produce similar interests for groups within states, across states, the effect of similar identities on policy preferences is likely mitigated by other substantive interests.

As for the variables that measure indicators of substantive interests on issues that should produce similar preferences and thus representation, most perform as expected, though there are some surprise findings. First, the effect of regime type is not completely as expected. The polity difference variable is negative and significant as expected. Going from a dyad of identical regimes to one of completely dissimilar regimes produces a change in the S score of .08 (for all votes) to .38 (for important votes). The odd finding is for joint democracy which is actually negative and significant for all the models with the largest effect being about .1 for votes about economic issues. While the coefficient is the opposite of the predicted direction, this variable cannot be considered outside the context of the polity difference variable. For example, comparing two very democratic states (each scoring a 10 on the combined Polity scale) and a very democratic (10) and very autocratic (-10) states voting record based on their regime type alone produces the result that the democratic states have a more similar voting record. While the effect of joint democracy is negative, this effect is mitigated by the larger negative effect for the difference in Polity scores for the democratic and autocratic state. So, states with similar regimes are more likely to vote together, but of these similar regimes, jointly democratic regimes are less likely to do so. This finding may again be driven by the different priorities of democratic states, including development levels, as suggested by the large coefficient for the economic issue votes. Looking at the data, democratic states also have a tremendous range in GDP/capita, suggesting
that some while regime type does influence similarity in preferences, other issues may ultimately trump the effect of similar regime institutions.

Turning to the security interest variables, there are mixed findings across these variables. First, the dyadic measure of relative capabilities was negative and significant in one model (as expected) and positive and significant in two models. For close votes and votes on domestic politics, states at equal levels of power were likely to have lower levels of similarity, while the opposite is found for security votes, where those at parity are found to have more similar voting profiles. These findings highlight two common themes found so far. The issues used to examine voting matter. Level of power matters in terms of similarity of voting for security votes but for domestic votes, parity actually produces lower similarity. The other theme is that within one measure of interest, states are likely to vary on other dimensions of interest. For example, during the Cold War, while the US and Soviet Union had similar levels of power, they likely had stark differences on UN votes on domestic issues such as human rights.

The alliances variable performs as expected. The coefficient is positive and significant. Allies are more likely to have similar voting records in the UN and thus should be better representatives of each other in the UNSC than non-allies. This is not a surprising finding though the effect of this variable is small, with coefficients similar in size to that of the joint region variable. The odd finding is looking at the results for the Joint US and Joint Soviet allies variables. With the exception of close votes, states that are allied with the US are likely to have dissimilar voting records with each other. The expected effect exists for close votes, suggesting that American allies may share similar preferences for more controversial UN policies. However, the heterogeneity in US allies may also account for this finding. American allies in the developing world (the Rio pact members) may have different preferences from their more developed world
counterparts (e.g. NATO). Allies of the Soviet Union again only appear to have similar voting records on close votes and domestic votes. For the other vote types, the variable is not significant. The joint CMEA variable (not presented) performs better and is positive and significant in all models, though the effect is small.

The similarity of threat variables again produced mixed findings. Whether two states experienced a militarized dispute has the expected effect and is generally significant though the size of the coefficient is small. The other threat variable, the number of shared militarized disputes against a third state is generally in the opposite of the expected direction. Again, for close votes, it is positive and significant, but it is negative for all other vote types. Dyads with high numbers of MIDs against a third state have higher voting similarity on close votes but lower similarity on other types of votes. One factor that may be influencing this variable is the fairly rare occurrences of MIDs so most of the values of this variable are 0 with major power dyads accounting for a large portion of these cases. As demonstrated by the permanent SC member variables (who happen to also be the major powers for the period covered until 1992), major powers are likely to have lower similarity scores with each other and other UN members.

As for the economic measures of interest, the results are again mixed. The difference in GDP/capita is variable is negative and significant as expected. Dyads of differing development levels have dissimilar voting records. The traditional North-South cleavage appears to have an effect on voting similarity and thus on representation suggesting that states may be better represented by states within their own economic grouping. The effect of this variable going from 2 standard deviations below to above the mean is modest, with a small effect of .05 and a large effect of about .25 (again, a little over 10% of the range of the dependent variable). Similarly, the level of dyadic trade dependence is correctly signed but only significant in three of the models.
Dyads marked by higher levels of mutual trade dependence have higher voting similarities. The effect size is small given that dyad trade dependence is generally small. Again, going from two standard deviations below to above yields a change of about .018, though if you go to the maximum value (which is absurdly in the tails of the distribution) yields an effect size of .8 (or almost 50% of the range of the variable).

The other economic interest variable, economic openness, is significant but in the opposite of the expected direction. It is positive, indicating that the greater the difference in economic openness, the greater the level of similarity in UNGA voting. One explanation may be that the inclusion of the difference in GDP/capita variable is capturing the effect of this variable. Regardless, the small coefficient coupled with the small range of this variable means the effect is small. Using the two standard deviation comparison yields a maximum change of .02, while using the maximum value of the difference in openness produces only a .123 change, which is large but is based on the extreme tail of a distribution. Finally, as expected, the lag dependent variable is significant and positive with a fairly large effect across all the models. The results for the panel corrected standard errors and tobit models are essentially the same. The R squared of all the models is high, though this is likely due to the inclusion of the lag dependent variable.

Table 2 presents the results of the directed dyad models where the first state is only UN Security Council members. Unlike the data used for table 1, the set of cases is much smaller as these are not all pairs of states but only pairings between a Security Council member (for the years it was on the council) and all other states. Looking at the descriptive representation variables, there is one difference. The effect of joint region for non-permanent members is only positive and significant in one model (close votes) and actually negative and significant in one model (economic votes). So while, states in regions generally have higher similarity and thus are
likely to be better representatives of each others' substantive interests, this does not appear to be the case for those non-permanent members who are actually voted into office. They appear to only have higher degrees of similarity for close votes, though the effect is small at .048 (or about 2.5% of the range of the dependent variable). One explanation for this finding could be the politics involved in getting a state onto the Security Council, which often involves permanent member influence. Thus, those states that do make it on the SC, may actually be those that are less likely to substantively represent their regions because of the politics involved in getting onto the Security Council.

Beyond this finding, the findings for the other descriptive representation variables are very similar to the other results. First, the lack of similarity with and among the permanent members still holds. Compared to dyads of non-permanent SC members from other regions, any dyad involving a permanent member has a lower voting similarity. This vote difference is potentially large for economic votes where the difference again is around .2 (or 10% of the range of the dependent variable). The identity variables are again mixed in their level of significance across models with Joint Religion producing the same results. Joint language is now positive and significant for economic and domestic votes, while joint ethnicity is negative and only significant at the .1 level for 2 models. Again, the effect of descriptive representation by state based on identity factors does not appear to translate consistently into substantive representation. The closest finding is for sharing a same language when the votes are on economic or domestic issues.

As for the substantive interest variables, the regime variables (Polity Difference and Joint Democracy) produce the same findings as the all dyad model in table 1. The effect of relative capability is again mixed across models, while the alliance variable is again positive and
significant across all models, though with a very modest effect size. Similarly, the effect of the US and Soviet ally variables are consistent with the results in Table 1, with similarity only being positive and significant for close votes. Finally, the joint threat variable is again negative but only significant in one model, while the effect of a MID between the two states in a dyad still has a negative effect on similarity and is generally statistically significant. Finally, the economic interest variables all perform the same as in the all dyad models of table 1.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The goal of this paper was to determine whether descriptive representation at the international level produced substantive representation within executive style councils of international organizations. While other research has examined whether states are represented in general assemblies of international organizations, like the European Parliament, this paper looks at whether there is representation when states elect representatives to a powerful decision-making body with limited membership. These results suggest that regional as opposed to identity based descriptive representation has some potential to provide substantive representation, but this does not appear to be the case uniformly for those regional members that have actually been part of the UN Security Council. For those states voted on the Security Council, their similarity in voting preferences in the UNGA with other states in their region is conditioned by the types of votes, a similar finding for the identity measures of descriptive representation, suggesting that substantive representation may occur for some issues but not others.

While the effect of being in the same region was limited and conditional, it does appear that any non-permanent member of the SC is a better representative than a permanent member. Permanent members not only have lower voting similarity records with non-permanent members, they also have lower voting records with each other. This suggests that reforms that call for
adding more SC members based on region would increase representation relative to the permanent members but not necessarily relative to existing representation based on states with similar substantive interests. Also, reforms that call for more permanent members need to consider whether the effect for permanent members is because the current five are also major powers or whether being a permanent member shifts the preferences of states. Regardless, it is not clear that adding new permanent members ought to be along regional lines in order to boost representation. Adding India may not increase representation for Asian states compared to representation for African states. Rather, states ought to think about representation more along substantive divisions with economic development being one of the most consistent sources of difference. So would newly developed states really represent poorer states within their region or would their substantive interests align them with developed states in other regions? The results of this research suggest the latter is likely.

Finally, looking at tables 1 and 2 but replacing joint region (non-permanent) with the actual regions produces some interesting results. For all dyads, African and Asian dyads have higher similarity across all vote types, though this effect is greatly reduced when only looking at those states actually voted into the UNSC. For Africa, there is similarity only for close votes and an actual reduction in three of the other four vote types. Asian states only have significantly higher similarity for close and security votes. The same pattern holds for Latin America which for all dyads has higher similarity for four of five vote types but no significant increase and a significant decrease when the cases are those states that actually served on the UNSC paired with other LA states. The effect for East and West Europe is mixed across both sets of cases. These results coupled with the other results also suggest that if representation is the goal of reform, adding more members (permanent or non-permanent) may not be the solution, rather the selection
mechanism for the non-permanent members may need to be changed as states in similar regions ought to have higher voting similarity but this is not born out when comparing actual UNSC members to states in their regions.
Table 1: OLS Models on Non-Directed Dyads, 1951-1996 on S Score of UNGA Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Votes</th>
<th>Close Votes</th>
<th>Security Votes</th>
<th>Economy Votes</th>
<th>Domestic Votes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Region</strong> (nonP5)</td>
<td>.011***</td>
<td>.087***</td>
<td>.032***</td>
<td>.044***</td>
<td>.038***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P5-Other Dyad</strong></td>
<td>-.051***</td>
<td>-.041***</td>
<td>-.108**</td>
<td>-.204***</td>
<td>-.120***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint P5 Dyad</strong></td>
<td>-.047**</td>
<td>-.093*</td>
<td>-.086*</td>
<td>-.187*</td>
<td>-.121**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.046)</td>
<td>(.040)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Language</strong></td>
<td>-.004***</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.016**</td>
<td>.011+</td>
<td>-.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Religion</strong></td>
<td>-.000</td>
<td>.017***</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.016***</td>
<td>.004*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*(.001)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
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<td><strong>Joint Ethnicity</strong></td>
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<td>.019**</td>
<td>.012***</td>
<td>.011+</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Democracy</strong></td>
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<td>-.014***</td>
<td>-.032***</td>
<td>-.102***</td>
<td>-.065***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Polity Difference</strong></td>
<td>-.002***</td>
<td>-.005***</td>
<td>-.004**</td>
<td>-.008**</td>
<td>-.006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
<td>(.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relative Capab.</strong></td>
<td>.002 (.002)</td>
<td>.014+ (.008)</td>
<td>-.010* (.04)</td>
<td>-.006 (.008)</td>
<td>.025***</td>
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<td><strong>Allies</strong></td>
<td>.019***</td>
<td>.041**</td>
<td>.049***</td>
<td>.069***</td>
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<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LN (GDP/Cap Diff)</strong></td>
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<td>-.012***</td>
<td>-.009***</td>
<td>-.023***</td>
<td>-.020***</td>
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<td><strong>Open Dif</strong></td>
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<td>.004</td>
<td>.011***</td>
<td>.016***</td>
<td>.014**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
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<td><strong>Low Trade Dep</strong></td>
<td>.180+ (.099)</td>
<td>3.93*** (.832)</td>
<td>.284 (.836)</td>
<td>.137 (.458)</td>
<td>1.30*** (329)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Threat</strong></td>
<td>-.006***</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>-.009***</td>
<td>-.022***</td>
<td>-.010***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MID</strong></td>
<td>-.016*</td>
<td>-.073**</td>
<td>-.022+</td>
<td>-.034+</td>
<td>-.054***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(.021)</td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.019)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Joint US Ally</strong></td>
<td>-.012***</td>
<td>.058***</td>
<td>-.033***</td>
<td>-.075***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>Joint Soviet Ally</strong></td>
<td>.005 (.05)</td>
<td>.141**</td>
<td>.020 (.013)</td>
<td>.008 (.021)</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>Lag DV</strong></td>
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<td>.581***</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
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<td>.437***</td>
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<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.006)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
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N=287978, F=28361***, R2=.794  
N=215539, F=4633***, R2=.678  
N=286128, F=6787***, R2=.55   
N=233957, F=2410***, R2=.316  
N=270274, F=4235***, R2=.469  

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, +p<.1 Clustered Std Errors in parentheses
Table 2: OLS Models on Directed Dyads where StateA is a Security Council Member, 1951-1996 on S Score of UNGA Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Votes</th>
<th>Close Votes</th>
<th>Security Votes</th>
<th>Economic Votes</th>
<th>Domestic Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint Region (nonP5)</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.048***</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>-.018*</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5-Other Dyad</td>
<td>-.040***</td>
<td>-.013+</td>
<td>-.112***</td>
<td>-.189***</td>
<td>-.100***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint P5 Dyad</td>
<td>-.047***</td>
<td>-.071***</td>
<td>-.109***</td>
<td>-.206***</td>
<td>-.117***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Language</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.070***</td>
<td>.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Religion</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.038***</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.032***</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Ethnicity</td>
<td>-.008+</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.037+</td>
<td>-.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>-.037***</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>-.072***</td>
<td>-.117***</td>
<td>-.104***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Difference</td>
<td>-.004***</td>
<td>-.007***</td>
<td>-.008***</td>
<td>-.013***</td>
<td>-.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Capab.</td>
<td>-.030***</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>.023***</td>
<td>.088***</td>
<td>.057***</td>
<td>.027*</td>
<td>.050***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN (GDP/Cap Diff)</td>
<td>-.012***</td>
<td>-.028***</td>
<td>-.025***</td>
<td>-.052***</td>
<td>-.032***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Dif</td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td>.030***</td>
<td>.025***</td>
<td>.018*</td>
<td>.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Trade Dep</td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>4.26***</td>
<td>1.65***</td>
<td>4.31***</td>
<td>2.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Threat</td>
<td>-.003*</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>MID</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>-.109***</td>
<td>-.039+</td>
<td>-.090*</td>
<td>-.058**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint US Ally</td>
<td>-.017***</td>
<td>.061***</td>
<td>-.018***</td>
<td>-.050***</td>
<td>-.019***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Soviet Ally</td>
<td>.015**</td>
<td>.067*</td>
<td>.040**</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lag DV</td>
<td>.831***</td>
<td>.583***</td>
<td>.615***</td>
<td>.396***</td>
<td>.625***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.272***</td>
<td>.260***</td>
<td>.511***</td>
<td>.994***</td>
<td>.550***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, +p<.1 Clustered Std Errors in parentheses

N=42065 F=8181*** R2=.846
N=32271 F=1315*** R2=.45
N=41823 F=3122*** R2=.635
N=35253 F=702*** R2=.402
N=39689 F=2187*** R2=.615
Works Cited


