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Amanda Abigail Licht

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EDUCATION

University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA

Ph.D. in Political Science

Expected May 2010

Major Fields: International Relations and Methodology

Minor Field: Comparative Politics

Dissertation: “Private Incentives, Public Outcomes: The Role of Target Political Incentives in Foreign Policy Success.”

Committee: Brian Lai (Chair), Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Frederick Boehmke, Cameron Thies, Michaela Hoenicke

Abstract: When do foreign influence attempts succeed in obtaining concessions from targeted states, and why do they so often fail? Powerful states employ a broad range of foreign policy tools in their dealings with other countries. The effectiveness of some of the most common strategies – foreign aid and economic sanctions – has, however, proven notoriously questionable. This project seeks an explanation for the patchy record of such external influence attempts in the political incentives of targeted leaders. If we are to understand the process of foreign policy success and failure we must consider both the effect of intervention on leader survival and the domestic cost of providing concessions. In both respects, the type of sanction interacts with targets’ domestic context. Dynamic trends in leadership experience and political support, strength of political opposition, and institutions of representation condition both the probability of sanctions’ effectively tapping into target incentives and the difficulty of actually providing the concession. My theoretical framework and empirical analyses push beyond the conceptualizations of leader incentives and foreign policy in the extant literature in several ways. The framework unites positive and negative strategies rather than treating them as divergent phenomena. I also break open the traditional dichotomy between democratic and autocratic regimes, modeling dynamic political processes while explicitly incorporating the role of political opposition. I pursue a multi-stage modeling technique to more faithfully represent the strategic encounters between sending and targeted states and further our understanding of the interplay between external demands and domestic political incentives. Both theoretically and methodologically, the project contributes to the burgeoning literature on strategic incentives and political elites in international relations scholarship.

University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND

B.A. Political Science and Honors

2005

Honors: Summa Cum Laude

Honors Thesis: “Two Paths to Democracy: Exploring the Differences in the Process of Democratization in Cases of Internally-Trigged versus Militarily-Instigated Transitions”

TEACHING INTERESTS

International Relations: Introduction to International Relations, American foreign policy, Foreign Policy, Domestic politics and IR, International conflict, Theoretical approaches in the study of world politics

Methodology: OLS regression, Limited dependent variables, Event history analysis, Data management and presentation, Introduction to empirical political research, Writing political science

AWARDS

- Presidential Fellowship, University of Iowa **2005-present**
 - Methods Fellowship to attend summer methods meeting **2009**
 - Selected paper presentation for Journeys in World Politics Conference **2008**
 - Phi Beta Kappa **2005**
 - Starcher Prize for Outstanding Presentation, University of North Dakota Undergraduate Research Conference **2005**
 - Lloyd Omdahl Award for Political Science Writing **2003 and 2004**
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

Teaching Assistant – “American Foreign Policy.” **Spring 2008**
Conducted discussion sections, graded exams and weekly assignments

Teaching Assistant – “Introduction to International Relations.” **Fall 2006, 2007**
Conducted discussion sections, designed weekly quizzes and exercises, graded exams and research papers

Teaching Assistant – “The Politics of Terrorism” **Spring 2007**
Graded weekly papers

Research Assistant – Professor Sarah McLaughlin Mitchell **Summer 2006**
Data gathering, coding and manipulation

Graduate Association of Political Science, President **2007-2008**
Elected one-year term, organized and refereed meetings; appointed and served on committees to draft reports of graduate student positions and recommendations for revision of the comprehensive exam process, the first year curriculum and the pursuit of external funding opportunities; attended faculty meetings to represent graduate student views

University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota

Student Teacher – “Developing World Views” **Spring 2005**
Worked with two other students to develop a syllabus with an aim towards developing critical thought and self-reflection, led discussion section with 20 underclassmen, prepared and delivered short lectures, graded written work and assigned final grades

Writing Tutor **2004-2005**
Worked one-on-one with honors and “learning community” students to improve grammar, style and argument

PUBLICATIONS

“Coming Into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Tenure”, forthcoming February 2010 in the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Abstract: Donors are more likely to send aid to leaders facing elevated risks of losing power, but targets’ ability to benefit from this assistance is conditioned by regime type and political processes. The institutionalization of winning coalitions’ loyalty across regime type follows opposite patterns, supporting opposite temporal dynamics across regime types. Democratic leaders’ coalitions are firmest immediately after taking office, and aid is of most assistance to them then. As competition and dissatisfaction grows, aid becomes a political liability. In small winning coalition systems, however, coalitions become more solid over time, facilitating increasing benefits from aid. Without a firm coalition, however, external resources are destabilizing to autocratic leaders. Analysis of 4,692 leader years from 1960-2001 using a censored probit model supports these expectations.

Change Comes with Time: Interpreting Nonproportional Hazards in Event History Analyses, under review

Abstract: While political methodologists have provided us ample notice of both the problem of non-proportional hazards and the means of correcting it, less attention has been paid to the post-estimation consequences. The inclusion of time interactions in our models is more than a statistical fix: these corrections alter the substantive meaning and interpretation of results. Framing the issue as a specific case of multiplicative modeling, I provide detailed discussion of the problem of non-proportional hazards and present an appropriate means of interpreting both the substantive impact and the significance of variables whose impact may change over time.

Private Benefits, Public Concessions? Leaders' Instrumental Incentives and Strategic Concessions to Aid

Abstract: Some of the most recent articles on foreign aid and policy concessions suggest nondemocratic (small winning coalition) states will be more willing to grant concessions. While there is some evidence that allocation is consistent with this expectation and that autocratic states do converge more with the U.S. voting records in the UNGA, these theories are built upon the untested assumption that the personal benefit such leaders enjoy as a result of receiving aid determines the shifts in policy. This paper tackles the missing link between leader benefit and policy convergence, beginning with an event-history model of leader failure to produce estimates of expected reduction in the risk of losing office for different kinds of aid-receiving leaders. Regressing this measure on political affinity scores tests whether expected personal benefit drives changes in policy.

Evaluating the Prospects for Liberal Hegemony

Abstract: Systemic theory in international relations suffers from a dearth of cases on which to test divergent expectations. This limitation stems from the assumption of the major power system as the only appropriate case. Expanding the sample of systems using Lemke's (2002) regional coding scheme, this paper provides a test of Ikenberry's (2001) liberal hegemony theory on 8,368 dyad years within 20 African, Asian, Latin American and Middle Eastern systems. Results provide modest support for liberal hegemony arguments, but suggest overall that alternative logics also operate inside regional security systems.

Ensuring a Smooth Ride: Regional Hegemons and the Choice Between Bandwagoning and Balancing Dynamics

Abstract: Definitions of balancing and bandwagoning alliances presuppose that bandwagon alliances are formed only by states with war on their minds; the systemic consequences of bandwagoning dynamics cannot be objectively evaluated if we begin by assuming that bandwagoning states mean harm. In this article, a definition of bandwagoning and balancing wherein the intentions of states can be positive is forwarded. In this sense, bandwagon alliances occur just as frequently as balancing alliances. A logistic regression of dyadic conflict within 20 regional security systems suggests that systems dominated by bandwagoning dynamics may be significantly more peaceful than those where balancing predominates.

In Whose Aid: Foreign Aid and the Stability of Regimes, with Brian Lai

Abstract: Allocation of development assistance constitutes one of the most common foreign policy decisions in favor of democratic development. Yet, the actual ability of aid monies to spur democratization remains unclear. Some blame mixed motives from sender states, others the devastated state of target economies. To the extent that aid is fungible, we should see it contributing to increased pursuit of *existing* elite goals, not necessarily to progress. The allocation of aid then, as Morgenthau (1962) noted, likely produces a solidification of the status quo. Using event history analysis, we evaluate the ability of foreign aid to insulate receiving regimes from internal crisis.

CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

American Political Science Association, Toronto, ON Canada

Paper Presentations 2009

“Coming Into Money: the impact of foreign aid on leader tenure”

“Change Comes with Time: interpreting nonproportional hazards in event history analysis”

Political Methodology Annual Summer Meeting, New Haven, CT

Poster Presentation 2009

“Change Comes with Time: Interpreting Nonproportional Hazards in Event History Analysis”

Midwest Political Science Association Annual Convention, Chicago, IL

Paper Presentations

“Private Benefits, Public Concessions?: Strategic Incentives and Foreign Aid” 2009

“Evaluating the Prospects for Liberal Hegemony” 2008

“Bandwagoning vs. Balancing Alliances in Regional Security Systems”

Round Table 2007

“Foreign Aid and the Stability of Regimes”, with Brian Lai

Journeys in World Politics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA

Paper Presentation 2008

“Coming Into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Tenure”

American Political Science Association Annual Convention, Chicago, IL

Poster Presentation 2007

“Ensuring a Smooth Ride: Regional Powers and the Virtues of Bandwagoning Vs. Balancing Alliance Dynamics”

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

American Political Science Association
Midwest Political Science Association

Society for Political Methodology
Peace Science Society

REFERENCES

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